NOTES, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION AND

NOTES, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY TO
Howard D. Grier,
Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944-1945
Corrections
Hubert Wangenheim was never an admiral during World War II, as incorrectly stated on
p. xvi (dramatis personae). He was promoted to Captain on 1 December 1943, and
became an admiral in the Federal German Navy in the mid-1950s. The author thanks Dr.
Werner Rahn for pointing out this error.
The quote on the dust jacket attributed to Mark R. Peattie is actually by Professor
Gerhard L. Weinberg.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank the anonymous readers of the manuscript for US Naval
Institute Press for their numerous helpful suggestions. I am also particularly indebted to
Dr. Werner Rahn for his comments.
Abbreviations
BA/BL
BA/K
BA/MA
Fst, avd M
GNR
GVK
HGr
IfZ
IMT, TMWC
KrA
KDB
KTB
Mst
NA
NavOpArch
OKH
OKW
Skl
TBJG
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde
Bundesarchiv Koblenz
Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv
Försvarsstaben, Marinavdelning (Swedish Defense Staff, Naval Section)
German Naval Records (at Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives)
Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion
Heeresgruppe
Institut für Zeitgeschichte
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
Kungl. Krigsarkivet, Stockholm
Krigsdagbok (War Diary)
Kriegstagebuch
Marinstaben (Swedish Naval Staff)
National Archives
Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard
Oberkommando des Heeres
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Seekriegsleitung
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
USSBS
US Strategic Bombing Survey
Introduction
1. Important works dealing with Finland's role in World War II include Earl Ziemke, The
German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1960); Ernst Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"
Operationsgebiet östliche Ostsee und der finnische-baltische Raum 1944
(Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961);
Peter Krosby, Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1940-1944: The Petsamo Dispute
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); Waldemar Erfurth, The Last Finnish
War, 1941-1944 (Washington: University Publications of America, 1979).
2. This debate is summarized in Martin Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore and German Steel,"
Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 21 (1973): 133-144.
3. Some major works on Sweden in World War II include Ziemke, The German
Northern Theater of Operations; Erik Boheman, På Vakt, Vol. 2, Kabinettssekreterare
under andra världskriget (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1964); Carl August Ehrensvärd, I rikets
tjänst: Händelser och människor från min bana (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1965); Wilhelm
Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War (Arthur Spencer trans.)
(London: Ernest Benn, 1977); Wilhelm Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939-1945
(Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1985); Carl-Axel Gemzell, "Tysk militär
planläggning under det andra världskriget: fall Sverige," Scandia, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1975):
198-248; Sveriges militära beredskap 1939-1945 (Carl-Axel Wangel ed.) (Köping:
Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982).
4. Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (R.H. Stevens trans.) (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1959).
5. The most recent biography, Peter Padfield, Dönitz, the Last Führer: Portrait of a Nazi
War Leader (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), contains much useful information, but is
marred by questionable psychoanalysis.
6. Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1951).
The sole biography of Schörner, Erich Kernmayr (Erich Kern pseud.),
Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schörner: Ein deutsche Soldatenschicksal (Oldendorf:
Schütz, 1976), contains little of use to the scholar.
7. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau
(Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973).
8. Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935-1945, 3 Vols. (Munich:
Bernard & Graefe, 1970-75).
9. Charles Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1990); Eric Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34 (New York:
Praeger, 1991); Keith Bird, Weimar, The German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of
National Socialism (Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1977); Keith Bird, Erich Raeder: Admiral
of the Third Reich (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Holger Herwig, Politics of
Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1976); Gerhard Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben:
Marineführung und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919-1944 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1978); Werner Rahn, “Kriegführung, Politik und Krisen—Die Marine
des Deutschen Reiches, 1914-1933,” Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik
1848-1985 (Deutsches Marine Institut and Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed)
(Herford: Mittler, 1985), 79-104; see also Rahn’s sections in Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed), vol. 6: Horst Boog et al,
Der globale Krieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990); Herbert Kraus, “Karl
Dönitz und das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” Ende des Dritten Reiches—Ende des
Zweiten Weltkriegs: Eine Perspektivische Rundschau (Hans-Erich Volkmann ed)
(Munich: Piper, 1995), 1-23; Douglas Peifer, The Three German Navies: Dissolution,
Transition, and New Beginnings, 1945-1960 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
2002).
10. Helmuth Forwick, "Der Rückzug der Heeresgruppe Nord nach Kurland,"
Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront 1944-1945 (Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1963).
11. Werner Haupt, Kurland: Die letzte Front—Schicksal für zwei Armeen (Bad
Nauheim: Podzun, 1959); Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 1941-1945 (Bad Nauheim:
Podzun, 1966); Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 1944/45 (Friedberg:
Podzun-Pallas, 1979); Franz Kurowski, Todeskessel Kurland: Kampf und Untergang der
Heeresgruppe Nord 1944/1945 (Wölfersheim-Berstadt: Podzun-Pallas, 2000).
12. Rudolf Kabath, “Die Rolle der Seebrückenköpfe beim Kampf um Ostpreussen, 19441945,” Abwehrkämpfe am Nordflügel der Ostfront; Kurt Dieckert and Horst Grossmann,
Der Kampf um Ostpreussen: Der umfassende Dokumentarbericht über das
Kriegsgeschehen in Ostpreussen (2nd ed.) (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1976); Otto Lasch, So
fiel Königsberg (2nd ed.) (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1977); Erich Murawski, Die Eroberung
Pommerns durch die Rote Armee (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1969).
Chapter 1: The Retreat: From Leningrad to Narva
1. Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I), Nr.
33408/40 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa," 18 Dec. 1940, in Hitlers
Weisungen für die Kriegführung, 1939-1945 (Walther Hubatsch ed.) (2nd Ed.)
(Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1983), 86.
2. OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I Op), "Nr. 441675/41 gKdos. Chefs.," 7 Oct. 1941, International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military
Tribunal, 1949) (hereafter cited as IMT, TMWC), 34: 425-27. See also Heeresgruppe
Nord/Ia, "Kriegstagebuch (hereafter cited as HGr Nord, KTB)," entries for 18 Sept. and
12 Oct. 1941, National Archives Microcopy T-311, Roll 53, Frames 7065327, 7065441
(hereafter T-311/53/7065327); "Besprechung des Chefs OKW mit Oberbefehlshaber der
Heeresgruppe Mitte am 25. Juli 1941," Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der
Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940-1945 (Percy Schramm ed.) (Frankfurt:
Bernard & Graefe, 1961) (hereafter OKW KTB), Vol. 1, Part 2, 1036. On Hitler's
intention to raze Leningrad, see Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims (New York: Norton,
1974), 2: 327, 392; Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier (Henry Picker ed.)
(3rd Ed.) (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1976), entry for 5 Apr. 1942, 192-93; Monologe im
Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944 (Werner Jochmann ed.) (Hamburg: Knaus, 1980),
entries for 25-26 Sept. 1941, 17-18 Oct. 1941, 29 Oct. 1941, 6 and 8 Aug. 1942, 71, 93,
116, 331, 334.
3. David Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2002), 78-80; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1983), 169.
4. During the winter of 1941-1942, the Soviets brought more than 360,000 tons of goods
into Leningrad via the ice roads, and evacuated over 500,000 people; Glantz, The Battle
for Leningrad, 144. Initially, the army group attempted to tighten the blockade by
seizing the railhead at Tikhvin and pushing to the Svir River to link up with Finnish
forces. The Germans hoped the Finns would push across the Svir and advance on
Tikhvin as well. But the Finns were reluctant to cross the pre-1940 Russo-Finnish
frontier, because this would justify Soviet claims that the location of the old border posed
a threat to Leningrad, and thus vindicate Soviet aggression in the Winter War of 19391940. Although the Germans briefly gained control of Tikhvin, the Soviets recaptured
the city in one of their first successful counteroffensives of the war; Verb. Stab Nord/Ia,
"Nr. 55/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 4 Sept. 1942, T-78/337/6292971-72; Glantz, The Battle for
Leningrad, 459; Earl Ziemke and Magna Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the
East (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1988), 147-48.
5. N. Komarov, "Operation Iskra," Soviet Military Review 1973 (No. 1), 44-46.
6. In mid-September 1943 the army group possessed only 7 serviceable tanks; Earl
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington: Center of
Military History, 1968), 197; "Besprechung beim Führer am 11.9.1943," gKdos.Chefs.,
T-311/77/7100293-95; Der Ob. der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 106/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Sept.
1943, ibid., Frame 7100287; HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7070854-60;
Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia/Id, "Aufstellung der Abgaben aus dem alten Bereich der H.Gr. Nord
seit dem 1.8.1943," 3 Nov. 1943, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (hereafter BA/MA), RH 19
III/5, 110-11.
7. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7071026.
8. This is one of the most extensively documented conferences of an Army Group North
commander with Hitler; Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 227/43 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Besprechungspunkte für den 30.12.43," 29 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/14, 107-09;
HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Dec. 43, T-311/57/7071536; Nr. 290, "Anruf O.B. an Chef,
30.12.43, 17.42 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 101; HGr Nord/ Ia, "Bericht über den
Vortrag des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers im Führerhauptquartier am 30.12.1943," 3 Jan.
1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/3, 35-38; "Besprechung des Führers mit Feldmarschall v.
Küchler am 30. Dezember 1943 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die
Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Helmut Heiber ed.)
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 519-524. An indication that Hitler seriously
considered the retreat is revealed in a letter Keitel prepared for Mannerheim, dated 31
Dec. 1943 but never dispatched, which announced that the Germans would withdraw to
the Panther Position in order to gain forces; "Der nördliche Kriegsschauplatz," Part 1, in
OKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part, 2, 12.
9. H Gr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1943, T-311/57/7071550-51; Nr. 296, "Anruf Chef
GenStab an Chef, 31.12.43, 10.45 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 104.
10. On 31 Dec. the army group warned Zeitzler that it could not hold its positions if the
Soviets attacked, and requested immediate approval for a retreat to the Panther Position;
H Gr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 232/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RH19 III/14, 133. A
week later the army group reported that in the last six months the number of divisions at
the front had been reduced by 40% (18 divisions); Anlage 1 zu Obkdo HGr Nord/Ia, Nr.
6/44 gKdos.Chefs. vom 7.1.1944, "Aufstellung über die Kräfteverschiebung aus dem
alten Bereich der H.Gr.Nord seit Juli 1943," ibid., 146. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 230/43
gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 31 Jan.
1943, T-78/337/6292937-944.
11. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 328-37; Ivan Fediuninskii, "The Feat of
Leningrad," Soviet Military Review, 1974, No. 1, 6. Fediuninskii commanded the Soviet
2nd Shock Army.
12. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7071863.
13. Emphasis in the original; ibid., 17 Jan. 1944, Frame 7072051.
14. Partisan detachments operating behind the front wreaked havoc by disrupting road
and rail communications, which considerably impeded the transfer of German units to
vital sectors. On 18 January alone over three hundred rail demolitions occurred in the
army group's sector; ibid., 18-21 and 23 Jan. 1944, Frames 7072099-103, 7072107,
7072121, 7072127, 7072135, 7072177, 7072215-17, 7072235, 7072237; HGr Nord/Ia,
"Nr. 15/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 20 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292925-26.
15. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 and 24 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072299-303, 7072349. Zeitzler
later informed Küchler that his visit came at a bad time, since Hitler was preoccupied
with other matters (the Allies landed at Anzio on 22 January); Nr. 355, "Anruf Chef an
Chef Gen Stab, 23.1.44, 11.05 Uhr," BA/MA, RH19 III/19, 179.
16. HGr Nord, KTB, 24 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072365, 7072385; H Gr Nord/Ia, Nr.
20/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 26.1.," 26 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH19
III/14, 178-79; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 24/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292911.
18th Army's fighting power had nearly disintegrated. On 10 Jan. its infantry combat
strength was nearly 58,000 men, but on 29 Jan. it had dropped to only 17,000; HGr
Nord/Ia, "Nr. 23/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Jan. 1944, T-78/337/6292916-17; HGr Nord,
KTB, 29 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072569.
17. Nr. 377, "Anruf Chef an Chef 18, 28.1.44, 20.00 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 207;
HGr Nord, KTB, 28 and 29 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072551, 7072581, 7072591-93; Nr.
379, "Anruf Chef an Chef 18, 29.1.44, 12.10 Uhr," BA/MA, RH 19 III/19, 209.
Küchler's about-face is especially interesting in view of a document in the army group's
Chefsachen files. The memorandum, presumably notes for his up-coming meeting with
Hitler, lists reasons for the success of the Soviet offensive: the army group had given up
10 divisions since July 1943; its front had been lengthened by 140 kilometers, requiring
the army group to transfer units to this area; insufficient reserves; and the Russians had
attacked at several far-flung sectors simultaneously (Nevel, Novgorod and
Leningrad/Oranienbaum); "Gründe für die gegenwärtige Lage der Heeresgruppe," 26
Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 18-19.
18. HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Jan. 1944, T-311/58/7072652, 7072668. On 26 Jan. the
remnants of LIV Corps and III SS Panzer Corps combined to form Group Sponheimer,
commanded by LIV corps’ commander, General Otto Sponheimer. By 30 Jan. there was
a 60-kilometer gap between Group Sponheimer and the closest German forces to the
south; ibid., 30 Jan. 1944, Frame 7072623.
19. By 3 Feb. this bridgehead was 35 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep;
Deutschland im zweiten Weltkrieg (Wolfgang Schumann et al ed.) (Cologne: PahlRugenstein, 1984), 5: 71.
20. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073075; ibid., 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/272, 4. As of 1 March the army group reported a strength of 638,521 men, and a
shortage of over 75,000 men; H Gr Nord/Abt.IIb, Nr. 88/44 gKdos., "Zusammenstellung
über Verluste u. Ersatz im Januar u. Februar 1944, Fehlstellen u. Iststärke v. 1.3.1944,"
21 March 1944, T-311/73/7095173.
21. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 375.
22. Ibid., 401-05.
23. This is the evaluation of a later commander of 18th Army (and a commander of one
of 18th Army’s corps in Jan. 1944); Herbert Loch, “The Operations of the Eighteenth
Army During the First Half of 1944 to the Occupation of the Panther Line,” Retreat from
Leningrad: Army Group North 1944/1945 (Steven Newton trans. and ed.) (Atglen, PA:
Schiffer, 1995), 80-82. The Soviet High Command (Stavka) disbanded the Volkhov
Front on 15 February, distributing its units to the Leningrad and Second Baltic Fronts.
The Soviets soon discovered, however, that the huge forces of the Leningrad Front were
unwieldy, and on 18 April created a new front (Third Baltic) out of three armies of the
Leningrad Front and one army from the Second Baltic Front; Sergei Shtemenko, The
Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-1945 (rev. ed.) (Robert Daglish trans.) (Moscow:
Progress, 1985), 1: 342.
24. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 455.
25. Skl Iop, 2486/40, "Besprechung des Ob.d.M. beim Führer am 14.11.40,"
Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945 (Gerhard
Wagner ed.) (Munich: Lehmanns, 1972), 154-55 (hereafter Lagevorträge, date of
conference). See also Wagner's comments to Raeder's private discussion with Hitler on
26 Sept. 1940 in ibid., 145-46; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 356-60;
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed), Germany and the Second World War, vol. 4:
Horst Boog et al, The Attack on the Soviet Union (Ewald Osers et al trans.) (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), 377-80; Bird, Erich Raeder, 160-74.
26. Extract from Halder Diary, 30 June 41, in 1939-1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in
Chronik und Dokumenten (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen ed.) (5th ed.) (Darmstadt: Wehr und
Wissen, 1961), 251. For the same reason, Hitler stressed the importance of capturing
Leningrad when he visited Army Group North's headquarters the next month; "Besuch
des Führers bei Heeres-Gruppe Nord am 21. Juli 1941," OKW KTB, 2: 1029-30.
27. Wilhelm Keitel, In the Service of the Reich (Walter Görlitz ed.) (David Irving trans.)
(New York: Stein & Day, 1979), 150; Franz Halder, "Decisions affecting the Campaign
in Russia (1941/ 42)," in Donald Detwiler (ed.), World War II German Military Studies:
A Collection of 213 Special Reports on the Second World War Prepared by former
Officers of the Wehrmacht for the United States Army (New York: Garland, 1979), Vol.
15, MS # C-067b, 1-2; Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden der
deutschen Armee, 1923-1945 (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1950), 133; Wilhelm Ritter
von Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen (Georg
Meyer ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), entries for 3 and 23 July 1941,
286, 304-05.
28. zu ObdM op 107/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im Ostseeraum," 10 Feb. 1942,
BA/MA, RM 7/1014, 103-05; 1/ Skl IL 495/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im
Ostseeraum," 2 Mar. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 120-21; Lagevorträge, 13 Feb. 1942,
354; ObdL/Füst/Ia (Robinson), "Nr. 5845/42 gKdos. (Op 1)," 20 Feb. 1942, BA/MA, RM
7/1014, 106; Gerhard Hümmelchen, "Unternehmen 'Eisstoss:' Der Angriff der Luftflotte
1 gegen die russische Ostseeflotte im April 1942," Marine-Rundschau 56 (No. 4): 22632.
29. Lagevorträge, 6 and 13 Feb., 19 Nov. and 22 Dec. 1942, 8 July 1943, 350, 354, 427,
430-31, 434, 520-21; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 420053/42 gKdos. Chefs.,
"Weisung für die Kampfführung im Osten nach Abschluss des Winters," 12 Feb. 1942,
OKW KTB, 2: 1095; MVO zum OKH (GenStdH), B.Nr. 26/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Bericht
über Besprechungen beim XXVI.A.K. bezugl. Wegnahme der Inseln im finnischen
Meerbusen," T-78/337/6293034-38; Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der
Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt, Nr. 55616/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung 41," 5 Apr. 1942,
Hitlers Weisungen, 184; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 36/42 gKdos.Chefs. (W)," 24 June 1942, T311/77/7100070-72; Der Chef des Stabes des Marinebefehlshabers Ostland, "Chefs.
B.Nr. gKdos. 116," 30 Dec. 1942, T-311/77/7100263-70; Carls to Küchler, gKdos.
Chefs., 5 Jan. 1943, T-311/77/7100461-62; "Niederschrift über den Besuch des Chefs des
Stabes der Skl beim Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres vom 29.6.-1.7.1943," Chefs.,
BA/MA, RM 7/265, 161-62; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 430422/43 gKdos.Chefs.,"
5 July 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/225, 6; HGr Nord, KTB, 5 July 1943, T311/57/7070008-09; OKW KTB, 8 July 1943, 6: 761-62.
30. OKW KTB, 26 June 1942, 3: 451; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 420510/42
gKdos. Chefs.," 19 July 1942, T-311/75/7097998; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr.
551288/42 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 45," 23 July 1942, Hitlers Weisungen, 199;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 420550/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 24 July 1942, BA/MA, RH
2/749, 104; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 420550/42 gKdos.Chefs. II.Ang.," 1 Aug.
1942, BA/MA, RH 2/749, 107; Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad, 412.
31. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 1809/42 gKdos., "Betr.: Bekämpfung le.russ.Seestreitkräfte," 6
Aug. 1942, T-311/73/ 7094441; Marinegruppenkommando Nord, B.Nr. gKdos. 1009/42
Chefs. A III, "Betrifft: 'Nordlicht' und Wegnahme Raum Schepel/Oranienbaum," 13 Aug.
1942, T-311/75/7098241-42; I Nord, "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16.-31.8.1942, gKdos.,
BA/MA, RM 7/90, 188; Lagevorträge, 29 Aug. 1942, 406.
32. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 5 Apr. 1942, 192-93; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 8
and 12 Aug. 1942, 334, 341.
33. OKW KTB, 23 and 24 Aug., 4 Sept., 5, 9 and 27 Oct. 1942, 3: 627-30, 633-34, 678;
4: 793, 811, 868; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 420826/42 gKdos. Chefs.," 19 Oct.
1942, T-311/75/7098033-34. In the spring of 1943 Hitler informed Küchler that he
planned an attack to capture Leningrad for the latter part of the summer, but German
reverses in southern Russia ended any such hopes; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (vorg.St.), Nr.
430163/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Operationsbefehl Nr. 5," 13 Mar. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1421;
HGr Nord/Ia, gKdos.Chefs., "Stichworte für den Führervortrag des Oberbefehlshabers
der Heeresgruppe Nord," 7 May 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/2, 8-12.
34. 1/Skl, "Br.Nr. I Opa 2106/42 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Oct. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 22831. See also I Nord, gKdos., "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16.-31.10.1942," BA/MA, RM
7/90, 199-200; MarGrKdo Nord, B.Nr. gKdos. 1330/42 Chefs. A III, "Betrifft:
Ostseekrieg 1942 und 1943," 8 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 246-58; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I
op 2662/42 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Ostseekrieg 1942/43," 16 Dec. 1942, BA/MA, RM
7/159, 263; MarGrKdo Nord, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 225/43 A III, "Ostseekrieg 1942," 18
Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/159, 276-77.
35. Skl, "B.Nr. 1 Abt.Ia 598/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 37-40
(emphasis in the original).
36. 1/Skl B.Nr. 1396/43 Chefs., "Reise C/Skl zum Führerhauptquartier vom 30.4.2.5.1943," BA/MA, RM 7/260, 181.
37. Kommando der Marinestation der Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 25/43 Chefs.,
(Schmundt to Meisel)," 28 June 1943, ibid., 84-89.
38. Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 520-21; Seekriegsleitung, Kriegstagebuch, Teil A
(hereafter Skl KTB), 13 July 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/50, 264. The Skl war diary was
published in 68 volumes (one month per volume for Sept. 1939-Apr. 1945) by the
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt and E.S. Mittler Verlag from 1988-1997;
Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945 (ed. for Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt in conjunction with the Federal Military Archives and the MarineOffizier-Vereinigung by Werner Rahn and Gerhard Schreiber) (facs. Edn. Pt. A/i-lxviii)
(Herford and Bonn: Mittler, 1988-1997). Archivists in Freiburg informed the author that
in the future researchers would have access only to the published set. The originals
examined by the author carried the file designations RM 7/50 (July 1943) to RM 7/71
(Apr. 1945). As listing the file numbers for each volume would only further clutter the
notes, only dates and page numbers will be provided for future Skl KTB references.
39. Skl KTB, 13 and 15 Aug. 1943, 226, 270.
40. OKM, B.Nr.1 Skl Ia, "Nr. 2397/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 15 Aug. 1943, Anlage 1 to MOK
Ostsee, Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8 bis 21.12.43, BA/MA, RM 31/M522.
41. Lagevorträge, 19 Aug. 1943, 540.
42. Ibid., 28 Aug. 1943, 544-45. A month later Hitler again proclaimed his intention not
to withdraw Army Group North; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op Nr. 662375/43 gKdos.
Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 50 für die Vorbereitung der Rückführung des Geb.A.O.K. 20 nach
Nordfinnland und Nordnorwegen," 28 Sept. 1943, Hitlers Weisungen, 231.
43. Junge to Wangenheim, 16 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/265, 173-74.
44. Assmann to 1Skl Ia (Admiral Hubert Wangenheim), 29 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RM
7/260, 451; Skl, KTB, 30 Dec. 1943, 523. Dönitz made these comments to a small circle
of his closest associates ("im kleinsten Kreis"). This group usually consisted only of
Dönitz, Meisel (Skl Chief of Staff), Wagner, Wangenheim and Pfeiffer (Skl war diarist);
Michael Salewski, "Das Kriegstagebuch der deutschen Seekriegsleitung im Zweiten
Weltkrieg," Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 3): 140.
45. Lagevorträge, 1-3 Jan. 1944, 565; OKW/WFSt/Op M, "Nr. 77089/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"
12 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/130, 59-62.
46. Skl KTB, 22 and 28 Jan. 1944, 385, 504.
47. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Lage Nordflügel Ostfront
am Finnenbusen," 30 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 28. The Skl replied that over 1100
naval personnel were either already in action or in transit to assist in the land fighting. In
addition, a half-dozen artillery barges had been ordered to the Baltic, and the transfer of a
heavy cruiser, several destroyers and a motor-torpedo boat flotilla was under
consideration; Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl I op a 3052/44 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/161, 36; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op a 3053/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: Einsatz weiterer
Seestreitkräfte in Finnenbusen," 31 Jan. 1944, RM 7/161, 34; Gruppe Nord/Flotte, "Nr.
0169/44 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1944, ibid., 33. By the time the army group reached the
Panther Position, some 1700 naval troops were in action; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,
B.Nr. gKdos. 1023/44 AIII, "Kurzer Überblick auf Februar 1944," 8 Mar. 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/90, 299.
48. Admiral Ostland, KTB, 9 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/39078a.
49. Skl, 1/Skl Ia, "Nr. 466/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 76;
MOK Ost, KTB, 13 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 492/44
gKdos. Chefs.," 14 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 83; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 204/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Betr: Feindliche Grosslandungen," 25 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/130, 8990; Skl KTB, 25 Jan. 1944, 441. Dönitz had received Hitler's approval for his intention
not to use heavy surface vessels against an invasion in the West; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan.
1944, 572.
50. Commanding Admiral, Submarines, protested that Dönitz's order to maintain 6 Uboats on 12-hour readiness hampered training, and that within 2 months 6 fewer
submarines would be available for action in the Atlantic; Skl, KTB, 11 Feb. 1944, 235.
On 20 Feb. Dönitz cancelled the order for the submarines to remain on alert, but only
after receiving a report from MOK Ost advising this measure, stating that due to the ice
situation in the Gulf of Finland, neither a landing operation nor a breakout attempt of the
Soviet fleet was likely; MOK Ost/Führstab, "274/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 19 Feb. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/161, 101-03; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl Iop 552/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Feb. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/161, 110-11.
51. Skl, KTB, 15 Nov. 1943, 349-50; Der Ob der Kriegsmarine und Chef der Skl, B.Nr.
1.Skl Ib 1285/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Lagebetrachtung der Seekriegsleitung vom 20.5.1943,"
BA/MA, RM 7/260, 217; Skl, KTB, 21 July 1943, 420; Skl, KTB, 18 and 25 Sept. 1943,
361, 505; see also Pfeiffer's comments, dated 2 Feb. 1944, regarding Dönitz's reaction to
a gloomy evaluation of Germany's overall situation from 10 Nov. 1943 in BA/MA, RM
7/260, 388.
52. Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 530/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 16 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 8788; “B.Nr. 1/Skl 552/44, gKdos.Chefs.,” 19 Feb. 1944, ibid., 101-03; Skl, KTB, 10 and
12 Mar. 1944, 200, 252.
53. HGr Nord, KTB, 2, 4, 14, 17, and 23 Nov. 1943, T-311/57/7070828, 7070854,
7071026, 7071078, 7071135-38. Hitler came up with an idea to reinforce the
Oranienbaum front using 60 immobilized tanks.
54. OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt (I), "Nr. 440063/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 6 Feb. 1944, T78/337/6292909-10; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 260.
55. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 670/44 gKdos.," 10 Feb. 1944, T-311/60/7075823; HGr Nord/Ia,
Nr. 20/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 26.1.," 26 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/14, 178-79; HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Jan., 30-31 Jan., 6 Feb., 12 Feb., 13 Feb., 14 Feb.
and 22 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7071987-89, 7072615, 7072619-20, 7072624-25, 7072632,
7072673, 7072851, 7073048, 7073075, 7073095, 7073284-86. The army group received
the following reinforcements during the offensive: 12th Panzer, Feldherrnhalle, 87th and
214th infantry divisions; the battle group of Hitler's Escort Battalion (over 1,000 men);
and a brigade of Estonian soldiers. The Estonian brigade, Hitler's Escort troops,
Feldherrnhalle and 214th Inf. Div. were sent to Narva. Hitler personally requested that
Dönitz use all available sea transport to expedite the transfer of the 214th Inf. Div. from
Norway to Narva, and if need be to defer all other transport tasks; MOK Ost, KTB, 12
Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/38768; Skl KTB, 9 Feb. 1944, 184.
56. HGr Nord, KTB, 3, 6, 7, 10, 18 and 19 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072762-63, 7072847,
7072873-75, 7072996-97, 7073204, 7073231-32.
57. The day before Hitler ordered the army group to reinforce the Narva sector, he
instructed the Skl to strengthen coastal artillery in this area; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr.
001388/44 gKdos., "Verteidigung Estland," 5 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 50;
OKM/Skl Qu A IV, Nr. 789/44 gKdos., "Betr: Verteidigung Estland-Küsten und Flak," 6
Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 523/38768. For the navy’s discussions, see Skl, KTB, 22 Jan.
1944, 385; Skl, KTB, 7, 8, 13 and 15 Feb. 1944, 134-38, 159, 286, 328-29; MOK Ost,
KTB, 24 Jan., 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/ M523; Admiral Ostland, KTB, 22 Jan.
1944, 6 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/39078a. For intelligence indicating a Soviet landing
behind the front, see HGr Nord, KTB, 2 Feb. and 15 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072748,
7073150; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op a 3455/44 gKdos.," 3 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161,
46.
58. Model warned that the Soviets had transport space for 30,000 to 40,000 troops and
could support a landing with one battleship, three cruisers and numerous smaller vessels;
HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073204. In his second appeal, when the
retreat to the Panther was almost concluded, Model described the attack as "urgent;"
ibid., 27 Feb., Frame 7073398. His third request referred to the bombardment as
"absolutely necessary;" HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 38/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage
vom 1.3.44," 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 35. For Model's final plea, HGr Nord,
KTB, 7 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 272, 85.
59. The problems included the transfer of sufficient units, the slight chance of inflicting a
crippling blow upon the fleet and expected heavy flak; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 Mar. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/272, 103. One of Germany's top pilots stated that when attacking the
Soviet fleet at Leningrad in Sept. 1941, he encountered the heaviest flak of the entire war;
Hans Rudel, Stuka Pilot (Lynton Hudson trans.) (New York: Bantam, 1979), 34.
60. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1383/44 geh.," 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 58; Dönitz,
Grossadmiral, 1/Skl Ia 3893/44 gKdos., "Auf HGr Nord/Ia Nr. 1383/44 geh.," 7 Feb.
1944, BA/MA, M533/39078a.
61. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 375; Admiral Burchardi, “Landings of the
Russians on the Baltic Coast,” German Naval Records, Naval Historical Center,
Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard (hereafter NavOpArch), Box T65; Skl,
KTB, 14 Feb. 1944, 301; HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7073097, 7073104.
62. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 34/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 19 Feb.1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 20-21;
HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 38/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom 1.3.44," 1 Mar. 1944,
ibid., 35; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 41/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Kampfführung im Raum Narwa,"
5 Mar. 1944, ibid., 40; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 51/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Lage vom
27.3.44," 27 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292854-57.
63. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 49/44 gKdos.Chefs, "Planspiel am 16. März 1944," 16 Mar. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/290, 4-8; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 47/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 Mar. 1944,
ibid., 10-13. It is possible Hitler explicitly ordered this exercise. In summoning officers
to this exercise, Model wrote, "Ich werde in den Tagen vom 13.-16.3.1944 in Reval eine
Besprechung über einen Sonderauftrag des Führers und ein Planspiel über die
Möglichkeiten einer russischen Landung an der estnischen Küste abhalten;" Der Ob der
HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1216/44 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1944, T-312/1626/987. It is unclear
whether this exercise was part of Model's special mission from Hitler, or a completely
separate matter.
64. Grossadmiral Dönitz, "B.Nr. 1/Skl 943/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/161, 305-07.
65. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 77927/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/1099, 98; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über die Bedeutung der
Narwa-Stellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 9096.
66. "Kampf um Öl an der Narwa," T-312/1626/601-03.
67. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 453; Der Ob der Kriegsmarine und Chef
der Skl, "B.Nr. 1Skl 642/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 1 Mar. 1943, reproduced in ibid., 627; Skl,
"B.Nr. 1 Abt.Ia 598/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 Feb. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 38-39. In his
memorandum on the importance of the Narva Position, Dönitz claimed that Estonian
shale oil represented the sole possibility for improving Germany's oil supply, except for
synthetic production; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über die
Bedeutung der Narwa-Stellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/15, 92. The British recognized the shale oil's importance to Germany, and in
October 1942 parachuted an agent into Estonia to sabotage the mines. The mission
failed, however, because the agent was betrayed and captured by the Gestapo; Charles
Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (New York: Oxford, 1986), 69-70.
68. Skl, "B.Nr. 1Skl Ia, 2397/43 gKdos.Chefs." 15 Aug. 1943, Anlage 1 to MOK Ost,
Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8 bis 21.12.43, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; MOK
Ost/Führstab gKdos.Chefs. 122/43, "Betrifft: Ostwall," 10 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RM
7/994, 28; Anlage 4 zu WFSt/Op, Nr. 662002/43 gKdos.Chefs. v. 21.8.43, "Ölgewinnung
im Estland," T-77/778/5504009.
69. Zeitzler claims that Germany needed the shale oil for its submarines, and that the loss
of this area would have been intolerable for the navy; Kurt Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die
grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg" (c. 1951), BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N
63/80, Vol. 2, 112-13, 162. See also OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos. Chefs.,
"Betr.: Lage Nordflügel Ostfront am Finnenbusen," 31 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161,
28.
70. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 1388/44 gKdos., "Verteidigung Estland," 5 Feb. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/161, 50; HGr Nord/Ia op, Nr. 600/44 gKdos., "Herresgruppen-Befehl für
den Küstenschutz an der Nordküste Estlands," 7 Feb. 1944, ibid., 142-44.
71. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Jan. 1944, T-311/57/7072303; Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die
grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2, BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N
63/80, 112-13; OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr. 662002/43 gKdos.Chefs. "Vortragsnotiz zur
Linienführung des Ostwalls," 21 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RW 4/v. 708, 53; Walter
Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 39-45 (3rd ed) (Munich:
Bernard & Graefe, 1978), 426-27.
72. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 109; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 246-49; Anlagen 1 and 2 to
Obkdo 20.Geb.-Armeee/Der Oberbefehlshaber/Ia, Nr. 95/44 gKdos., "Aktenvermerk über
meinen Besuch im finnischen Hauptquartier," 24 Jan. 1944, reproduced in OKW KTB,
Vol. 4, Part 2, addendum, 51-52. On 31 Jan. Keitel assured Mannerheim that Army
Group North would hold the Luga Position, explaining the army group's weakness
resulted from the need to withdraw forces to counter an expected invasion in the West;
Ernst Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944," in Operationsgebiet östliche
Ostsee und der finnisch-baltische Raum 1944 (Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt ed.)
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961) (hereafter cited as Östliche Ostsee), 20-21.
73. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Elke Fröhlich ed. (Munich: Saur, 1994), Part
II (hereafter cited as TBJG), entry for 25 Jan. 1944, 11: 156; Klink, "Der deutschfinnische Zusammenarbeit," 17-22; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 209.
74. Earl Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 (Washington:
US Govt. Printing Office, 1959) (hereafter cited as German NTO), 273-74; Skl, KTB, 22
and 24 Feb. 1944, 484, 523. In early March, OKH emphasized the importance of holding
the present front in the Baltic States to stiffen Finnish resolve; OKH/Att. Abt/Ia, "Nr.
45/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292958-60. Goebbels maintained that the
Finns were likely to remain in the war as long as the front at Narva held; TBJG, 1 Apr.
1944, 12: 34.
75. TBJG, 3, 4 and 15 Mar. 1944, 11: 389, 396-97, 481.
76. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771273/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 16 April
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 26; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"
31.
77. Four Finnish officers, including the head of the Army's Operations Section, visited
the Narva front from 7-14 April; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944,"
28-29; Keitel to Mannerheim, 2 Apr. 1944, Mannerheim to Keitel, 4 Apr. 1944, OKW
KTB, Vol. 4, Part 2, addendum 77-78.
78. HGr Nord, KTB, 1 April 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 7; HGr Nord/Ia,
"Niederschrift über die Fahrt des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zum Führerhauptquartier
(1.4.-3.4.44)," 4 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/4, 22-25. The army group carried out this
operation from 6-9 April, significantly reducing the Soviet bridgehead on the west bank
of the Narva River during the Finnish officers' visit to the front; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 April
1944, RH 19 III/272, 135. Later in April the Germans attempted to eliminate the
bridgehead completely, but were unable to dislodge the Soviets.
79. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 2679/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung," 13 Mar. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/161, 241; HGr Nord, KTB, 3 Mar. and 31 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/272, 28, 370; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 7-8;
Armeegruppenkommando Narwa/Ia, Nr. 15/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung des
inneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 28 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 78-80; HGr
Nord/Ia, Nr. 58/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes der
Divisionen," 1 April 1944, T-78/337/6292842-48. In mid-March, Assmann reported,
"Führer misst Halten Narwa ganz besondere militärische und politische Bedeutung zu;"
see OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 2679/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung," 13 Mar. 1944, RM
7/161, 241.
80. MOK Ostsee, B.Nr. gKdos. 2060/44 A I, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Monat April 1944,"
7 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 306; Skl, KTB, 14 and 16 Mar. 1944, 284, 325.
81. For Hitler's continued concern about a Soviet landing, see Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I Nord
16775/44 gKdos.," 31 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 440; for the Navy's anxiety, Skl,
KTB, 1 June 1944, 14-15; MOK Ost, KTB, 15 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; 1/Skl
I E 2972/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Minensperrmassnahmen Finnenbusen Frühjahr
1944," 5 Oct. 1943, RM 31/M523; see also Skl, KTB, 4 Nov. 1943, 107.
82. Skl, 1/Skl "B.Nr. 1435/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 451-52;
Skl, KTB, 6 June 1944, 125.
83. This would mean that the German Navy was responsible for Tallinn 's defense; HGr
Nord, KTB, 11 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 161.
84. B.Nr. 1.Skl I Op 11620/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Ausbau Reval als 'fester Platz' gemäss
Führerbefehl Nr. 11," 22 April 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/227, 147-48.
85. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Denkschrift über die Bedeutung der NarwaStellung für die Gesamtkriegführung," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 93-94.
86. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 13656/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: Ausbau Reval als fester Platz," 4 May
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/227, 149-50; Skl, KTB, 3 May 1944, 35-36; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op
14501/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Ausbau Reval als fester Platz," 10 May 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/161, 404. Admiral Kummetz (MOK Ostsee) insisted that Tallinn 's value for protecting
the Baltic in the interests of the U-boat war could not be emphasized too strongly; MOK
Ost, KTB, 3 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.
87. Hitler's dissatisfaction with the performance of the navy's surface fleet led him in
1942 to demand that it be scrapped. For this reason, Raeder resigned as naval
Commander-in-Chief. Upon his appointment to that post, Dönitz managed to convince
Hitler not to send the fleet to the scrap yard, although the ships were decommissioned and
served mainly as floating barracks for naval personnel; Salewski, Die deutsche
Seekriegsleitung, 2: 209-38; Lagevorträge, 6 Jan. and 8 Feb. 1943, 453-70.
88. In a message at the height of the Soviet offensive to Group North/Fleet and Naval
Command, Baltic, the Skl emphasized that all possible means must be used to smash a
Soviet landing attempt west of Narva, and that if Soviet vessels appeared east of the
Nashorn mine barrage, destroyers and torpedo boats must challenge them in this area,
despite the risk of hitting their own mines; Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 436/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 11
Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 72.
89. Skl, KTB, 11 and 18 Feb. 1944, 231-32, 397.
90. Dönitz informed Hitler that the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and the cruisers
Prinz Eugen, Nürnberg and Emden were immediately ready to sail, changing in the
course of the summer to the pocket battleship Lützow and cruisers Admiral Hipper and
Köln. Except for the battleship Tirpitz, which, although afloat, had been disabled by
small British submarines in Sept. 1943 (and was finally sunk by British aircraft in Nov.
1944), this constituted all heavy surface vessels of the German Navy, aside from the (at
the time) damaged light cruiser Leipzig and two antiquated World War I battleships,
Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein; Jak Mallmann Showell, The German Navy in World
War II: A Reference Guide to the Kriegsmarine, 1935-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1979), 102-17.
Chapter 2: The German Collapse in the Summer of 1944
1. Andreas Hillgruber, Der Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45 als Problem der
deutschen Nationalgeschichte und der europäischen Geschichte (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), 14; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 228.
2. David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped
Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 220.
3. For the army group’s strength, see HGr Nord, KTB, 20 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/310, 23. On German intelligence estimates, OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 1428/44
gKdos., "Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor der deutschen Ostfront im
grossen—Stand 3.5.44," 3 May 1944, T-78/466/6446142-45. For a critical appraisal of
German intelligence in the East, see Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "Die Prognosen der
Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945," in Zwei Legenden aus dem Dritten Reich
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974); on the Soviet 1944 summer offensive, 5963. See also David Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World
War II (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990), 138-46.
4. PzAOK 3, KTB, 23 June 1944, T-313/316/8594975; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 June 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/310, 128.
5. Der Ob der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 90/44 (Lindemann to Hitler)," 29 June 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/15, 109-11. On 23 Feb. Group Sponheimer (originally formed from the staff of
LIV Corps) had been renamed Armeegruppe Narva, and on 30 May it was upgraded to an
Army Detachment (Armeeabteilung). General Hans Friessner commanded this force
until he assumed command of the army group in July; his successor was General Anton
Grasser.
6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (I), "Nr. 6452/44 gKdos.," 30 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
II/205, 16; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 311, 1-2; HGr Nord/Ia,
"Nr. 95/44 gKdos.Chefs. (Lindemann to Hitler)," 30 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/15,
131; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 96/44 gKdos.Chefs., (Lindemann to Hitler)" 2 July 1944, RH 19
III/15, 133; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 6532/44 gKdos.," 3 July 1944, RH 19
III/15, 135.
7. HGr Nord, KTB, 4, 5 and 6 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 77, 82, 104-05, 112,
121, 127. In his memoirs Friessner maintains that he was not sufficiently informed by
Hitler of Army Group Center's desperate predicament; Hans Friessner, Verratene
Schlachten (Holstein: Verlag Hamburg, 1956), 13, 16. Upon learning of the Allied
landing in Normandy Friessner, either seeking to curry favor or experiencing a complete
mental collapse, suggested that Zeitzler order a spontaneous general offensive on the
entire Russian front; Friessner, General der Inf./Ia, "Nr. 753/44 gKdos.," 6 June 1944, T312/1628/1074.
8. HGr Nord, KTB, 9 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 174-77, 188; Lagevorträge, 9
July 1944, 595-96.
9. Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion (Alfred Anderle et
al trans.) (Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 1965) (hereafter GVK), 4: 384; Geschichte des
zweiten Weltkrieges 1939-1945 (H. Hoffmann et al ed.) (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR,
1978), 9: 83-84; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1: 354-57; Ivan
Bagramian, "Die Schaulen-Mitau-Operation der 1. Baltischen Front" (Wilhelm Arenz ed.
and trans.), Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 13 (No. 10): 588-91.
10. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 15 July, 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 16-21, 56; Friessner
to Hitler, 12 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/6, 3-7; Friessner, Verratene Schlachten, 1827; Der Ob der HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 6620/44 geh., "Tagesbefehl," 14 July 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/6, 8; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 2653/44 gKdos., "Besprechung mit dem Herrn
Oberbefehlshaber der H.Gr. Nord, General d. Inf. Friessner am 15.7.44 in Rositten," 15
July 1944, T-312/957/9148703.
11. HGr Nord, KTB, 15 and 18 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 60, 71-73, 131-35.
12. PzAOK 3, KTB, 22 July 1944, T-313/317/8595402; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 July 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 208, 213. On Guderian and Kinzel, see HGr Nord, KTB, RH 19
III/313, 21 July 1944, 195-96; Nr. 555, "Besprechung beim Chef des Generalstabes d.
Heeres, 21 July 1944, 1700 Uhr," T-78/352/6312576.
13. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 126/44 gKdos.Chefs. (Friessner to Hitler)," 23 July 1944, T312/970/9162224-26. 95. Hitler did not place Friessner in the "Führer Reserve," in this
period a rapidly-growing pool of officers, but promoted him to Colonel-General and
appointed him commander of Army Group South Ukraine (renamed Army Group South
on 23 Sept.), where he remained until Hitler relieved him on 22 Dec. 1944. Hitler gave
Schörner authority over all military and civil personnel in order to halt the Soviet
offensive and maintain the Baltic States; Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/ Qu.2 (Ost)/Verw. 1,
Nr. 007984/44 gKdos., "Betr: Neuregelung der Befehlsverhältnisse im Bereich der
Heeresgruppe Nord," 23 July 1944, Hitlers Weisungen, 264-65. Although in reality the
bestowal of these powers merely placed a few thousand men at Schörner’s disposal, it
demonstrates Hitler's determination to retain the Baltic States; Ziemke, Stalingrad to
Berlin, 336. Schörner later stated that Hitler appointed him commander of Army Group
North at Guderian's request; see Schörner’s comments, dated 29 Nov. 1960, to page 66 of
Werner Haupt's Kurland in BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N 60/73.
14. TBJG, 24 July 1944, 13: 152.
15. The Marienburg Position ran along the rail line Pskov-Jakobstadt, connecting the
Dvina River with Lake Peipus; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 214.
16. The army group suffered 49,498 casualties from 22 June-26 July; HGr Nord, KTB,
26 and 27 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 26, 30-35, 77; Bagramian, "Die SchaulenMitau-Operation der 1. Baltischen Front," 589-601.
17. OKH quickly responded to Schörner’s plea, and from 1-3 Aug. sent 10,431
replacements (although this included 3800 naval and air force soldiers requiring three
weeks' training before they could be sent to the front), and on 6 Aug. another 4542 men
arrived; HGr Nord, KTB, 2, 4 and 6 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 22, 52-53, 95.
18th Army alone lost over 32,000 men from 10 July to 7 Aug.; AOK 18. KTB, 8 Aug.
1944, T-312/956/9147152.
18. HGr Nord, KTB, 6 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 95-96.
19. Ibid., 12 Aug. 1944, 181-82, 197-202.
20. Ibid., 16 and 18 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 64-65, 132; PzAOK 3, KTB, 9
and 10 Aug. 1944, T-313/317/ 8595577-78, 8595589-90.
21. The warships of the 2nd Task Force supporting this operation included the cruiser
Prinz Eugen, 2-4 destroyers and 4-5 torpedo boats; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341
F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944, " 22 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 338; Skl,
KTB, 22 Aug. 1944, 543.
22. HGr Nord, KTB, 24 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/317, 79.
23. Lagevorträge, 12 June 1944, 588. In addition, on 19 June German torpedo boats
delivered 9,000 anti-tank grenade launchers (Panzerfaust), and on 22 June 5,000
bazookas (Panzerschreck) arrived by air; Ziemke, German NTO, 282-83; Klink, "Die
deutsch-finnische Zusammenarbeit 1944," 66.
24. OKH also ordered the army group to send an assault gun brigade with the division
(the 122nd Infantry Division); HGr Nord, KTB, 20 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/310,
19; Skl KTB, 20 June 1944, 538.
25. From 10 June-18 July the Finns lost 44,000 men; Waldemar Erfurth, The Last
Finnish War, 1941-1944 (Washington: University Publications, 1979), 193.
26. Since Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki on the 22nd, the Finns were also under pressure
from Germany at this time; Ziemke, German NTO, 283; Klink, "Die deutsch-finnische
Zusammenarbeit 1944," 39-41; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 256-57.
27. HGr Nord, KTB, 2 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 37; AOK 18, KTB, 3 Aug.
1944, T-312/956/9146972. Hitler sent Schörner, who earlier had served as a corps
commander in Finland, because the Finns had requested information on the situation in
the Baltic States; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 387-88. Natzmer later questioned
whether Schörner was the best person for this, as Mannerheim was a commander of the
“old school;” Oldwig von Natzmer, “Festung Kurland: Der Kampf im Norden der
deutschen Ostfront 1944/45,” April 1949, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (hereafter
IfZ), ZS 111, 47.
28. The terms for the armistice, signed on 19 Sept., included restoration of the 1940
border, cession of the Pechenga area and $300 million in reparations; Ziemke, German
NTO, 290-91.
29. Skl, KTB, 15, 16, 17 and 18 June 1944, 389-90, 428, 457, 484-87; MOK Ost, KTB,
18 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772010/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 20/6," 21 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 100; Skl,
"B.Nr. 1/Skl Iop 1805/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 474; Skl,
"B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 20356/44 gKdos.," 3 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 724. MOK Ost
informed the Skl that it had sent 2 torpedo boats, 6 artillery barges and 6 transport barges,
and that a motor mine sweeper flotilla was en route; MOK Ost/Führstab "gKdos. 544/44
Chefs. AI," 17 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.
30. Gustav Forstmann, "Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und der östlichen Ostsee von 1942 bis
zum 8. Mai 1945", BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v. 15, 10 (Forstmann was chief of
staff to Admiral Eastern Baltic.); Skl, KTB, 18 June 1944, 485. In June the Skl ordered
organizational changes in the Baltic theater. On 17 June, Admiral Ostland was renamed
Admiral Eastern Baltic, and Commander of Mine Sweepers, East (FdM Ost), became
Commander, 9th Escort Division.
31. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 771340/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 25 April 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/161, 384; Skl, KTB, 8 and 12 May 1944, 117-18, 206.
32. Skl, KTB, 17 and 21 June 1944, 453, 565; 1/Skl, B.Nr. 2326/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Aalandsfrage," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 508-12; Hans Prager, Panzerschiff
Deutschland/Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow: Ein Schiffs-Schicksal vor den Hintergründen
seiner Zeit (Herford: Koehlers, 1981), 414-19.
33. Skl KTB, 6 and 7 June 1944, 96, 133-35.
34. For this interpretation, see Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 460-65.
35. Ibid., 407-16; Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (Buenos Aires: Dürer,
1950), entry for 10 June 1944, 2: 8; "An Interview with Gen Art Walter Warlimont: From
Invasion to the Siegfried Line," 19-20 July 1945, World War II German Military Studies,
Vol. 2, ETHINT 1, 9; Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-45 (Mainz: Hase &
Koehler, 1980), 374.
36. Skl KTB, 10 June 1944, 244. Despite Dönitz’s offer, Hitler insisted that naval troops
for the land front not include U-boat trainees; Lagevorträge, 13 July 1944, 600.
37. Skl KTB, 13 June 1944, 329-30; Lagevorträge, 12 June 1944, 589.
38. Skl KTB, 28 June 1944, 772.
39. HGr Nord, KTB, 9 and 10 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/311, 177-78, 199;
Lagevorträge, 9 July 1944, 595-96; Nr. 481, "Anruf Chef an Chef Op.Abt., 10.7.44,
12.15 Uhr," T-78/352/6312653.
40. “Stichworte aus Besprechung bei Chef Skl am 12.7.Nm.," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 65659; Dönitz to Meisel, Chefs., 11 July 1944, ibid., 654; Lagevorträge, 11 July 1944, 598,
600. At the time, this seemingly would not have represented a disastrous reduction, since
in July 1944 the German Navy commissioned only 14 new submarines; 2/Skl, BdU Op,
B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 356 Ing., "Stand der Uboote am 1. August 1944," 6 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 87/42, 7-9. But Dönitz was then in the process of switching over to new
submarine types and he had secured Hitler's approval for, and hoped to realize, an
increase in production to 40 U-boats per month; "Niederschrift über die Ansprache des
Ob.d.M. an die Hauptamts- und Amtschefs am 2.6.43," gKdos.Chefs., 2 June 1943,
BA/MA, RM 7/260, 232; Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271.
41. "B.Nr. Chef Skl 2099/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 12 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 640-41;
Skl, KTB, 12 July 1944, 267-68; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2136/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:
'Weissdorn,' 'Rotdorn,'" 16 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 626-28. After approving these
plans Dönitz sent a copy to Hitler's headquarters; Skl, KTB, 16 July 1944, 349.
42. Skl, KTB, 13, 14, 17 and 18 July 1944, 287, 306, 363-64, 386. Dönitz did not
protest, although he mentioned to Hitler that after the evacuation of the Narva position,
he still intended to hold the island of Tütters; Lagevorträge, 13 July 1944, 600.
43. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 772361/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 8.7.," 8 July
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 25-26.
44. OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 772531/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 19.7.," 19 July
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 100-03. In this report Assmann appears surprised at the
reasons for Hitler's refusal to permit Army Group North's withdrawal. This is odd,
because six months earlier he had reported that Hitler would not retreat to the Panther
Position for these very reasons; OKW/WFSt/Op M, Nr. 77263/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:
Lage Nordflügel Ostfront am Finnenbusen," 30 Jan. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 28.
45. Skl, KTB, 20 July 1944, 431.
46. Skl KTB, 20 July 1944, 433-35; Lagevorträge, 20 July 1944, 601-03; Peter
Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945 (Richard Barry trans.)
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1977), 402.
47. Elke Fröhlich, “Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944,” Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte. Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1990): 208-09.
48. Alfred Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?” Historical Journal 31
(1988): 392.
49. Traudl Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben (Munich:
List, 2003), 149-50; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms A Global History of World War
II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 754.
50. Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entries for 30 July and 5 Aug. 1944, 2: 101, 10305; Walter Lüdde-Neurath, Regierung Dönitz: Die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches (4th
ed.) (Leoni: Druffel, 1980), 17-18 Eleanor Hancock, The National Socialist Leadership
and Total War 1941-5 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 139-41.
51. Skl, KTB, 20, 24 and 25 July 1944, 433, 509, 532; "Kurzlage des ObdM," geh., 14
Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 271.
52. Skl, KTB, 27 and 28 July 1944, 580, 619-20.
53. Admiral Eastern Baltic called this breakdown incomprehensible, since no Soviet
troops were threatening Libau; ibid., 28 and 29 July 1944, 618, 638; Adm.FHQu, B.Nr.
142/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im baltischen Raum," 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/162, 563-64.
54. He informed Kummetz and Admiral Eastern Baltic that while naval interests would
be carefully considered, in view of the present land situation, they might not be decisive;
Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 2603/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Reise Ob Heeresgruppe Nord ins
Führerhauptquartier," 27 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 416-17; Skl, KTB, 27 Aug.
1944, 709-10.
55. "Vortrag des Chefs der Seekriegsleitung bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber
in 'Koralle' am 24./25.8. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 161-70.
56. OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Qu I, "Nr. 9007/44 gKdos.," 25 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162,
602; Skl Adm. Qu VI/gKdos. 5423, "Vorgang: OKW/WFSt Op (M) Qu I Nr. 009007/44
gKdos. vom 25.7.," 25 July 1944, ibid., 605-06.
57. Skl KTB, 20 and 26 July 1944, 432, 562.
58. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 234; Skl, KTB, 11 Aug.
1944, 271.
59. Der Ob der Kriegsmarine, "B.Nr. Skl/Adm. VI 6648/44 geh. S Nord," 3 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/162, 498; 9.Sich Div., KTB, 3 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.149.
Dönitz’s declaration that the Navy first learned of its task to supply Army Group North
on 26 July is not true. Assmann had alerted him to this possibility on 8 July, and the
seaborne supply of Schörner’s forces was included in the plans "Rotdorn" and
"Weissdorn."
60. In the period 25 July-13 August the Navy also delivered 27,379 men, 93 horses and
145 vehicles to the army group, and brought back 15,782 troops, 25,362 wounded,
21,679 POWs, 55,004 evacuees, 2735 horses and 539 vehicles; Skl, KTB, 14 Aug. 1944,
352. The 9th Escort Division reported that during August 594 ships had sailed, suffering
no losses or serious damage despite weak escort protection, carrying 2,390,966 tons
(these figures almost certainly include supplies shipped to Finland); 9. Sich. Div., KTB,
"Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. August 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149; PzAOK 3, KTB, 21
Aug. 1944, T-313/317/8595696-97; Skl, KTB, 24 Aug. 1944, 627. The Navy continued
to ferry supplies to Schörner’s forces. The daily average at the end of the month was
3897 tons; Skl, KTB, 2 Sept. 1944, 49.
61. Rudel remained until 23 Aug.; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/315, 20102; AOK 18, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147280; Rudel, Stuka Pilot, 182-90.
62. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 28 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 210, RH 19 III/317,
149, 151. The Air Force Chief of Staff noted his surprise in his diary: “Decision for air
transport to the Baltics!!” See Persönliches Kriegstagebuch des Generals der Flieger
Kreipe als Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe für die Zeit vom 22.7.-2.11.44,”
(hereafter cited as Kreipe KTB) IfZ, F 29, entry for 27 Aug. 1944.
63. The army group considered an attack here unlikely, since the Russians had
withdrawn at least 9 divisions from the Narva sector; HGr Nord, KTB, 24, 25 and 27
June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/310, 73, 77, 83, 115.
64. Zeitzler claims that on at least three occasions he had heated arguments with Hitler
on this subject, and asked to be relieved of his post. When Hitler refused, he finally
reported himself sick; Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten
Weltkrieg," Vol. 2, BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 162-66.
65. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 June and 10 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 310, 145-46, RH 19
III/311, 199.
66. "Der Reichsmarschall schaltet sich ein und weist darauf hin, dass Kräfte doch nur zu
kriegen wären, wenn man die Düna-Linie einnehme. Man müsste das mal klar
aussprechen. Der Führer erwidert, das dies das einfachste wäre. Das geht nicht aber
wegen der unabsehbaren Folgen. Damit würde Finnland preis-gegeben, die Ostsee für
den Russen frei werden, die gesamte U-Bootausbildung eingestellt werden müssen. Eine
solche Massnahme könnte in der Folge den Verlust des Krieges bedeuten. Das Beispiel
wäre hierfür der Verlust der Krim. Sie hat den Abfall der Türkei zur Folge gehabt, der
Türken wäre Spanien und Portugal mit den Ausfall ihrer Chromlieferungen gefolgt.
Durch die Änderung der Haltung der Türkein wäre weiter die Haltung Bulgariens stark
beinflusst worden, was nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf Rumänien und Ungarn bleiben
könnte. Für den Fall des Zusammenbrechens dieser Verbündeten bedürfe es keines
Hinweises mehr auf die Auswirkungen auf den ganzen Balkan-Raum und die Folgen für
die Gesamtkriegführung. Die Aufgabe des Ostlandes würde zur Folgen haben: 1.)
Ausfall des für die Marine unbedingt notwendigen Balt-Öls. 2.) Ausfall Finnlands als
einzigem Nickellieferanten. 3.) Ausfall Schwedens mit jährlich 9 Mill. to.
hochwertigstem Erz. Jeder Krieg bedürfe bestimmter industrieller Grundlagen, sonst
gäbe es keine Waffen. Der Auftrag der H.Gr.Nord muss daher bleiben: Halten der
augenblicklichen Front mit allen Mitteln und allen nur erdenklichen Aushilfen. Der
Führer betont hierbei, dass sein Leben auch nur immer von der Suche nach Aushilfen
bestimmt gewesen wäre;" ibid., 18 July 1944, RH 19 III/313, 134-35.
67. Ibid., 15 July 1944, 60, 73; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (I), "Nr. 440412/44
gKdos.Chefs.," 15 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 633.
68. Adm.FHQu, Nr. 129/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 23 July 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/101, 64-65; AOK 18, KTB, 6 Aug. 1944, T-312/956/ 9147069; AOK 18, Nr.
2991/44 gKdos., "Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 6. August 1944," T312/959/9150156.
69. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 134. Hitler had already
permitted the withdrawal of several units from Army Detachment Narva. Originally
composed of 10 divisions and a brigade, by mid-July it had given up 6 divisions; ibid., 17
July 1944, RH 19 III/313, 110. On 20 July Grasser reported his forces no longer sufficed
to hold the front; ArmeeAbt Narwa/Ia, Nr. 962/44 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage," 20
July 1944, T-312/1633/436-38.
70. HGr Mitte, KTB, 21 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/199, 209; Obkdo HGr Mitte/Ia,
Nr. 11473/44 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage am 20.8.44, 20.00 Uhr," 21 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 160-61. Several other high-ranking German military figures
maintain that concern for Finland affected Hitler's decision not to retreat from Narva;
Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 296, 335; Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen
Wehrmacht, 502-03; "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering: From the
Invasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," WWII German
Military Studies, Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 19; Friessner, Verratene Schlachten, 32-33.
71. For Finland’s concern, Der deutsche General beim Obkdo der finn. Wehrmacht/Ia,
"Nr. 144/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Aug. 1944, T-311/53/7065562-63; OKH/Att.Abt/Ia, "Nr.
45/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 8 Mar. 1944, T-78/337/6292958-60; "Der nördliche
Kriegsschauplatz," OKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part 1, 872; Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, 195;
Wipert von Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden: Limes,
1951), 362, 401 (Blücher was German Minister to Finland from 1935-1944). For Hitler’s
order, OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440530/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für die
weitere Kampfführung im Osten," 2 Sept. 1944, T-311/53/7065571-74.
72. HGr Nord/Ia Op, "Nr. 2918/44 gKdos.," 7 July 1944, T-312/1633/105; Der Ob der
HGr Nord, Nr. 2156/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Estnisches Ölschiefergebiet," 12 Aug. 1944, T312/1633/814. In July Schörner ordered the transfer of three of the nine heavy flak
batteries from the shale oil area to the front, but Hitler commanded their return; HGr
Nord, KTB, 26 and 31 July, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 314, 45, 145.
73. Der Führer, OKW/WFSt/Op, Nr. 662375/43 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung Nr. 50 für die
Vorbereitung der Rückführung des Geb. A.O.K. 20 nach Nordfinnland und
Nordnorwegen," 28 Sept. 1943, Hitlers Weisungen, 231-32.
74. OKW/WFSt/Op (H), Nr. 77459/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Besetzung der AalandInseln und der Insel Hochland," 19 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 131-35; "Die
nördliche Kriegsschauplatz," addendum to OKW KTB, Vol. IV, Part 2, 13-14; Skl, KTB,
29 Feb. 1944, 629; Ursula von Gersdorff, "Der Operationsplan 'Tanne,'" Östliche Ostsee,
145.
75. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 310/44 Chefs. AI, "Betrifft: 'Tanne,'" 9
Mar. 1944, T-1022/1825/PG 32518.; Carl-Axel Gemzel, Raeder, Hitler und
Skandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund: Gleerup, 1965),
276-77; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 66-69; Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und
die Marine, 520-24.
76. 1/Skl, B.Nr. 641/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Vorbereitungen zur Besetzung der Insel
Hochland," 1 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/161, 151-52; Skl, KTB, 14 Mar. 1944, 275-76.
77. For example, see HGr Nord, KTB, 4 and 10 April 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/273, 6667, 138; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771049/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 29
Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 74.
78. Skl, KTB, 21 June 1944, 565; ibid., 5 July 1944, 103-04.
79. For example, see OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772010/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Lageunterrichtung 20/6," 21 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 100; Skl, AdmQu II, B.Nr.
5132/44 gKdos.Chefs., “Besprechungen Chef Skl AdmQu II im Hauptquartier am
11.8.44 mit Konteradmiral Wagner, General Warlimont und Freg.Kapt. Meyer,” T1022/1825/PG 32520; OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 772903/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Betr.:
'Tanne,'" 16 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 460-01.
80. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772115/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 24.6," 24
June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 78-79; Skl, KTB, 24 June 1944, 656. There is no record
of this in Lagevorträge. Dönitz left for Hitler's headquarters on 22 June and returned late
the following day. Wagner states that on several occasions Hitler and Dönitz met
privately, but Dönitz did not reveal the content of these discussions (and thus they were
not recorded), since he regarded these talks as confidential; "Kurzbericht des Admirals
z.b.V. beim Ob.d.M. über Teilnahme des Ob.d.M. an Führerlagen," 28 Oct. 1945,
BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/ v.1. This is a handwritten report by Wagner,
prepared while he was a POW, apparently in response to a question posed by his captors.
After the success of the Normandy invasion, Dönitz had appointed Wagner Admiral for
Special Duty (Admiral zbV); Wagner served as liaison between Dönitz and the Skl
whenever Dönitz was absent from OKM and he accompanied the Grand Admiral on his
visits to Hitler's headquarters. (Hans Meyer took over Wagner's duties as head of Skl's
Operations Section.)
81. OKW/WFSt/Op(H)/Nord, Nr. 772122/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Studie über die
Fortführung des Kampfes im süd- und mittel-finnischen Raum im Fall eines
Zusammenbruches Finnlands," 26 June 1944, T-77/786/5514516-20. Assmann reiterated
these points a few days later; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772122/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.:
Fortführung Kampfes im süd- und mittelfinnischen Raum im Fall Zusammenbruchs
Finnland," 6 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 695-96.
82. Despite the minister's negative reply, Ribbentrop returned to this theme repeatedly;
Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie, 369-70; Ziemke, Stalingrad to
Berlin, 389-90; 9.Sich.Div. gKdos. 1289 A I, "Lagebeurteilung 3.9. 0600 Uhr," 3 Sept.
1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.147, 249.
83. Skl, KTB, 9 Aug. 1944, 206; Skl, "1/Skl, I Nord 2387/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 9 Aug.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 482.
84. Skl, KTB, 3 Sept. 1944, 58. Dönitz left for Hitler's headquarters on the evening of
31 Aug., and had returned by the morning of 4 September. It is interesting that Wagner
maintains that Dönitz did not attend any conferences with Hitler between 20 July and 13
Oct. 1944; see Wagner's note in Lagevorträge, 615. Yet the Skl War Diary states that
Wagner was also at Hitler's headquarters during Dönitz’s visit; Skl, KTB, 3 Sept. 1944,
69-70. In addition, the transcripts of Hitler's situation conferences list Dönitz and
Wagner as present, and include Dönitz’s remarks, at a conference on 1 September;
"Mittagslage vom 1. September 1944 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,
634-36.
85. Skl, KTB, 3 and 4 Sept. 1944, 69, 99. Besides the obvious lack of forces for this
operation, the seizure of the Åland islands was scrapped primarily in consideration of
Sweden. Hitler feared that it would prompt the Swedes to halt the shipment of iron ore
and ball-bearings to Germany; 1 Skl, B.Nr. 2326/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Aalandsfrage," [1]
Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 508-12; OKW/WFSt/Qu 2 (Nord), Nr. 77653/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Besondere Anordnungen Nr. 1 zum Stichwort 'Tanne,'" 11 Mar. 1944,
BA/MA, RW 4/v.646, 1-5; "Der nördliche Kriegsschauplatz," Part 2, OKW KTB, Vol. 4,
Part 1, 893. Sweden's military was aware of German plans to occupy the islands, and
quite concerned, fearing it could be a prelude to an attack on Sweden; Fst, avd M,
"Krigsdagbok (hereafter KDB)," 31 Mar. 1944, Kungl. Krigsarkivet, Stockholm
(hereafter KrA), F III:1; Fst, Avd M, "PM rörande åtgörder viden eventuell tysk
ockupation av Åland," 4 Apr. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3; Mst, KDB, 31 Mar., 1 April, 19
June, and 15 Sept. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.
86. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 2842/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: 'Tanne-Ost,'" 10 Sept. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/162, 312; Skl, "1/Skl I op 2819/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 9 Sept. 1944, ibid.,
317.
87. Skl, KTB, 9 Sept. 1944, 231. No one seemed to mind that the report stated the
Finnish commander had made this comment, tears in his eyes, while intoxicated; Adm
Ostland, "B.Nr. gKdos. Chefs. 268 C," 9 June 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/323, 73-75;
1/Skl, "B.Nr. I op 33814/44 geh.," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 318. In fairness to
Dönitz, there were other reports that the Finns planned to evacuate the island.
88. Skl, KTB, 10 and 11 Sept. 1944, 255-56, 274; Adm FHQu, "Nr. 292/44
gKdos.Chefs.," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162.
89. Skl, KTB, 12 and 13 Sept. 1944, 296, 334; MOK Ost/Führungsstab, "KTB über
Durchführung 'Tanne Ost,'" 14 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; 9.Sich.Div., Gkdos.
1289 A I, "Lagebeurteilung 3.9. 0600 Uhr," 3 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v. 147, 249;
Anlage 1 zu Lehr-Division Nord, Nr. 11/44 gKdos., "Betr: Aufenhalt auf der Insel
Suursaari," 27 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/323, 38-40; Lehr-Brigade Nord/Ia, Nr.
28/44 gKdos., "Denkschrift über Unternehmen 'Tanne,'" 7 May 1944, T-311/75/7097757.
90. OKL/Füst (Robinson), "Nr. 10160/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 11 Sept. 1944, T1022/1685/PG 32521; MOK Ost/Führstab, "gKdos. 05823," 12 Sept. 1944, ibid.;
9.Sich.Div., B.Nr. gKdos. 1373 A1, "Sperrbefehl für den 'Schnellschluss 1' und
'Schnellschluss 1 Süd,'" 12 Sept. 1944, Anlage 3 to 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 1-15 Sept. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/v.149; Skl, KTB, 12 and 15 Sept. 1944, 299, 407.
91. Skl, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944, 392. Communications with the landing force were so
fouled up that the Germans had to monitor Finnish radio reports for information; MOK
Ost, KTB über Durchführung "Tanne Ost," 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.
Goebbels remarked that the operation had been poorly planned and executed; TBJG, 17
Sept. 1944, 13: 499.
92. Again, Dönitz was at Hitler's headquarters with Wagner; Skl, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944,
385, 390, 394-95; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl Ia 28524/44 gKdos., "Vermerk über Ferngespräche
betr. 'Tanne Ost' am 15. September 1944," BA/MA, RM 7/162, 239; MOK Ost, KTB
über Durchführung "Tanne Ost," 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523.
93. "Neu 1/Skl Ib 29035/44 gKdos.," 20 Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A. The
Germans lost 132 dead and 1200 captured. In addition, 6 naval barges and 1 tug were
sunk, and 3 motor mine sweepers, 3 mine sweepers and 1 tug were damaged; Skl, KTB,
17 and 20 Sept. 1944, 457, 528-29.
94. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/313, 135. Two days later
Friessner again emphasized the importance of Hitler's diplomatic motives, although this
time he also mentioned ore imports from Finland and Sweden; "Besprechung am
20.7.1944 auf Gef.Stand der Armee-abteilung Grasser," T-312/1633/439. This is a topic
which merits investigation. Did other generals make similar claims?
95. TBJG, 18 Sept. 1944, 13: 508-09.
96. OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 9512/44 gKdos., "Operative und taktische Fragen der
Seekriegsführung in östlicher Ostsee und im Nordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RW
4/v.614; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. 395 II.Ang.Chefs.Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1.
September 1944," BA/MA, RM 87/43, 6-7.
97. In the West, from 6-15 June the German navy lost (not including ships damaged) 2
destroyers, 16 motor torpedo boats, 3 torpedo boats and 20 smaller vessels; Skl, KTB, 15
June 1944, 398. In the month of June alone, the navy lost 171 vessels the size of
destroyer and smaller; ibid., 14 July 1944, 303. Meisel stated that in the two months
following the Normandy landings, Germany had lost 219 escort vessels; "Vortrag des
Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle' am 24./25.8. 44,"
BA/MA, RM 7/100, 166-67.
98. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 30 and 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 239, 242; "MOK
Ost/Führstab op 05019 gKdos.," 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M523; OKW/WFSt/Op
(M)/Ia, Nr. 9512/44 gKdos., "Operative und taktische Fragen der Seekriegführung in
östlicher Ostsee und im Nordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.614; Adm.FHQu,
Nr. 157/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 1 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 11-12.
99. This reduced the number of Germany's remaining fleet torpedo boats by 30%; Walter
Lohmann and Hans Hildebrand, Die Deutsche Kriegsmarine 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim:
Podzun, 1959-64), 1: Part 54, 9-21. The Germans lost 397 men in this operation; Führer
der Zerstörer, B.Nr. 2710 gKdos., "Zusammenfassender Bericht über Unternehmung 6.
Torpedobootsflotille am 17.-18.8.44," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 45 Ost/6; MOK Ostsee,
Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944," 22 Sept. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/90, 337; Skl, KTB, 1 Sept. 1944, 20; Mike Whitley, "Das Desaster in der
Bucht von Narwa: Die Minenoperation der 6. T-Flotille vom 18./19. August 1944"
(Friedrich Forstmeier trans.), Marine-Rundschau, 80 (No. 10): 466-70. A former German
naval officer claims that the channel had been swept for mines the previous day, and that
Russian ships were ready to pick up survivors. He believes that the Soviets had been
tipped off by the Russian-born wife of a Finnish friend of Admiral Böhmer. Böhmer
supposedly issued orders by telephone from his friend’s house; Study No. 121, “Soviet
Naval Warfare (Partial Translation)” NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 94, 10.
100. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 25826/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Minenlage Finnenbusen," 23 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/162, 431. The mine barrage was successfully laid on the night of 7-8
Sept.; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 8 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/ v.149.
Chapter 3: The Retreat to Courland
1. As of 1 Sept. Army Group North reported a strength of 571,579 troops. During the
month of Aug. it had suffered 70,566 casualties and received only 41,841 replacements;
HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 123; Forwick, "Der Rückzug
der Heeresgruppe Nord nach Kurland,” 103, 211.
2. HGr Nord, KTB, 5, 7, 9 and 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 49-50, 67, 84-87,
107-09.
3. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 143/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8 Aug. 1944, T-312/958/9148790-93.
Army Detachment Narva’s former chief of staff maintained that a map exercise for the
withdrawal was conducted in Schörner’s presence in early September; Paul Reichelt,
“The Battles of Armeeabteilung Narva, June-September 1944,” Retreat from Leningrad,
160. HGr Nord, KTB, 6 and 12 Aug. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 19 III/315, 95-96, 202, 209,
218.
4. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 49-50, 56-58; Natzmer,
“Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 48.
5. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 404; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 and 11 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/315, 126, 178.
6. Schörner, Genob. und Ob. der HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 187/ 44 gKdos.Chefs., (Schörner to
Keitel)," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.708, 86; HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Sept. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 133.
7. The Soviets assembled 900,000 men, 17,483 guns and mortars, 3081 tanks and assault
guns and 2643 aircraft (excluding naval aircraft) for the attack. In addition, the Russians
had nearly doubled their armored strength opposite Army Group North. For this
operation the Russians disposed of 15 armies, including 3 Guards, 1 Guards Tank and 4
Shock armies; GVK, 4: 388-91; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 411-12; Deutschland im
zweiten Weltkrieg, 6: 72; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 2963/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste
Feindstellungen vom 3.9. 1944," 3 Sept. 1944, T-78/466/6445468.
8. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 and 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 147-48, 167-69; HGr
Nord/Ia, Nr. 200/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Befehl für Durchführung Planspiel 'Aster' (Absetzen
der H.Gr.Nord mit 18. Armee und Armeeabt. Narwa auf die Wenden-Stellung)," 14 Sept.
1944, T-312/1636/336-40; AOK 18, KTB, 15 Sept. 1944, T-312/957/ 9147962.
Guderian appointed Wenck Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff and head of OKH's
Command Group, which consisted of the Operations Department, Foreign Armies East
and the newly-established Fortifications Branch; its purpose was to co-ordinate
operations on the Eastern Front; Heinz Guderian, "General Critique of MSS# P-041a - P041ll and a Report on the June 1944-March 1945 Period," The German Army High
Command 1938-1945, Reel 4, MS# P-041jj, p. 8.
9. HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 3. Schörner’s notes for the
upcoming meeting reveal the arguments he intended to use to persuade Hitler: the army
group had completely exhausted its reserves in only two days and had barely prevented a
breakthrough; the Russians had additional reserves and soon would attack the Doblen and
Dorpat sectors; the order for "Aster" had to be issued immediately, before his forces were
split up and the retreat became impossible; lack of forces to hold open the corridor to
Army Group Center; an overall shortage of troops, weapons and aircraft fuel; a warning
that the mud period would begin in about three weeks, which would greatly reduce
mobility; and that the retreat would release 7 divisions; "Punkte für Führervortrag am
16.9.44," ibid., 15 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 189-94.
10. Ibid., 17 and 18 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 23, 71. Although Hitler
approved the order, Army Detachment Narva's rear area services had already begun their
withdrawal on the night of the 17th.
11. Ibid., 18 Sept. 1944, 60; PzAOK 3, KTB, 13, 14 and 18 Sept. 1944, T313/317/8595832-33, 8595840-41, 8595860-63. To provide unified command for this
attack, OKH attached 3rd Panzer Army to Army Group North as of 21 Sept.;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440592/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 20 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/16, 33.
12. From 17-25 Sept. German vessels evacuated over 100,000 people (46,168 troops,
13,049 wounded, 26,131 evacuees and 23,474 POWs) and 30,000 tons of goods from
Estonian ports; Skl, KTB, 26 Sept. 1944, 730; ibid., 3 Oct. 1944, 72; MOK Ostsee, Op
B.Nr. gKdos. 4630 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf September 1944," 9 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/90, 357.
13. Schörner had already informed Guderian that there was no reason to hold the
Segewold Position, or even a bridgehead around Riga. Guderian emphasized that the
command to hold Riga was "an extremely forcefully declared Führer order," from which
he dared not deviate; HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 82.
14. Ibid., 22 and 23 Sept. 1944, 131-32, 138, 143-44; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 4079/44 gKdos.,
"Weisung für die Kampfführung der H.Gr. Nord ab 23.9.1944," 23 Sept. 1944, T313/323/8602774-75. Nordland's achievement, covering approximately 500 kilometers
in less than 5 days, is astonishing. Schörner had earlier estimated that retreating units
would require 12 days to reach the Estland-West Position, and an additional 9 days from
that line to the Wenden Position.
15. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440608/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die weitere
Kampfführung," 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 47. During the conference
Wenck intervened on Schörner’s behalf, explaining that a retreat to the Riga-East
Position would release 16 of the 22 divisions currently in the Segewold Position. The
divisions freed by the retreat would allow Schörner to withdraw Third Panzer Army's
armored divisions from the front, and assemble them for "Blitz." The attack could not
begin until late Oct., because the retreat to the Riga-East Position was not scheduled until
12 Oct.; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 220-21, 233-35.
16. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 417-18; GVK, 4: 399; Shtemenko, The Soviet General
Staff at War, 1: 369.
17. 3rd Panzer Army defended a sector of nearly 200 kilometers with less than 6
divisions, and the average combat strength per kilometer was only 86 men and less than 2
pieces of artillery; PzAOK 3/Id, "Kräfteeinsatz PzAOK 3 (Infanterie und Artillerie)
(Stand 30.9. 44)," 30 Sept. 1944, T-313/323/8603093-94; HGr Nord, KTB, 15 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 14-15.
18. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept., RH 19 III/319, 241; ibid., 1, 2 and 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/330, 9, 14, 16, 24, 36; PzAOK 3/Ia, Nr. 55/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der
Lage am 2.10.44 Abends," 3 Oct. 1944, T-311/53/7065625-29; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 233/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Donner,'" 4 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/369.
19. Hitler re-attached 3rd Panzer Army to Army Group Center and ordered Schörner
immediately to launch a flank attack against Soviet force advancing on Memel and Libau.
At the same time, Army Group Center received instructions to mount an assault on
Memel from the south; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440630/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 10
Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 83. The army group issued 16th Army the order to
retreat to the Aa Position before Hitler had given his approval; HGr Nord, KTB, 10 and
11 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/330, 188, 208, 217-219, 222. For more information on these
withdrawals, HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 233/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Donner,'" 4 Oct.
1944, T-312/1636/369-71; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 097/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Studie
'Bewegung Regen,'" 7 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/376-82; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 100/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Bewegung 'Sonnenschein,'" 13 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/383-85.
20. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2868/44 gKdos.," 6 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254571; HGr Nord/Ia,
"Nr. 9808/44 geh.," 7 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/662. From 23 Sept.-16 Oct. the following
units passed through the 45-kilometer-long and 6-kilometer-wide corridor between Riga
and Schlock, which included 2 river crossings with only 3 roads available: 3 army-level
and 8 corps headquarters with all their supply complement; 20 divisions and 1 brigade
(across the Düna); 9 divisions and 1 brigade (west of the Düna); 120 flak batteries; and
174 miscellaneous units (engineers, police, Organization Todt units, artillery, etc.). In
addition, 111,007 vehicles passed over the 2 Düna bridges in Riga after 25 Sept.; AOK
16/Ia, "Nr. 7350/44 geh.," 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/636/8264190-96.
21. HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 11, 13 and 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 209-12, 219,
253, 260-62, 270; OKH/ GenStdH/OpAbt, "Nr. 440639/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 87; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, Nr. 440645 /44 gKdos. Chefs.,
"Befehl für die weitere Kampfführung im memelländisch-kurlandisch Raum," 16 Oct.
1944, RH 19 III/16, 89; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia)/MVO, Nr. 440635 /44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Einsatz von Seestreitkräften im Landbeschuss," 12 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294757; Skl,
"1/Skl I Nord 3256/44 gKdos.Chefs." 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 38. On
Dönitz’s interest, Skl, KTB, 14 and 15 Oct. 1944, 338, 358, 362.
22. Der Chef des GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440629/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der
Lage an der Ostfront," 8 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294774; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef),
"Gedanken über die Weiterführung des Kampfes im Osten (in Stichworten)," 18 Oct.
1944, ibid., Fame 6294723-24.
23. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10 mit Oberbefehlshaber und
Chef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand der
Heeresgruppe," Chefs., T-78/338/6294698-702. Although this was clearly a very
important conference, Army Group North's war diary contains no mention of the meeting
with Bonin. The war diary merely states that Schörner flew to Libau in the afternoon;
HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 57.
24. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440652/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/16, 91; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 134, 143.
Although there was no mention of a later attack to East Prussia, Schörner’s remarks
during his discussion with Bonin on 19 Oct. would indicate that this was his end goal. In
addition, see Schörner’s comments on his desire to break through to the Reich in
"Besprechung mit Felix M. Steiner am 10. April 1955," BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N
60/73.
25. OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440662/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Oct. 1944, T78/338/6294665-66; Forwick, "Rückzug nach Kurland," 172.
26. Skl, KTB, 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, 385, 416; Adm FHQu, Nr. 297/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Lageunterrichtung 12/9," 12 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 264; Adm FHQu, Nr.
311/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 15.9.," 15 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100,
279. Again, there is no mention of Dönitz’s meeting with Hitler in Lagevorträge. Dönitz
returned from Hitler's headquarters on the morning of the 19th; Skl, KTB, 19 Sept. 1944,
495.
27. Lagevorträge, 16 Sept. 1944, 419; Skl, B.Nr 1/Skl Ia, 2972/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Betrifft: Heeresgruppe Nord," 16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 224; Skl, KTB, 16
Sept. 1944, 419; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I L 29573/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Schutz des Raumes der
östl. Ostsee gegen Feindluftangriffe und Sicherung gegen Feindstreitkräfte, insbes. UBoote," 28 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 110-13.
28. Other tasks included the conveyance and protection of supply transports to the Baltic
States, protection of merchant shipping and training areas in the Baltic, supporting the
Army by transport tasks and coastal bombardment, coastal defense in the Baltic States
and the protection of Moon Sound; Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Weisung für die Seekriegsführung in der östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/162, 106-09.
29. Skl, 1/Skl 30074/44 gKdos., "Lageunterrichtung 2. 10. Abends," 2 Oct. 1944, T1022/1709/PG 32122-A.
30. MVO beim GenStdH, "B.Nr. 2776/44 gKdos.," 9 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 47.
31. Adm FHQu, Nr. 142/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Lage im baltischen Raum," 29 July
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 563-64. Skl, 1/Skl I Op 2235/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr:
Versorgung Heeresgr. Nord über See," 26 July 1944, BA/MA, Anlage 24 to MOK Ost,
KTB (16-31 July 1944), RM 31/M 522. The Skl reminded Conrady and Voss of the
importance of northern Courland for the army group's supply at the beginning of Sept.;
"B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2705/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 380.
32. HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 10308/44 gKdos.," 4 Aug. 1944, T-311/229/699; HGr Nord/Ia
Op, "Nr. 3392/44 gKdos.," 6 Aug. 1944, T-312/627/8253823; PzAOK 3, KTB, 14 Sept.
1944, T-313/317/8595842; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Sept., 7, 9 and 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/319, 179, RH 19 III/330, 142, 174, 212. 16th Army, responsible for Windau,
ordered the city's commander that if necessary, he was to allow his men to be cut off
inside Windau and fight to the end; Anlage zu AOK 16/Ia/Id, Nr. 3024/44 gKdos.,
"Besondere Kampfanweisung für den Festungs-Kdt. Windau," 18 Oct. 1944, T312/634/8262306.
33. OKH/GenStdH/MVO, "B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/162, 326; Skl, KTB, 6 Sept. 1944, 158. Conrady reported that as of 1 July Army Group
North had 520,000 men, 147,000 horses and 1,932 artillery pieces; MVO beim GenStdH,
"B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos. Chefs. II. Ang.," 7 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 325;
Seetransportchef f.d. Wehrmacht, OKM/Skl, "Adm QuVI 5294/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8
Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 327-28. From this information, Salewski asserts that
Army Group North's evacuation was not possible as early as Sept. 1944, and would have
been equally impossible a month later; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 491.
This author disagrees with Salewski’s interpretation.
34. B.Nr. 1/Skl I Nord, 31363/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Einsatz Flottenstreitkräfte als
Transporter," 21 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 347.
35. HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 238, 242; ibid., 1, 4 and 14 Oct.
1944, RH 19 III/330, 1, 6, 53, 271; ibid., 15 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 8, 13; 9. Sich.
Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 30. September 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149. The
vessels Dönitz ordered to remain operational were Prinz Eugen, Hipper, Scheer, Lützow,
Köln and Emden; Leipzig and Hansa were exempt. The World War I battleships
Schlesien and Schleswig Holstein were deemed unsuitable for coastal bombardment; Skl,
KTB, 5 and 15 Oct. 1944, 118, 363.
36. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3066/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte zur
Abwehr von Landungen im Skagerrak-Raum," 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 32729; Skl, KTB, 8 Oct. 1944, 198.
37. HGr Nord, KTB, 6, 16 and 18 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/318, 62, RH 19
III/319, 12, 71; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 214/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 18 Sept. 1944, T312/1634/373.
38. The Skl noted that loss of Estonian oil would reduce the navy's Heizöl allotment by
8-10%; Skl, KTB, 16 Sept., 416. One study of the navy's fuel supply during the war cites
this as evidence that the oil installations played no decisive role in the fall of 1944;
Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, Die Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine 1935 bis 1945 (Freiburg:
Rombach, 1973), 34. Kummetz claimed that Admiral Eastern Baltic's entire forces were
supplied by Estonian shale oil; MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. 3813 AI op, "Kurzer Rückblick
auf Juli 1944," 19 Aug. 1944, RM 31/M 522.
39. The Germans captured Tütters by sending an assault force in trucks 42 kilometers
across the frozen Gulf of Finland; Theodor Burchardi, "Operationen in der östlichen
Ostsee," in BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v. 15, 3. Burchardi was Admiral Eastern
Baltic.
40. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Aug., 13 and 21 Sept. 1943, T-311/57/7070318, 7070378,
7070409; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 2937/43 gKdos., "Betr.: Insel Tytärsaari," 13 Sept. 1943, T311/73/7094619-20; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt IN, Nr. 9408/43 gKdos., "Bezug: HGr
Nord/Ia, Nr. 2937 /43 gKdos.," 20 Sept. 1943, T-311/73/7094621.
41. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Chef, "IN-Nr. 430635/43 gKdos.Chefs. (Heusinger to
Kinzel)," 22 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/13, 9; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 3141/44 gKdos.,
"Betrifft: Insel Tytärsaari," 27 Sept. 1943, Anlage 8a to MOK Ost,
"Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8. bis 21.12.43,", BA/MA, RM 31/M 522.
42. MOK Ostsee, "Sonderkriegstagebuch für die Zeit vom 17.8. bis 21.12.43," 4 and 11
Sept., 29 Nov. 1943, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522; Verbindungsoffizier des GenStdH beim
OKM, "B.Nr. 1 Skl If 2865/43 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Sept. 1943, BA/MA, RH 19 III/13, 1011.
43. Admiral Ostland, KTB, 3 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, M 533/ 39078a; MOK
Ostsee/Führstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 1023/44 A III, "Kurzer Überblick auf Februar 1944," 8
Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 299; Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1944, 87.
44. Skl, KTB, 5 July 1944, 101. This occurred the same day that army units earmarked
for "Tanne" were released for front action and the navy received responsibility for the
operation against Hogland.
45. "B.Nr. 1/Skl, Ia 2113/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 14 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 634;
MOK Ost, KTB, 14 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522; Skl, KTB, 25 July 1944, 531;
Skl KTB, 17 Sept. 1944, 442-43; MOK Ostsee/ Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I,
"Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im
Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 422.
46. Adm FHQu, Nr. 129/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 23 July 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/101, 64-65.
47. Adm FHQu, Nr. 384/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 8.10.44," 8 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/100, 358.
48. Wagner relayed Dönitz’s order for the Skl immediately to prepare a report on these
transport tasks, and pointed out that it was especially important to restrict information
about of these operational intentions to the smallest number of personnel; Adm zbV,
"397/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 30.
49. The Skl received this message at 1740 hours on 19 Oct., and OKH issued the orders
to Army Group North on the afternoon of the following day; Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944,
484-85, 488-89.
50. Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 603-05.
51. Adm FHQu, Nr. 421/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 21/10," 21 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/100, 393; Adm FHQu, Nr. 429/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung
24.10.," 24 Oct. 1944, ibid., 395.
52. Guderian also stated that he needed 100,000 replacements, sufficient weapons and
fuel, and that the Luftwaffe must gain air superiority over the Soviets at least at critical
sectors of the front; Der Chef des GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440629/44 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Beurteilung der Lage an der Ostfront," 8 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294766-75.
53. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 264-65. Guderian slightly
amended his position the next day. He ordered Schörner to break through to Memel and
establish a line Garsden-Plunge-Zidikiai; next, Schörner was to thrust towards Heydekrug
and link up with forces from Army Group Center attacking to the north from Tilsit;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440645/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Befehl für die weitere
Kampfführung im memelländisch-kurlandisch Raum," 16 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/16, 89.
54. Voss claimed that the situation in East Prussia required the withdrawal of units from
Courland; Adm FHQu, Nr. 421/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 21/10," 21 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 393. A few days earlier the Skl had briefed various naval
stations on the situation, and declared that the further retention of Courland depended
upon future Soviet attacks as well as on the situation in East Prussia, whither Army
Group North possibly would have to give up forces; 1/Skl 31572/44 gKdos.,
"Lageunterrichtung 18.10," 18 Oct. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A.
55. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 318, 50. Schörner acknowledged
Hitler's hope that the situation in Finland would swing in Germany's favor, but insisted
that, militarily, the retreat was essential; ibid., 15 Sept. 1944, 168. Voss had earlier
reported that Hitler believed a definite assessment of Finland's attitude could be gained
only after 15 Sept.; Adm.FHQu, Nr. 286/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 5/9," 5
Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A. Presumably, the Finns' fierce resistance to the
Hogland operation provided Hitler with his "definite assessment."
56. Hitler informed Jodl that he was also hesitant because peace feelers had been
extended, and he needed the Baltic States to bargain with; Tagebuch Generaloberst Jodl,
16 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 57.
57. HGr Nord, KTB, 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 218.
58. In reply to Natzmer's query whether the army group could expect to retreat from
Estonia, Wenck answered that the occupation of Hogland posed no problem, since it was
intended only as a temporary measure; ibid., 12 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 114.
59. For example, ibid., 7, 11, and 26 Sept., 8 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 67, 104, RH 19
III/319, 190, RH 19 III/330, 160-61.
60. Grasser's order refers to a withdrawal to the Riga area in order to break through to
the southwest via the Tuckum-Schlock corridor, as had been the case in "Map Exercise
Königsberg;" Armeeabt. Narwa/Ia, Nr. 1250/44 gKdos., "Armee-Befehl für die
Durchführung der Bewegung 'Tannenbaum,'" 16 Sept. 1944, T-312/963/9154900.
"Tannenbaum" was Army Detachment Narva's code-name for "Aster."
61. HGr Nord, KTB, 16 and 17 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 3, 24.
62. “Interview, Harold Deutsch with Puttkamer,” 27 June 1970, IfZ, ZS 285/III, 14-15;
see also Weinberg, A World at Arms, 668-69.
63. For example, see "Stellungnahme zu dem Aufsatz von Walter Baum 'Der
Zusammenbruch der obersten deutschen militärischen Führung 1945,'" BA/MA, Nachlass
Dönitz, N 236/10, in which Dönitz stated, "I did not have the slightest influence on army
operations in the East, and merely received a general picture by my occasional
participation in the army situation conference with Hitler." But as Siegfried Westphal,
the former Chief of Staff to the army's Commander-in-Chief, West, pointed out to Dönitz
after the war, if as late as mid-March 1945 Guderian assumed that Hitler had ordered
Courland held for reasons relating to naval strategy, then Guderian probably had a good
reason for this belief. Dönitz had complained about Westphal's remarks in his book that
Dönitz convinced Hitler to hold Courland and the Crimea. Westphal also replied that he
had repeatedly requested an additional army group headquarters staff and suggested that
of Army Group Courland. OKW had refused every request with the claim that Dönitz
had insisted upon Courland's defense in the interests of U-boat training; Dönitz to
Westphal, 13 Mar. 1965, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/7, 111-13; Westphal to Dönitz, 9 Apr.
1965, N 236/7, 117-18. Dönitz lodged a similar complaint with Ruge; Dönitz to Ruge,
11 July 1961, N 236/7, 61-62.
Chapter 4: The Struggle for the Baltic Isles
1. The approximate size of the three main islands is as follows: Moon, 77 sq.mi.; Dagö,
372 sq.mi.; and Ösel, 1042 sq.mi.; Walther Melzer, Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln,
1917-1941-1944 (Neckargemünd: Vowinckel, 1960), 9.
2. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 096/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Führerbefehl Nr. 10," 13 Sept. 1943,
T-311/74/7097064; HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 14 and 19 Feb. 1944, T-311/58/7072966,
7072996-97, 7073104, 7073233.
3. Wehrmacht-Kommandant Baltische Inseln/Ia, "Nr. 1901/44 geh.," 25 Sept. 1944, T312/964/9155584; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440530/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung
für die weitere Kampfführung im Osten," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 16; HGr
Nord, KTB, 22 and 27 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/319, 138, 203; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),
"Nr. 440592/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 33.
4. Jürg Meister, "Die sowjetrussischen amphibischen Operationen, 1939-1945," MarineRundschau, 52 (No. 5): 132. The Soviets landed approximately 78,000 troops on the
islands in the course of this operation; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 9: 181. One
Soviet account states that although this was the largest amphibious assault by the Baltic
Fleet; the largest Russian amphibious operation of the war occurred at Kertsch-Eltigen in
Nov. 1943; Vasiliy Achkasov and Nikolai Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the
Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 119-20, 140.
5. GVK, 4: 410-11; HGr Nord, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 249-50.
6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 440608/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die weitere
Kampfführung," 30 Sept. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 19 III/16, 47; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 2.
7. HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 68-70, 89-90, 95-96,
103.
8. Ibid., 8 and 10 Oct. 1944, 146, 163, 194.
9. Approximately 500 Soviet troops landed behind the front on Sworbe's east coast on 12
Oct. The Russians dumped their men into the water 300-400 meters from the beach,
certainly an unpleasant experience in Baltic waters in Oct. German naval vessels
prevented a second wave from landing, and almost the entire force was killed or captured.
A company-strength landing on the west coast on 11 Oct. also failed; ibid., 12 Oct. 1944,
232, 236; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.150, 51-52; AOK 16, KTB,
20-24 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8261802-17.
10. Adm.FHQu, Nr. 423/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 22.10.," 22 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/100, 395; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 and 24 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/
331, 91, 117-19.
11. Adm.F.H.Qu, "Nr. 443/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 28 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 319.
12. OKH/GenStdH/MVO/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440666/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 29 Oct. 1944, T78/338/6294677; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 3100/44 gKdos.," 28 Oct. 1944, T-312/635/8262911.
13. HGr Nord, KTB, 19 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 31, 41, 48-49.
14. AOK 16, KTB, 21 Nov, 1944, T-312/634/8261916; HGr Nord, KTB, 23 Nov. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 125, 138. On the night of 23-24 Nov. 4491 troops and 678
wounded were evacuated; Skl, KTB, 3 Dec. 1944, 66. 16th Army reported 5296
casualties on Sworbe from 18-24 Nov., nearly 50% of its entire strength on the peninsula;
HGr Nord, KTB, 8 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 332, 112; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 8733/44
geh. II. Ang., "Betr.: Gefechtsbericht über die Kampfhandlung auf Sworbe," 8 Dec. 1944,
T-312/636/8264225-26.
15. HGr Nord, KTB, 26 Sept. and 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 193-94, RH 19
III/330, 225, 229. After the war Natzmer referred to Sworbe’s defense as “totally
senseless;” Oldwig von Natzmer, “Festung Kurland: Der Kampf im Norden der
deutschen Ostfront 1944/45,” April 1949, IfZ, ZS 111, 53-54.
16. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 243-44, 264, 266.
17. Skl, 1/Skl I Nord 2396/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Anfrage Adm.F.H.Qu nach
Beurteilung Bedeutung baltischer Inseln für Ostsee-Kriegführung," 10 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/162, 481; Skl, KTB, 10 Aug. 1944, 230.
18. HGr Nord, KTB, 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 6-7, 12-13; Adm.östl.
Ostsee gKdos. 5032, "Lagebetrachtung Sworbe," 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 31;
HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4499/44 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262497-98.
19. Skl, 1/Skl I Nord 31177/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Bedeutung Halbinsel Sworbe für
Seekriegführung," 15 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 20.
20. "MOK Ost Füst op 06457 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, BA/ MA, RM 7/162, 18; Skl,
KTB, 17 and 18 Oct. 1944, 410-11, 437-38.
21. HGr Nord, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 74-75; Skl, KTB, 23 Oct.
1944, 561.
22. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10. mit Oberbefehlshaber und
Chef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand der
Heeresgruppe," Chefs., 19 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294698-701; Adm FHQu, Nr. 411/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 17.10.44," 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 376;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440562/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/16, 91.
23. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 7389/44 geh.," 12 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254650; AOK 16, KTB,
12 Oct. 1944, T-312/627/ 8253752; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/330, 233; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2994/44 gKdos.," 15 Oct. 1944, T-312/628/8254690; AOK
16/Ia, "Nr. 7566/44 geh.," 19 Oct. 1944, T-312/635/8262861; AOK 16, KTB, 19 Oct.
1944, T-312/634/8261798. On the 20th the Armed Forces Commander for the Baltic
Isles issued an order to his troops that Hitler had commanded Sworbe's defense due to its
importance for the war at sea. Burchardi notified the Skl that as a result of this order,
army troops on Sworbe believed they were there only for naval interests;
Wehrmachtkommandant der Baltischen Inseln/Ia, Nr. 2024/44 geh., "Befehl für die
weitere Verteidigung der Festung Sworbe," 20 Oct. 1944, T-312/636/8264455; Skl, KTB,
21 Oct. 1944, 513.
24. HGr Nord, KTB, 23 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 109. The army group's
diarist noted "It [Sworbe's evacuation] has again been refused at the navy’s request;"
ibid., 111. This view was reiterated a few days later by 16th Army's quartermaster:
"Giving up Sworbe is not possible, since the navy absolutely requires the peninsula for its
purposes;" AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "O.Qu.Besprechung am 25.10.44, 9.30 Uhr," T312/640/8268877.
25. "Gedanken über einen Ost-West Konflikt im nordöstlichen Seeraum Europas,"
(winter 1948-1949), BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v. 13, 13. In a report from March
1945, Kummetz wrote, “It is obvious what significance these islands had for the navy,
that is, for control of the eastern Baltic;” MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos.
600/45 F I, “Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK
Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM 7/90, 423.
26. Lagevorträge, 9 July 1944, 595-96; Skl, KTB, 14 July 1944, 306; Skl KTB, 22 Sept.
1944, 602, 610.
27. Skl, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, 809-10; ibid, 2 Oct. 1944, 30-31.
28. The Skl ordered Lützow, Prinz Eugen, a destroyer flotilla, and two torpedo boat
flotillas readied for action; ibid., 3 and 7 Oct. 1944, 59-61, 163; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op
3151/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz 2. Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung H.Gr.Nord," 3
Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 82-83.
29. Skl, KTB, 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, 169, 188-89.
30. Lagevorträge, 14 Oct., 28 and 30 Nov. 1944, 605, 618-19; Skl, KTB, 19, 20 and 23
Nov. 1944, 407, 431, 512-13.
31. Skl, KTB, 21and 24 Nov. 1944, 454, 537.
32. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1944, 484; "1/Skl IE 31587/44 gKdos.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/163, 350.
33. Skl, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, 669-70; AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 3144/44 gKdos., "Betr.:
Bevorratung Sworbe," 2 Nov. 1944, T-312/636/8264197; AOK 16/OQu/ Qu1, KTB, 5
Nov. 1944, T-312/640/8268614.
34. Soviet aircraft and artillery had destroyed nearly every building on the peninsula, and
Sworbe's groundwater level was only half a meter below ground; HGr Nord, KTB, 2
Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 18; AOK 16, KTB, 1 Nov. 1944, T312/634/8261841; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5351/44 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf
Oktober 1944," 20 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 367; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 100.
35. Obkdo HGr Nord/Der Oberquartiermeister/Qu 1, Nr. 22468/44 geh., "Vortragsnotiz
über den Besuch bei der 23. I.D. auf Halbinsel Sworbe am 25.10.44," 29 Oct. 1944, T312/641/8270468-69; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 192.
36. This was the opinion of both MOK Ost and the 9th Escort Division; "MOK
Ost/Führstab op 06745 gKdos. F I op," 30 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 262;
9.Sich.Div., Anlage 6 zu KTB für den Zeit 1-15 Nov. 1944, "Versorgung Sworbe,"
BA/MA, RM 67/v. 150, 183-84. Admiral Böhmer had been killed by partisans near
Windau on 1 Oct., and Blanc took over as commander of the 9th Escort Division on 10
Oct.
37. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4499/44 gKdos.," 16 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/2862497-98; AOK 16,
KTB, 1 Nov. 1944, ibid., Frame 8261841; Adm.Östl.Ostsee, "5272/44 F I," 1 Nov. 1944,
ibid., Frame 8262564; B.Nr. 1/Skl I Ost 32523/44 gKdos., "Betrifft: Winterbevorratung
Sworbe," 3 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 263-63.
38. At this time only 38.3% of the necessary tonnage had been delivered. Sworbe was
well stocked with diesel fuel (77%) and medical (80%) and veterinary (91%) supplies,
but stores of ammunition (44%), food (38%), fodder (25%) and clothing (34%) revealed
serious shortages; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "Bevorratung Sworbe Stand 17.11.44," T312/640/8268841. During Oct. and Nov. the Navy shipped 5554 men, 231 animals, 293
vehicles and 8145 tons of supplies from Windau to Sworbe; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,
B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im
Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM7/ 90, 440.
39. For example, on 21-22 Oct. the following forces were sent into action off Sworbe: 2
torpedo boats, 3 artillery barges, 33 cutters, 10 motor torpedo boats, 5 motor mine
sweepers, and 13 barges; Skl, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, 546. On 20 Nov. Blanc held 7 minesweepers and patrol boats, 17 artillery barges, 45 cutters, 5 motor torpedo boats and 6
motor mine sweepers ready for action off Sworbe; HGr Nord, KTB, 20 Nov. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 58.
40. On 4 Oct. the Navy offered Prinz Eugen for coastal shelling, but the army group
turned down this proposal, claiming that it would tie up fighter aircraft needed to support
the land fighting; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept., 4 and 7 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319,
259-60, RH 19 III/330, 51, 134; Skl, KTB, 6 Oct. 1944, 140; MOK Ost/Führstab Op
06236 gKdos., "Weisung für Einsatz 2. Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung Heeresgruppe
Nord," 5 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 65-66; "1/Skl I Nord 31886/44 gKdos.," 22 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 345.
41. Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Seestrategie in zwei Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: Kurt
Vowinckel, 1957), 203-04. The 2nd Task Force supported German troops on Sworbe on
24 Oct. and again from 20-24 Nov. The warships Admiral Scheer, Lützow and Prinz
Eugen, as well as numerous destroyers and torpedo boats took part in this action; Jürgen
Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 (Derek
Masters trans.) (London: Ian Allen, 1974), 2: 455, 470. The battleship Tirpitz, in
Norway, had been sunk by British aircraft on 12 Nov., and the heavy cruiser Admiral
Hipper was not fully operational.
42. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 262. An entry from 12 Oct.
states that there had been 1092 casualties among the 3200 naval troops on Ösel, and two
weeks later there were only 667 naval soldiers on Sworbe; ibid., 12 and 26 Oct. 1944, RH
19 III/330, 236-37, RH 19 III/331, 154. Of a total of 4000 combat troops on Sworbe,
2000 belonged to the Navy; ibid., 21 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 80; MOK
Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten
Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM
7/90, 425.
43. Jürgen Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im Finnischen Meerbusen, Juni-August 1941,"
Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 1): 16-19; Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. 1941, 287; Salewski, Die
deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 418-23; Jürgen Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im Finnischen
Meerbusen, September-November 1941," Marine-Rundschau, 64 (No. 2): 96-97.
44. Skl, I Nord, "Lageübersicht Ostsee vom 16. bis 30. April 1942," gKdos., BA/MA,
RM 7/90, 161-62; Gr Nord, "Nr. 03546/42 gKdos.," 18 April 1942, BA/MA, RM 7/159,
163-65.
45. The net barrier consisted of two rows of steel net 50 meters apart; Forstmann,
"Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und der östlichen Ostsee von 1942 bis zum 8. Mai 1945,"
BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N 539/v.15, 6.
46. Skl, KTB, 7 and 12 Sept. 1943, 138-39, 249.
47. For example, from 20-21 July, of 5 mine sweepers and 2 picket boats protecting the
mine barrages, Soviet aircraft sank 2 mine sweepers and both picket boats; the remaining
3 vessels were damaged; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 22 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148; MOK
Ost/Führstab, "gKdos. 421/44 Chefs.," 25 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 523; Skl, KTB,
23 July 1944, 488; MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. 3813 AI op, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Juli
1944," 19 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 327; 9. Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung
zum 31 Juli 1944," 31 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 67/v.148, 248.
48. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2092/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Fortführung Kampfes in Südund Mittelfinnland," 11 July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 663-64; Skl, KTB, 14 July 1944,
306.
49. Skl, KTB, 31 July 1944, 698; OKW/WFSt/Op (M)/Ia, Nr. 009512/44 gKdos.,
"Operative und taktische Fragen der Seekriegführung in östlicher Ostsee und im
Nordmeer," 14 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 4/v.614; Skl, KTB, 1 and 2 Aug. 1944, 2, 28-29;
Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 23871/44 gKdos.," 1 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 522.
50. For example, Soviet aircraft sank 5 German ships guarding the mine barrages on 1
Aug.; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4341 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf August 1944,"
22 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 337. At the beginning of Aug. only 12 vessels were
operational, compared to 37 a month earlier. By mid-August, another 2 vessels had been
sunk and 15 damaged (including one submarine); 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 1 Aug. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 67/v.149; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 15. August 1944,"
BA/MA, RM 67/v.149.
51. The submarines shifted from protecting the Seeigel to the area west of the Nashorn
barrage; 7 U-boats remained at sea in this area; Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Sept. 1944, 618,
650; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl IE 3116/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Sperrplannung Rigabusen," 29
Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 103.
52. Despite this lack of preparation, Soviet submarines sank only 2 German ships in Oct.
Kummetz estimated that the Soviets had at least 25 submarines ready for action in the
Baltic; 9 Sich. Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RM
67/v.150, 123; Skl, KTB, 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, 164, 170-71, 201.
53. Skl, KTB, 7 Oct. 1944, 169.
55. Ibid., 8 and 10 Oct. 1944, 200, 241-42.
55. Dönitz commanded that Hipper and Scheer be readied for action and he ordered the
Fleet to examine whether the (never fully-converted) auxiliary cruiser Hansa and the
light cruiser Nürnberg could provide support to the army; ibid., 13 and 14 Oct., 307, 33334, 338-39. A few days later Hitler asked if the old battleships (both commissioned in
1908) Schlesien and Schleswig Holstein were capable of coastal bombardment. The Skl,
however, concluded that these vessels were too old and had insufficient armament; ibid.,
15 Oct. 1944, pp. 363-64; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I op, 31366/44 gKdos., "Betr.: KB-Zustand
der Schiffe des Ausbildungsverbandes," 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 6.
56. Burchardi requested the transfer of German shipyard workers to Courland; Skl, KTB,
7, 9 and 12 Oct. 1944, 164, 224, 287.
57. For example, on 22 Nov. Kummetz reported that Burchardi had to withdraw 9 of his
23 escorts for action off Sworbe; MOK Ost/Füstab, Op 07188 F I M, gKdos., "Betr.:
Sicherung Nachschub Heeresgruppe Nord," 22 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 199; Skl,
KTB, 20-23 Nov. 1944, 443, 453, 466, 486, 505-06, 524; Adm. östl. Ostsee gKdos. F I,
"Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 1944," 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 156.
58. In October the 9th Escort Division had 4 vessels sunk and 27 damaged; 9.Sich.Div.,
KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 31. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.150, 122. In Nov.
almost all torpedo boats, mine sweepers, patrol boats and artillery barges were damaged
in action off Sworbe; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung für
den Monat November 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 390-91; Adm. östl.
Ostsee gKdos. F I, "Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 1944," 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/163, 157.
59. Skl, KTB, 23 Nov. 1944, 514; Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl Ia 3602/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Nov.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 182-83.
60. Kummetz noted that this mine barrage represented no serious obstacle to the Soviets,
and at most somewhat restricted their freedom of movement; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab,
B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im
Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945, RM 7/90, 428.
61. Skl, KTB, 12 Dec. 1944, 291-92. After this second catastrophe, the Skl finally took
steps to prevent another disaster, and ordered that new minefields be laid at least 3
nautical miles from previous mine barrages; ibid., 21 Dec. 1944, 536-38; B.Nr. 1/Skl I E
36668/44 gKdos., "Besprechungsniederschrift betreffend Verlust Z 35 und Z 36 vom
21.12.1944," BA/MA, RM 7/163, 72-80. A detailed account of this action is Mike
Whitley, "Kriegsschauplatz Finnenbusen 1944: Der Verlust der Zerstörer 'Z35' und
'Z36,'" Marine-Rundschau, 78 (No. 5): 263-67.
62. Mike Whitley, Destroyer! German Destroyers in World War II (London: Arms and
Armor, 1983), 268-79.
63. GVK, 4: 412; Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great
Patriotic War, 141-42.
64. HGr Nord, KTB, 10 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/330, 212, 215.
65. After the war Natzmer claimed that Schörner had refused to evacuate the peninsula
and gave credit for saving the troops on Sworbe to Army Group North’s staff; Natzmer,
“Festung Kurland,” 54. Although possible, Schörner certainly played a role in the
decision to evacuate, and had repeatedly asked Hitler for permission to withdraw from
Sworbe.
66. Dönitz kept approximately 10% of his submarines in the Gulf of Finland for the rest
of the year: on 1 Oct. 14 of Germany's 141 operational submarines; on 1 Nov. 15 of 135
operational U-boats; and on 1 Dec. 16 of 140 operational submarines; 2/Skl BdU Op,
B.Nr. gKdos. 459 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. Oktober 1944," 6 Oct.. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 87/44, 9-10; 2/Skl, BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 507 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der UBoote am 1. November 1944," 7 Nov. 1944, RM 87/45, 6-7; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos.
Chefs. 560 Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. Dezember 1944," 11 Dec. 1944, RM 87/46, 78.
67. Burchardi, "Operationen in der östlichen Ostsee," 1954, BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner,
N 539/v. 15, 19.
68. AOK 16/Ia, Nr. 3144/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Bevorratung Sworbe," 2 Nov. 1944, T312/641/8270436-38. For the Navy's nonchalant attitude regarding this, Admiral östliche
Ostsee, B.Nr. gKdos. 5399 F I, "Betr.: Bevorratung Sworbe," 9 Nov. 1944, ibid., Frame
8270403.
69. HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 256-57, 267.
Chapter 5: Army Group Courland, October 1944-May 1945
1. Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1964), 760;
John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990), 510; Erickson, The
Road to Berlin, 422.
2. There is some difference of opinion in establishing the dates of the Courland Battles.
Haupt, the author of several studies on Courland, with some logic counts the Soviet
offensive from 16-26 Oct. as the 1st Courland Battle, and groups together as the 2nd
Courland Battle what this author designates the 2nd and 3rd Courland Battles. In general,
this study will follow dates in AOK 18, "Hauptdaten Ostfeldzug 22.6.41-30.4.45,"
BA/MA, RH 20-18/928.
3. HGr Nord, KTB, 27 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 132-35; Der Ob der HGr
Nord/Ia, "Nr. 150/45 geh.," 4 Jan. 1945, T-311/134/7179641.
4. Skl, KTB, 11 Mar. 1945, 154.
5. HGr Nord, KTB, 23 and 26 Nov., 22 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 136, 140,
177, RH 19 III/335, 22. The Russians retained powerful artillery units opposite
Courland. On the first day of the 5th Courland Battle they unleashed a barrage of about
130,000 shells against 18th Army; AOK 18, KTB, 20 and 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2018/926, 104, 116.
6. Germans casualties are as follows: in the 1st Courland Battle 21,292; in the 2nd
Courland Battle 13,677; for the 3rd Courland Battle 27,144; in the 4th Courland Battle
13,315; in the 5th Courland Battle (from 15 Feb-14 Mar.) 25,406; and in the 6th Courland
Battle 17,037, for a total of 117,871; HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/
335, 185; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN, "Tagesmeldung H.Gr. Kurland vom 4.2.45," 5 Feb.
1945, T-78/308/6259758; HGr Kurland/ Ia, "Nr. 35/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 17 Mar. 1945, T78/339/6295136; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 4058/45 geh.," 6 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335,
185.
7. As best as can be determined, the army group suffered approximately 154,108
casualties up to 20 April 1945. From 10 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944, 18th Army reported 45,945
casualties (6,888 dead, 33,556 wounded and 5,501 missing), and 16th Army (from 16
Oct.-31 Dec.) a total of 35,825 casualties (5,627 killed, 24,825 wounded and 5,373
missing). It is uncertain whether Army Detachment Grasser/Kleffel's losses (10,226 men
from 10 Oct.-3 Nov.) are included in these figures. From 1 Jan-20 April 1945, 16th and
18th Armies combined suffered 72,788 casualties; AOK 18/Ia, "Tägliche
Verlustmeldungen v. 6.10.1944-31. 12.1944, BA/MA, RH 20-18/1173; AOK 16/IIa-Az
Verl, "Tägliche Verlustmeldung Stand vom 16 Oktober 1944," 18 Oct. 1944, T312/639/8267182; AOK 16/IIa-Az Verl, "Tägliche Verlustmeldung Stand vom 31.12.44,"
2 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267096; Armeeabt. Grasser/IIb, "Verlustmeldung vom 10.Okt.
1944," 12 Oct. 1944, T-312/1637/924; Armeeabt. Kleffel/IIb, "Verlustmeldung vom 3.
Nov. 1944," 5 Nov. 1944, T-312/1637/972; Der Heeresarzt im OKH/GenStdH/GenQu,
Nr. I/063/45 gKdos., "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres vom 22. Juni 1941 bis
31. Dezember 1944," 4 Jan. 1945, reproduced in Hermann Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive
1944/45 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), 286; Der Heeresarzt im OKH, Nr. 20/45
gKdos., "Personelle blutige Verluste des Feldheeres vom 22. Juni 1941 bis 20. April
1945," Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 289.
8. For example, the army group reported destroying 509 Soviet tanks and inflicting
44,794 casualties in the 4th Courland Battle; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN, "Tagesmeldung
H.Gr. Kurland vom 4.2.45," 5 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6259758. Haupt estimates that
Russian forces in Courland suffered 394,000 casualties, and lost 2,651 tanks and 722
aircraft (although he provides no source for these figures); Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord,
343. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, provide detailed statistics on Soviet
casualties during almost every operation during the war (Table B, 293-300), but do not
include figures for the period after Nov. 1944. Wenck reported that Army Group North
had destroyed 522 Soviet tanks in the 1st Courland Battle; "Mittagslage vom 6.
November 1944," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 679.
9. Army Group North had one artillery battery per 0.6 kilometer of land front. In
contrast, Army Group Center possessed 1 battery per 1.1 kilometers of front, Army
Group A 1 battery per 1.5 kilometers, and Army Group South 1 battery per 2.3 kilometers
of front; General der Artillerie im OKH (Id), "Stärkevergleich der Artillerie an der Westu. Ostfront, Stand 10.1.1945," BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 69-70. In mid-February, the army
group possessed 2,850 artillery pieces; HGr Kurland/Ia/Id, Nr. 723/45 gKdos., "Bezug:
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt., Nr. 2170/45 gKdos. v. 18.2.45," 19 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/332, 200.
10. According to a study prepared by Army Group A (defending Poland and
Czechoslovakia) Army Group North had 27.5 units on a 240-kilometer front, yielding an
average divisional sector of 8.7 kilometers. Army Group A had 31 units (not counting 3
Hungarian divisions) on a 760-kilometer front (average divisional frontage of 24.5 km)
and Army Group Center possessed 35 units on a 580-kilometer front (divisional sector of
16.6 km). Army Group North held 3 divisions in reserve, compared to Army Group A's
6.5 and Center's 8.5 divisions. Army Group North possessed 4.5 mechanized divisions to
Army Group A's 5.5 and Army Group Center's 8; HGr A/Ia, Nr. 91/45 gKdos.,
"Gegenüberstellungen der eigenen Kräfte bei H.Gruppe A, Mitte und Nord, Stand
29.12.1944," 3 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 VI/33, 20.
11. HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Dec. 44, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 13; HGr Kurland /Ia/Id, Nr.
723/45 gKdos., "Bezug: OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, Nr. 2170/45 gKdos. v. 18.2.45," 19 Feb.
1945, BA/ MA, RH 2/332, 200. In comparison, at beginning of Feb. the Germans had
only 446 tanks and assault guns on the entire Western Front; Jung, Die ArdennenOffensive, 196. Vietinghoff claimed that at the start of the 4th Courland Battle the army
group had 191 tanks and 604 assault guns, but by the end of first phase of 5th Courland
Battle (27 Feb.) it had 121 tanks and 392 assault guns; HGr Kurland /Ia, "Nr. 869/45
gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 350-52.
12. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3305/45 gKdos., "Bezug: H.Gr.Kurland, Ia Nr.
1095/45 gKdos. v. 18.3.45," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 178;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3554/45 gKdos., "Bezug: H.Gr. Kurland Ia Nr. 38/45
gKdos. Chefs. v. 23.3.45," 24 Mar. 1945, ibid., 59. At this time German forces in Italy
had only about 400 armored fighting vehicles; "Teil einer Mittagslage, vermutlich vom 2.
März 1945," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 905.
13. Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16; Haupt,
Heeresgruppe Nord, 300.
14. This unit, composed of 18 captured tanks, formed the armored detachment of Panzer
Brigade Courland; Hauptmann Aster, Stab Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Tr., Abt. Org., A Nr. 4326/45
geh., "Betr.: Reisebericht zur Heeresgruppe Kurland vom 25.2. bis 6.3.1945," BA/MA,
RH 10/124, 138. The army group’s armored divisions usually were split up into several
groups in order to react quickly to possible Soviet breakthroughs; Dietrich von Saucken,
4. Panzer-Division, Part II (Privately published, 1968), 234-36, 249-53.
15. For example, HGr Nord, KTB, 16 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 4; AOK 18,
KTB, 2 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/925, 4.
16. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 168; AOK 18/Ic/AO, Nr.
3950/44 geh., "Ic/AO-Tagesmeldung vom 5.11.1944," T-78/487/6472590. During the
3rd Courland Battle, one report mentioned an attack in which the first wave of troops
wore German uniforms and was armed with German weapons. The third wave was
unarmed and supposed to get weapons from its dead comrades; HGr Nord, KTB, 26 Dec.
1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 111.
17. 32.Inf.Div./Ia, Nr. 2660/44 geh., "Erfahrungen aus der 2. Abwehrschlacht in
Kurland," 6 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/ 8262443-53; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 12574/44 geh.," 13
Dec. 1944, T-312/635/8262747; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 195/45 gKdos., "Wichtige
Frontaufklärungsmeldung und Gef.-Aussagen," 11 Jan. 1945, T-78/307/6258985; HGr
Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 42/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 28 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295071; Rendulic,
Genob. und Ob. der HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 38/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, T78/339/6295094.
18. Stalin to Churchill, Stalin to Roosevelt, 29 Sept. 1944, Stalin to Churchill, 9 Nov.
1944, Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Progress, 1975) (2nd Ed.) (hereafter Stalin's
Correspondence), 1: 261, 271-72; 2: 153; Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union (New York: International, 1945), 130. Shortly after the army group's
isolation, POW interrogations revealed that Stalin had ordered the Courland pocket
eliminated by 7 Nov., the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution; HGr Nord/Ic/AO, Nr.
7352/44 geh., "Tagesmeldung vom 30.10.1944," 31 Oct. 1944, T-78/487/6471800. After
this date had passed, interrogations disclosed that new deadlines had been set for 17 Nov.
1944, and later for 1 Jan. 1945.
19. W. Averell Harriman and Ellie Able, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 19411946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 435; GVK, 4: 409, 413; Geschichte des zweiten
Weltkrieges, 10: 144, 151-52.
20. German intelligence had reached these conclusions by mid-Jan. 1945;
OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Feindliche Kampfführung gegen die H.Gr. Nord," 17 Jan.
1945, T-78/487/6471681-84.
21. HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1944, RH 19 III/332, 63. Latvian partisans consisted
mainly of deserters who obtained provisions by force, or of young men evading
conscription; ibid., 26 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 146; HGr Nord/Ia/op/Ic/AO, Nr.
7113/44 geh., "Betr.: Bandenbekämpfung," 22 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262088; Natzmer,
“Festung Kurland,” 54.
22. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 106; OKH/GenStdH/FHO
(I/Bd), Nr. 12290/44 geh., "Übersicht über die Bandenlage in der Zeit vom 1.11.30.11.1944," 5 Dec. 1944, T-78/562/410-12. In contrast, German intelligence estimated
that there were 90,000 partisans operating against Army Group A and 13,000 against
Army Group Center; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (B/P), geh., "Feindlage Banden," 30 Nov.
1944, T-78/497/6485179-80. At the beginning of 1945, 16th Army estimated that there
were 11 bands with a total of 920-1055 partisans; Anlage 5 zu AOK 16/Ic/AO, Nr. 58/45
geh., "Bandenlage im Bereich 16. Armee, Stand 10.1.1945," T-312/639/ 8267091. Most
partisan activity was of a minor nature, robbing civilians for supplies and carrying out
isolated attacks on individual soldiers and vehicles; AOK 18/Ic/AO, Nr. 4611 /44 geh.,
"Ic/AO Tagesmeldung vom 15.12.1944," 15 Dec. 1944, T-312/1609/169, and the daily
reports of AOK 18/Ic/AO for the period 12 Oct. 1944-6 Jan. 1945 on T-78/487/6472503613.
23. HGr Nord, KTB, 8, 11 and 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 64, 86, 106;
Stöber, Die lettischen Divisionen, 121 and 358, Note 11; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4647/44
gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zum Kdt. rückw. Armeegebiet 583 am 5. Dezember 1944,"
T-312/971/9163102; H.W. Posinjakoff, “German Counterintelligence in the Occupied
Soviet Union,” World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 19, MS# P-122, 107-08.
24. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Ib), Nr. 2302/45 geh., "Übersicht über die Bandenlage in der
Zeit vom 1.2.-28.2. 1945," 6 Mar. 1945, T-78/562/402-04. For a report of an antipartisan operation, during which two Jews were discovered hiding in a bunker, Der
Einsatzbeauftragte für die SS-Jägerverbände Ostland, Leiter IC geh., 15 Feb. 1945,
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, RG-18.002M, Latvian Central State Archive
(Riga) Records, 1941-1945, Reel 9, Fond R-82, Opis I, Folder 47.
25. Perry Biddiscombe, “’Freies Deutschland’ Guerrilla Warfare in East Prussia, 19441945: A Contribution to the History of the German Resistance,” German Studies Review
27 (Feb. 2004): 60, note 24.
26. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 1094, note 85. In his memoirs Rendulic is quite
confused about the situation in Courland. He states that Hitler informed him the 6th
Courland Battle was expected to begin at any time (the 4th Courland Battle began on 24
Jan.), and that Riga had been lost and the army group cut off from Germany in the 5th
Courland Battle (these events occurred before the 1st Courland Battle); Lothar Rendulic,
Gekämpft, gesiegt, geschlagen (Heidelberg: Welsermühl, 1952), 331-32, 335-36.
27. Werner Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe (Friedberg: Podzun, 1979),
75; Hans Lederer, "Kurland," 5-6; Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,
Nachlass Loch, N 186/16; "Studie 'Laura,'" BA/MA, RH 19 III/338. Vietinghoff signed
the agreement to surrender on 29 April (to take effect on 2 May) while Hitler was still
alive. Obviously he acted on his own initiative; OKW KTB, Vol. 4, Part 2, 1165, 1437,
1662-64.
28. TBJG, 8 Feb. and 9 Mar. 1945, 15: 337, 456; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 1371/45 geh.," 2 Feb.
1945, T-312/260/7818559; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 1350/45 gKdos.," 2 Feb. 1945, T312/260/7818576; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 432-33.
29. Rendulic's statement is somewhat surprising because, in contrast to East Prussia, the
Soviets did not achieve any spectacular gains against his forces in Courland. Again,
Rendulic is extremely confused regarding chronology and troops strengths in Courland;
Lothar Rendulic, "The Russian Command in World War II: Possible Development since
World War II," World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 19, MS# P-079, 20-22.
30. Oldwig von Natzmer, “Zusätze zum Material über Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 70;
Lederer, "Kurland," 6; Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 121; Jürgen
Thorwald, Die grosse Flucht: Es begann an der Weichsel: Das Ende an der Elbe
(Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1962), 579; Curt-Ulrich von Gersdorff, "Generaloberst Carl
Hilpert: Zur 70. Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages am 12. September 1958," Deutscher
Soldatenkalender, No. 6 (1958): 47.
31. Biographical information on Schörner is taken from “Mein militärischer
Werdegang,” 1 Oct. 1956, BA/MA, Nachlass Schörner, N 60/2; Friedrich von
Mellenthin, German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them (Norman, OK: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1977), 175-86; Rudolf Aschenauer, Der Fall Schörner: Eine
Dokumentation (Munich: Privately published, 1973) (with caution!); "Tätigkeitsbericht
des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts," BA/MA, RH 7/v.565.
32. An evaluation of Schörner as a tactics instructor by a former pupil is in Ulrich de
Maizière, In der Pflicht: Lebensbericht eines deutschen Soldaten im 20. Jahrhundert (2nd
ed.) (Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1989), 28-30.
33. TBJG, 2 Jan. 1945, 15: 38.
34. This is what Schörner told the person who arranged his surrender to American
troops; “Unterredung mit General a.D. Foertsch, München, am 18.9.1951,” IfZ, ZS 37,
67. A German POW who saw Schörner in a Soviet prison camp in June 1945 states that
Schörner claimed he and his army group fought their way to American lines; Siegfried
Knappe and Ted Brusaw, Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949 (New
York: Orion, 1992), 293-94.
35. TBJG, 4 and 23 Jan., 12, 22 and 31 Mar., 4 Apr. 1945, 15: 61, 195, 479, 572, 649,
678-79.
36. "Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts," entries for 10 and 30 Aug., 3
and 9 Sept. 1944, BA/ MA, RH 7/v. 565, 196, 232, 239, 247; HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Aug.
1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/316, 10. Schörner relieved Grasser for not being harsh enough,
and he once ordered 18th Army's commander to be ruthless to the point of brutality; HGr
Nord, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, RH 19 III/331, 191; AOK 18, KTB, 11 Aug. 1944, T312/956/9147241.
37. "Der laute Kamerad," Der Spiegel, Vol. 9 (1955), No. 7, 12; Maizière, In der Pflicht,
89. Schörner often appeared at rear area units and headquarters unannounced. When he
departed there were usually several soldiers whose rank was lower than when he had
arrived; Mellenthin, German Generals of World War II, 184-85.
38. PzAOK 3, "Ferngespräche O.B. am 5.10.44," T-313/323/8603384; Schörner, Genob.
und Ob. der HGr Nord, 18 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/908; AOK 18, KTB, 11 Aug. 1944, T312/956/9147234.
39. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Tagesbefehl," 12 Aug. 1944, T-312/634/8261703; Der
Oberbefehlshaber, "Tagesbefehl," 28 Sept. 1944, ibid., Frame 8261708; Der Ob der HGr
Nord, "Tagesbefehl," 12 Dec. 1944, ibid., Frame 8262135; AOK 18, KTB, 26 Sept. 1944,
T-312/957/9148246; HGr Nord, KTB, 29 July 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 108;
Dermot Bradley, Walther Wenck: General der Panzertruppe (2nd ed) (Osnabrück:
Biblio, 1982), 288. General Foertsch confirmed this, and provided an example from the
Greek campaign; “Unterredung mit General a.D. Foertsch, München, am 18.9.1951,” IfZ,
ZS 37, 67.
40. AOK 16/Abt.III, "Tätigkeitsbericht des Armeerichters 16 für die Zeit vom 16.
Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1944," 24 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8268734-37; Ziemke, German
NTO, 222.
41. For example, when he encountered troops in Windau (probably en route to or coming
from Sworbe) who had not received warm food since the previous day, and no food at all
that day, he flew into a rage and ordered an immediate court-martial investigation; HGr
Nord, "Br B Nr. 251/44 geh.," 25 Oct. 1944, T-312/634/8262529-30. See the numerous
letters to Schörner from former members of Army Group Courland in BA/MA, Nachlass
Schörner, N 60/73.
42. During enemy offensives, Schörner spent most of his time at corps, division and
regimental headquarters in threatened sectors. He visited Tuckum on 21 Aug., when the
situation in the area was extremely fluid, and during his return from a trip to Sworbe on
25 Oct., Soviet aircraft attacked and seriously damaged the motor torpedo boat on which
he traveled; HGr Nord, KTB, 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 46; PzAOK 3, KTB,
21 Aug. 1944, T-313/317/8595698-99; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM
67/v.150, 103.
43. Hitler once claimed that the Golden Party Badge should rank higher than any honor
conferred by the state; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 132-33. Schörner received
this award (which conferred Party membership) on 30 Jan. 1943, the 10th anniversary of
the seizure of power; K Va Schn/Gs, “Aufnahme in die NSDAP,” 24 July 1943,
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BA/BL), BDC PK Schörner.
44. “3rd Situation Report, April 27, 1945,” Hitler and His Generals: Military
Conferences 1942-1945 (Helmut Heiber and David Glantz eds.) (Roland Winter et al
trans.) (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 735. Nearly a month before Schörner’s
promotion Goebbels noted that Hitler considered him one of his best commanders, and
that he was the next person Hitler planned to promote to field marshal; TBJG, 12 Mar.
1945, 15: 479.
45. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/315, 202-03; AOK 18, KTB, 12
Aug. 1944, T-312/956/9147280.
46. The army group received over 400 officers (a scarce commodity considering the
need to make good Army Group Center's losses in this period), of which 215 were rushed
via air transport, and 230 followed by sea; "Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des
Heerespersonalamts," 5 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 7/v.565, 194.
47. On 30 Sept. Schörner had requested the 30,000 troops as a prerequisite for the attack
"Blitz." Two weeks later the army group noted that, of the 30,000 men Hitler had
promised Schörner, it had received notification of 20,000, and about 9,000 were on the
way; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Sept. and 13 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/319, 269, RH 19
III/330, 259.
48. Ibid., 20 Aug. 1944, RH 19 III/316, 192; “Meeting of the Führer with General
Reinecke, January 7, 1944, at the Wolfsschanze,” Hitler and His Generals, 399; TBJG,
24 July 1944, 13: 152.
49. See a copy of Schörner’s order to XIX Mountain Corps from Feb. 1943 in NSDAP,
Partei-Kanzlei, Der Leiter der Partei-Kanzlei, “Rundschreiben Nr. 102/43,” 7 July 1943,
BA/BL, O. 367; TBJG, 9 Mar. 1945, 15: 459.
50. Whether or not Schörner actually believed this, it certainly would have strengthened
Hitler's conviction that the Soviets were on their last legs; Schörner to Hitler, 6 Aug.
1944, T-311/132/7177778.
51. There are several examples of Schörner approving retreats requested by subordinate
commanders; HGr Nord, KTB, 26 July and 12 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/314, 30,
32-35, RH 19 III/315, 189; AOK 18, KTB, 24 July 1944, T-312/956/9146751; AOK 18,
Nr. 3077/44 gKdos., "Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 12.8.1944," T312/959/9150136.
52. Albert Speer, Infiltration (Joachim Neugroschel trans.) (New York: Macmillan,
1981), 100.
53. Natzmer, “Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 55-60.
54. Maizière, In der Pflicht, 28-30; Knappe, Soldat, 263, 286-87; Hans von Luck, Panzer
Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck (New York: Dell, 1989), 248-49,
253-54. Glantz and House state, “breaking contact with a determined Soviet enemy and
establishing a new, longer defensive line in Courland required great skill and daring;”
Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 228.
55. Geoffrey Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2000), 126.
56. TBJG, 9, 28 and 31 Mar. 1945, 15: 456, 617, 649.
57. “Interview, Harold Deutsch with Puttkamer,” 27 June 1970, IfZ, ZS 285/III, 14;
“Niederschrift der Unterredung des Herrn Oberst a.D. Nicolaus von Below durchgeführt
im Hamburg am 7. Jan. 1952 durch Frhr. v. Siegler im Auftrag des IfZ,” IfZ, ZS 7, 9.
58. The starting point for any discussion of German morale on the Eastern Front is Omer
Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991). Hinsley claims that intercepted messages reported a
deterioration of morale in Courland, and that in late Nov. 1944 officers with the rank of
major and above were being replaced by officers who were Nazi Party members or in the
SS; F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2 (New
York: Cambridge, 1988), 286.
59. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Sabotage der Kriegführung," 10 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/727, 38; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev.
Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom 16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944,"
27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267744.
60. This occurred on 27 Mar. 1945 in the 563rd Volksgrenadier Division. As a result,
the Germans placed informants in this unit to prevent a reoccurrence; HGr Kurland/Ia,
Nr. 46/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Beurteilung des inneren Kampfwertes der Divisionen," 1
Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 17, 4-7; AOK 18, KTB, 27 and 28 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 20-18/927, 149, 158. For other examples of desertion, AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 8283 /44
geh.," 18 Nov. 1944, T-312/635/8263065; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4703/44 gKdos.,
"Ferngespräche des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers am 12. Dezember 1944," T312/971/9162987; Der Ob der HGr Nord/IIa, "Nr. 2100/44 geh.," 20 Dec. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/727, 51. Two Dutch SS soldiers deserted in Dec. 1944; Perry Pierik, From
Leningrad to Berlin: Dutch Volunteers in the Service of the German Waffen-SS, 19411945 (D.E. Butterman-Dorey trans.) (2nd ed) (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2001), 245.
61. 4.Pz.Div., KTB, 30 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 27-4/204; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4671/44
gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zur 32. I.D. und Gruppe Thomaski am 8.
Dezember 1944," T-312/971/9163097; Genkdo L.A.K./Abt. NS-Führung,
"Tätigkeitsbericht des NSFO," 30 Dec. 1944, T-312/639/8267360; 205.Inf.Div./Abt. NSFührung, "Tätigkeitsbericht Dezember 1944," 23 Dec. 1944, T-312/629/8267355;
GenKdo I AK/IIa, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 8.10.3.12.1944," 13 Dec. 1944, T314/80/339.
62. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), Nr. 11697/44 gKdos., "Besprechungspunkte
H.Gr.Nord," 7 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/ 316, 172; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16,
"Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev. Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom
16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944," 27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267743-45.
63. Der Ob der HGr Nord, "Tagesbefehl," 1 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/727, 34.
64. Der Ob der HGr Nord/IIa, "Nr. 1990/44 geh.," 29 Nov. 1944, ibid., 43; Der Ob der
HGr Nord/ Ia, "Nr. 150/45 geh.," 4 Jan. 1945, T-311/134/7179641-43.
65. AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4189/44 gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zur 132. und 263 Inf.Div. am
25. Oktober 1944," T-312/971/9163152; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4150/44 gKdos., "Fahrt des
Herrn Ob. zum X. and II. A.K. am 21. Okt. 1944," ibid., Frame 9163163; AOK 18/Ia, Nr.
4434/44 gKdos., "Fahrt des Herrn Ob. zur 30. Inf.Div., 263. Inf.Div. und zum X. A.K.
am 14 November 1944," ibid., Frames 9163119-20; AOK 16/Abt.NS-Führung,
"Richtlinie für die Sprecher im Rahmen der Aufklärungsaktion vom 15.11. bis
15.12.1944," 10 Nov. 1944, T-312/639/8267338-39.
66. Stellv. Genkdo. VII AK (Wehrkreiskdo VII)/NSF, "Betr.: Sprachregelung f.d. Studie
'Polit. Tagesfragen,'" 9 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 53-7/v. 878; AOK 16/Abt. NS-Führung,
"Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung vom 16.10. bis 31.12.1944," 30 Jan. 1945,
T-312/639/8267324-26.
67. HGr Nord, KTB, 18 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 15; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr.
4355/44," 5 Nov. 1944, T-312/634/8262599.
68. Hans Breithaupt, Die Geschichte der 30. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Bad
Nauheim: Podzun, 1955), 289-90. Only two issues of the newspaper reached Courland;
Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 108. A photograph of this decoration is
in Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 70.
69. NSFOs addressed every soldier in 16th Army between 15 Nov.-15 Dec.; AOK
16/Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung vom 16.10. bis
31.12.1944," 30 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267324.
70. For 16th Army, this resulted in an increase of tanks destroyed in close combat from
16% in Nov. 1944 to 25% in Dec.; AOK 16/Ia/Stopak, "Tätigkeitsbericht 16. Okt. 194431. Dez. 1944," T-312/634/8262276-77. One author claims that the only way a soldier
could obtain leave to Germany was to destroy an enemy tank; G.H. Bidermann, KrimKurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Hanover: Privately published,
1964), 326. In addition, a divisional NSFO complained of troops who had not been on
leave for over 18 months; 389.Inf. Div./Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit
vom 26.11.-25.12.44," 27 Dec. 1944, T-312/639/8267362. German soldiers were entitled
to 14 days of leave per year.
71. These “R and R” installations (Erholungsheim) ranged from regimental to corps
installations at varying distances from the front where troops could rest and enjoy good
rations for a few days to up to a week; Genkdo. XXXVIII AK/Nat.soz. Führung,
"Tätigkeitsbericht für den Monat Dezember 1944," 2 Jan. 1945, T-312/639/8267347;
215.Inf.Div./Abt.NS-Führung, Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1944," 30 Dec. 1944,
ibid., Frame 8267351; 389.Inf. Div./Abt. NS-Führung, "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit
vom 26.11.-25.12.44," 27 Dec. 1944, ibid., Frame 8267362.
72. AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4441/44 gKdos., "Fahrtbericht des Herrn Oberbefehlshabers zum I
A.K. am 15.11.1944," T-312/971/9163118; Evang. Armeepfarrer beim AOK 16,
"Tätigkeitsbericht der Ev. Armeepfarrers beim AOK 16 (Abt. IVd/e) für die Zeit vom
16.10.1944 bis 31.12.1944," 27 Jan. 1945, T-312/640/8267743; Rolf Grams, Die 14.
Panzer-Division, 1940-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1957), 277; Haupt, Heeresgruppe
Nord, 306.
73. Wilhelm Tieke, Tragödie um die Treue: Kampf und Opfergang des III. (germ.) SSPanzer-Korps (Osnabrück: Munin, 1968), 142; Willy Wolff, An der Seite der Roten
Armee (3rd ed) (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR, 1982), 182, 202, 213, 256-60.
74. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos.," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH
10/118, 44-45; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division, 331.
75. 32.Inf.Div./Ia, Nr. 2660/44 geh., "Erfahrungen aus der 2. Abwehrschlacht in
Kurland," 6 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/8262453; GenKdo I.AK/IIa, "Tätigkeitsbericht der
Gruppe II für die Zeit vom 4.12.44 bis 24.1.45," 10 Feb. 1945, T-314/80/3;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/IN/K, "Tagesmeldung der H.Gr. Kurland vom 3.4.45," 4 Apr.
1945, T-78/338/6294478; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132. Infanterie-Division,
315; Jan Montyn and Dirk Kooiman, A Lamb to Slaughter (Adrienne Dixon trans.) (New
York: Carroll & Graf, 1982), 89-102; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), Nr. 11697/44 gKdos.,
"Besprechungspunkte H.Gr.Nord," 7 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 172. As in other
German units, Army Group Courland had its own "Stomach Battalion" composed of men
with stomach disorders; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 9379/44 geh.," 28 Dec. 1944, T312/635/8263248.
76. Haupt, Kurland—Die letzte Front, 105; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit der 132.
Infanterie-Division, 333; Grams, Die 14. Panzer-Division, 305; Haupt, Kurland: Die
vergessene Heeresgruppe, 120; Thorwald, Die grosse Flucht, 574-75.
77. Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 82. While on leave for destroying an
enemy tank, Bidermann was offered a chance to remain in Germany, but refused and
returned to Courland; Gottlob Bidermann, In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier’s
Memoir of the Eastern Front (Derek Zumbro ed. and trans.) (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), 272-73.
78. Robert Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won: Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign
(New York: Paragon, 1987), 357, 384, 396; GenKdo I.AK/Abt.NS-Führung,
Tätigkeitsbericht der Abteilung NS-Führung Monat Oktober," 4 Nov. 1944, T314/80/344. See also what is apparently a poster exhorting troops to fight with the
message "We must destroy the enemy . . . No Bolshevik whom we destroy will be
available against East Prussia. Allow no Bolshevik to murder German women and
children," on T-312/630/8257072.
79. Grams, Die 14. Panzer-Division, 278; Breithaupt, Die Geschichte der 30. InfanterieDivision, 294; Bidermann, In Deadly Combat, 254.
80. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechung am 19.10 mit Oberbefehlshaber und
Chef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe Nord auf dem Gefechtsstand der
Heeresgruppe," 19 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294699-700; HGr Nord, KTB, 10, 23 and 28
Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 212-13; RH 19 III/331, 107, 189-90; HGr Nord/Ia,
"Nr. 4795/44 gKdos.," 3 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 212.
81. From 24 Sept.-25 Nov. the navy shipped 245,642 people (including 69,409 troops,
68,562 wounded, 7,558 Latvian recruits, 3,108 Latvian and Estonian soldiers, 5,809
Organization Todt workers and 77,110 refugees) to Germany. From 15-28 Nov. 11,626
horses, 6,432 vehicles and 290 artillery pieces were evacuated. Still awaiting transport,
however, were 135,301 people, 34,771 horses, over 12,000 vehicles and more than
75,000 tons of goods, which the army group estimated would require two and one-half
months; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/ 333, 202.
82. HGr Nord, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 102; AOK 18, KTB, 7, 18
and 19 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18 /925, 23, 80, 82; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
450012/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN),
"Nr. 1352/45 gKdos.," 2 Feb. 1945, T-311/171/7223228.
83. I.AK/Qu, KTB, 7 and 31 Dec. 1944, 10 and 22 Jan. 1945, T-314/80/30, 63, 77, 89;
HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 802/45 gKdos., "Beurteilung der Lage," 25 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/332, 264-67; Rendulic, Genob u. Ob HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 36/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 22
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.716, 26-27; Rendulic, Genob. und Ob. der HGr Kurland/Ia,
"Nr. 38/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295094; Skl, KTB, 26 Mar. 1945,
376; Anlage 9 zu OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos., 10 Apr. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 10/118, 44.
84. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nachtrag zur Morgenmeldung HGr Kurland
v.9.4.45," 9 Apr. 1945, T-78/354/6314268; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K),
"Tagesmeldung HGr Kurland 9.4.45," 10 Apr. 1945, ibid., Frame 6314254.
85. OKW/WFSt/Op, "2020 Uhr: Fernspruch an Quartiermeister der Wehrmacht, General
Toppe," 30 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.
86. Schörner reported that in Sept. his forces had lost 52,993 men and received 35,863
replacements. For Oct. the numbers were 25,200 casualties to 25,121 replacements (a
later report mentioned 17,374 unreplaced losses in Oct.). In Nov. there were 33,181
losses and 22,828 replacements, and OKH promised only 10,912 replacements for Dec.;
HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 163, RH 19 III/334,
11; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt (I), Nr. I/16554/44 geh., "Betr.: Ersatzbereitstellung für HGr
Nord im Dezember 1944," 17 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 244-45.
87. HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 196.
88. Upon Schörner’s arrival to Army Group North, he ordered 100,000 rear area troops
sent to the front as combat soldiers; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, KTB, 24 July 1944, T312/630/8257145. Although it is certain that he did not gain this number of men for the
front, at the end of Dec, 16th Army declared that 70% of its troops consisted of "combedout" men without sufficient training or experience; AOK 16/ Ia, "Nr. 114/44
gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 73. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr.
I/10433/44 geh., "Betr.: Abgabe von 5000 Mann für Luftflotte 1 an HGr Nord," 1 Oct.
1944, T-78/421/6390619; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. I/14045/44 geh.," 15 Nov. 1944,
T-78/421/6390728; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. I/11206/44 geh., "Betr.: Zuführung von
6000 Marinesoldaten an HGr Nord," 1 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 6; Chef des
GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. I/11715/44 geh., "Betr.: Verwendung von 4- und 8-Wochen
Rekruten," 1 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/849a, 50.
89. HGr Nord, KTB, 4 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 60. Rendulic protested that
from 15 Feb.-14 Mar. the army group had suffered over 25,000 casualties and received
only about 2,000 replacements; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 35/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 17 Mar.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 6-7.
90. OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, "Nr. IZ/30 140/45 gKdos.," 11 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/331b, 103; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Tagesmeldung HGr Kurland vom 28.1.45," 29
Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259438. Vietinghoff informed Guderian that the army group had
lost about 90,000 men in the first 5 Courland Battles, but received only 48,000
replacements. Also, since 27 Nov. the army group had given up nearly a dozen divisions;
HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 869/45 gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/333, 350-52. OKH noted that in Feb. 1945, besides giving up units with a total of
55,464 men, the army group had suffered 22,579 casualties and received only 6,975
replacements; Anlage 8 zu OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt, Nr. IZ/31 600/45 gKdos., "Betr.:
Stellungnahme zu den Zustandsbericht v.1.3.45," 10 April 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/118, 43.
91. Schörner’s divisions had 55,604 NCOs and lacked 10,614 (19.1%), the greatest
shortage of any army group in the East; OKH/GenStdH/OrgAbt (I), "Betr.: Uffz.-Lage
des Feldheeres," 22 Nov. 1944, T-78/421/6390751. From 26 Dec. 1944 to 10 Mar. 1945
the army group received 963 officers. In comparison, Army Group Center/North
received 604, Army Group A/Center 510, Army Group South 601, and Army Group
Vistula 98; OKH/Heerespersonalamt, file entitled "Führerreserve 1945," T78/39/6000086-94.
92. In Oct. Soviet aircraft scored a direct hit on the steamer Prake southwest of Libau,
killing 200 and wounding 90 men in a naval replacement battalion. On 17 Feb. Russian
planes sank the freighter Eifel southwest of Libau, with a loss of over 500 replacements.
A Soviet submarine torpedoed and sank the transport Göttingen, carrying over 1300 men,
in the same area on 23 Feb., resulting in heavy casualties. Vietinghoff protested that this
was intolerable due to lack of personnel and increased losses. He suggested dividing
troops, especially officers, among all vessels, including escorts, and called for additional
naval forces to escort convoys; HGr Nord, KTB, 12 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330,
237; Der Ob der HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 794/45 gKdos.," 24 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/332, 232; OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt, IN, "Tagesmeldung der HGr Kurland vom 17.2.45,"
18 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6260479; Heinz Schön, Ostsee '45: Menschen, Schiffe,
Schicksale (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1983), 337-38, 364.
93. AOK 18/IVa, "Beitrag zu den besonderen Anordnungen für die Versorgung und für
die Versorgungstruppen," 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 20-18/1463, 29; Natzmer, “Festung
Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 52; AOK 18/AWiFüOQu/IVa/Qu2/ VII, Az. 308 Nr. 708/44 geh.,
"Betr.: Landesausnutzung," 13 Oct. 1944, T-312/973/9164794-95; AOK 16/ OQu/Qu1,
"Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung für den 31.10., Nr. 678," 30 Oct. 1944, T312/640/8268930.
94. Anlage 7 zu AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, Nr. 1190/44 gKdos. v. 8.12.44, "Wirtschaft," T312/641/8269641; AOK 16/AWiFü, "Tätigkeitsbericht" for the period 19-25 Nov. 1944,
ibid., Frame 8269930; AOK 18/IV (Verpflegung), "Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom
20.11.-26.11.44," BA/MA, RH 20-18/1464, 5; HGr Nord, KTB, 30 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/331, 214; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 298.
95. Skl, KTB, 29 Nov. 1944, 656; Anlage 1 zu AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, Nr. 1220/44 gKdos.
v. 24.12. 44, "Verwaltungswesen," T-312/641/8269622; AOK 18/IVa (Verpflegung),
"Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 18.-31.12. 44," T-312/970/9162178-79; HGr Kurland,
"Besprechung ChefdGenSt/OQu am 23.2 betr. 'Laura,'" gKdos., 23 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/338, 57.
96. Haupt, Kurland: Die vergessene Heeresgruppe, 78; Bidermann, Krim-Kurland mit
der 132. Infanterie-Division, 307; Krosigk to Diplogerma Stockholm, 4 May 1945,
BA/BL, R 62/18, 33. One corps even distributed recipes for horsemeat to its divisions;
GenKdo I.AK/Qu, Anlage zu Besondere Anordnungen für die Versorgung Nr. 12,
"Verwendung von Pferdefleisch," 5 Jan. 1945, T-314/80/183-84.
97. Skl, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, 14. The army group received 71,450 tons of supplies in
Nov. (2,381.66 tons per day), 76,664 tons in Dec. (2,473.03 tons daily) and 56,138 tons
from 1-23 Jan. 1945 (2,440.78 tons per day). These figures are based upon entries,
usually on a daily basis, in ibid., 2 Nov. 1944 to 23 Jan. 1945, passim. These are
conservative numbers because on some days there was no mention of supplies sent to
Courland, they do not include vehicles and artillery shipped to Courland and, possibly,
omit tonnage from vessels not under direct naval command. Kummetz reported that the
Navy delivered 97,824 soldiers, 5,470 horses, 3,734 vehicles and approximately 100,000
tons of supplies per month to Courland from 16 Oct.-31 Dec. 1944; MOK
Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr.gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die wesentlichsten
Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17 Mar. 1945,
BA/MA, RM 7/90, 439. Kummetz's numbers, however, seem quite high, especially with
regard to replacements.
98. Only 19,990 tons of supplies reached Courland in Feb.; I Ost, Nr. 304/45 gKdos.,
"Lage Ostsee am 4. März 1945, 0800 Uhr," BA/MA, RM 7/292, 384. Dönitz informed
Hitler that 13,000 tons had been delivered in the first 13 days of the month;
Lagevorträge, 15 Feb. 1945, 653. At the beginning of April the head of the Skl's
Shipping Dept. estimated that despite daily requirements of 3000 tons for Army Groups
North and Courland, the Navy would be able to deliver only 1,000-1,500 tons per day;
Skl, KTB, 5 Apr. 1945, 69.
99. MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. gKdos. 5351/44 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf Oktober 1944,"
20 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 367-68; Forstmann, "Seekrieg im Finnenbusen und der
östlichen Ostsee von 1942 bus zum 8. Mai 1945," BA/MA, Nachlass Wagner, N
539/v.15, 12.; Skl, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944, 224; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, 17 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM
67 /v.150, 78-79.
100. MOK Ostsee, Op.B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung für den Monat
November 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 391; Adm.östl.Ostsee, gKdos. F I,
"Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/163, 156; Skl, KTB, 20-24 and 28
Nov. 1944, 443, 466, 505, 524, 547, 643. Examples of delays in later periods are in Skl,
KTB, 2 and 17 Dec. 1944, 25, 430; Adm östl. Ostsee, KTB, 7 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, M
543/39511; MOK Ost/Führstb "1874 F I M," 12 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/850, 111.
101. Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1945, 39; ibid., 6 Mar. 1945, 82-83.
102. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 and 15 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 113, 117, 122; Skl,
KTB, 14 and 18 Dec. 1944, 339, 444; AOK 18, KTB, 17 and 24 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
20-18/926, 85, 143.
103. During 1943, 77 vessels hit mines and the Germans cleared 441 mines in the entire
Baltic. In 1944 the number of ships struck by mines rose to 189 and the Navy cleared
2,013 mines; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die
wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 430.
104. From Oct. 1944-May 1945, Russian mines sank 6 warships and 9 merchant vessels
in the Baltic; Jürgen Rohwer, "Die sowjetische U-Bootwaffe in der Ostsee," MarineRundschau 65 (No. 6): 566; Skl, KTB, 19 Feb. 1945, 193; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),
"Nr. 2215/45 gKdos.," 19 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 177.
105. Skl, KTB, 1 and 27 Dec. 1944, 14, 644; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1049 F III,
"Rückblick auf Monat Januar 1945," 7 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 398; Adm.
westliche Ostsee, B.Nr. Op gKdos. 591 F III, "Monatsbericht Kommandierender Admiral
westliche Ostsee für den Monat März 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 503.
106. Skl, KTB, 7 and 12 Oct. 1944, 170-71, 280. In Dec., however, the Skl ordered an
anti-submarine flotilla from Norway to the Baltic; ibid., 6 Dec. 1944, 131.
107. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die
wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 446; “Soviet Naval Warfare (Partial Translation),”
NavOpArch, German Naval Records, Box T-94, Study No. 121, 6.
108. In Nov. the 9th Escort Division convoyed a total of 704 ships, and in Dec. 575
ships; 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Zusammenfassung für November 1944," BA/MA, RM
67/v.150, 242; ibid., "Zusammenfassung Dezember 1944," RM 67/v.151, 117.
109. Skl, KTB, 30 Oct. 1944, 727-28.
110. Kummetz reported that the Soviet fleet "presumably" was still in Kronstadt;
Adm.östl.Ostsee, gKdos. F I, "Lageübersicht 1. bis 30. Nov. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/163,
156; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1049 F III, "Rückblick auf Monat Januar 1945," 7
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 398.
111. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 9: 265-67, 10: 268; GVK, 5: 115; Achkasov
and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 246.
112. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr.gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die
wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 415.
113. PzAOK 3, KTB, 30 Sept. 1944, T-313/317/8595923; AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 2792/44
gKdos.," 30 Sept. 1944, T-312/628/8254505; HGr Nord, KTB, 8, 9 and 10 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 148-49, 183, 212; Skl, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944, 223.
114. Skl, "B.Nr.1/Skl Ia 3602/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163,
182-83; HGr Nord, KTB, 17 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 139.
115. On 1 Dec. 1944, the army group had a ration strength of 505,546 men. On 1 Apr.
1945 it reported a total strength of 250,743; HGr Nord, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH
19 III/334, 11; Anlage 7 zu HGr Kurland/IIb, Nr. 167/45 gKdos. v. 13.4.45, "Iststärke
vom 1. April 1945 der Heeresgruppe Kurland," T-311/133/7178549.
116. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440652/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 20 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RH 19 III/16, 91; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt, "Nr. 440658/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Oct. 1944,
ibid., 95; HGr Nord, KTB, 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 133;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440662/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Oct. 1944, T311/53/7065685-86; HGr Nord, KTB, 28 Oct. and 4 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/331,190-91, RH 19 III/332, 66.
117. TBJG, 9 Feb. 1945, 15: 345; "Abgabe von Verbänden der HGr in das Reich,"
Enclosure to Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16;
AOK 18, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/926, 83; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),
"Nr. 2096/45 gKdos.," 17 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 158; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt
(Ia), "Nr. 450160/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 252;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 2693/45 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333,
349.
118. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 1678/45 gKdos.," 7 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/332, 70; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 2254/45 gKdos.," 20 Feb. 1945, ibid., 190.
In Feb. 1945 the navy evacuated 49,451 troops, 11,785 animals, 12,655 vehicles and 549
guns from Libau; MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 1602 F III, "Rückblick auf Monat
Februar 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 492.
119. HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 72/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Vormittagsunterrichtung," 7 May 1945,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/17, 23; Der Grossadmiral, OKW/WFSt, "Nr. 89003/45 gKdos.
Chefs.," 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 127; OKW/WFSt, "Nr. 89002/45
gKdos.Chefs.," 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/34.
120. Maizière returned to Courland on 8 May with these instructions; Wilhelm Keitel,
"Die letzten Tage unter Adolf Hitler (completed 10 Oct. 1946)," BA/MA, Nachlass
Keitel, N 54/8, 21.
121. AOK 16/Ia, "Nr. 918/45 gKdos.," 8 May 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-16/1063;
OKW/WFSt/Einsatzabt. (H)/II, "Notiz über mündliche Berichterstattung des
Kdr.Pz.Rgt.d.14.Pz.Div. Oberst Sauvant," 13 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/54; Schön,
Ostsee '45, 626; “Tagesniederschrift der Reichsregierung vom 9. 5. 1945,” Chefs.,
BA/BL, R 62/15, 12; Maizière, In der Pflicht, 109-10.
122. In addition, thirty-five Ju-52 transport planes flew in from Norway to assist in the
evacuation. Only three of these aircraft, however, eluded Soviet fighters and reached
Germany. The pilots of the two wings of Fighter Group 54 remaining in Courland
stripped their aircraft of superfluous equipment to allow them to take two or three
members of their ground crews on their final flight to Germany; Rohwer and
Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 2: 519; Haupt, Kurland—Die vergessene
Heeresgruppe, 124, 128; Hannes Trautloft, Werner Held and Ekkehard Bob, Die
Grünherzjäger: Bildchronik des Jagdgeschwaders 54 (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas, 1985),
35.
123. Jürg Meister, Der Seekrieg in den osteuropäischen Gewässern, 1941-1945 (Munich:
Lehmanns, 1958), 131; Lederer, "Kurland," 12. An officer evacuated on 8 May declared
that many men planned to escape to Gotland in small boats, and that the operations
officer and quartermaster of I Army Corps had already fled Courland on 4 May;
OKW/WFSt/Einsatzabt. (H)/II, "Notiz über mündliche Berichterstattung des
Kdr.Pz.Rgt.d.14.Pz.Div. Oberst Sauvant," 13 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/54.
124. The Soviets took 189,112 German (including 42 generals) and 14,000 Latvian
soldiers prisoner; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 320. The army group consisted of 7 corps
with approximately 20 divisions; "Lage der HGr Kurland 9.5. 000 Uhr nach den bis 8.5.
abends eingegangenen Meldungen," T-311/135/7180163; Anlage 2 zu
OKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (H), Nr. 5817/45, "Verbände der HGr Kurland, Stand 7.5.45," 11
May 1945, T-77/864/5611084-85; OKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (Heer), "Vorläufige schematische
Kriegsgleiderung," 19 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/58, 259.
125. The next day the Luftwaffe ordered a fighter staff squadron, with at least 15 FW190s, to Courland; Skl, KTB, 17 and 18 Dec. 1944, 410, 448. The Luftwaffe had few
aircraft in Courland. On 15 Oct. the 1st Air Force possessed a total of 229 planes (92
ground attack aircraft, 34 night fighters, 29 short-range reconnaissance planes and 74
fighters), of which only 170 were operational; Köhler, "Einsatz der Luftwaffe," pp. 8687. Some of these may have been withdrawn, for other sources assert that only 2-3 wings
of Fighter Group 54 and a few reconnaissance planes were in Courland; Raymond
Toliver and Trevor Constable, Horrido (New York: Bantam, 1982), 280-81; Haupt,
Heeresgruppe Nord, 301; Trautloft, et al, Die Grünherzjäger, 34. Schörner, however,
informed Guderian on 22 Oct. that 2 fighter wings and 2 ground attack wings were in
Courland; HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 103. On the fuel
shortages, Rendulic, Genob u. Ob HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 36/45 gKdos.Chefs. (Rendulic to
Hitler)," 22 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.716, 26-27; "General Christian für Führerlage,"
gKdos.Chefs. (undated, but bears Keitel's initials from 23 Mar. 1945), T77/778/5503865.
126. Skl KTB, 28 Feb. 1945, 325; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 3744/45 gKdos.,
"Notiz nach Führervortrag Nacht 26./27.3.45," 27 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 56;
Lagevorträge, 28 Mar. 1945, 687.
Chapter 6: Memel, Prussia, and Pomerania
1. "Abschrift aus dem Taschen-Notiz-Kalender 1944 des Generals d.Inf. Gollnick,
Kommandierender General des XXVIII AK," entries for 7 and 8 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH
24-28/107, 27; "Erläuterung und Ergänzung der Aufzeichnungen aus dem TaschenNotiz-Kalender 1944 und des Gefechtsberichtes des XXVIII.A.K. über die Kämpfe vom
4. bis 10.10.1944: Angaben v. 19.5.1960," ibid., 30-31; HGr Nord, KTB, 9 Oct. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 186; Der Ob der 3.Panzer-Armee/Ia, "Nr. 9800/44 gKdos.," 9
Oct. 1944, T-312/974/9165756; "Die Kämpfe der Panzer-Grenadier-Division
Grossdeutschland in Nordlitauen und um Memel in der Zeit vom 5.-15. Oktober 1944,"
BA/MA, RH 26-1005/84.
2. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4376/44 gKdos.," 10 Oct. 1944, T-312/972/9164473-74; HGr
Nord, KTB, 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 190-92, 200-01. On the Volkssturm,
David Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
3. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 440630/44 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/162, 44-46; HGr Nord, KTB, 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 217-19;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 10624/44 gKdos.," 11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
II/207, 112. Upon learning of this Reinhardt noted in his diary, "A gift from the
Greeks?!"; Persönliche Tagebuch Hans Reinhardt (hereafter Reinhardt Diary), entry for
11 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 79.
4. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 270; "Die Kämpfe der
Panzer-Grenadier-Division Grossdeutschland in Nordlitauen und um Memel in der Zeit
vom 5.-15. Oktober 1944," BA/MA, RH 26-1005/84; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 24454; Skl, KTB, 11 and 15 Oct. 1944, 270, 272, 360-61.
5. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 3721/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom
21.10.1944," 21 Oct. 1944, T-78/466/6445418; Genkdo XXVIII AK/Ia, Nr. 1182/44
gKdos., "Bezug: FS Obkdo HGr Mitte, Ia Nr. 15022/44 gKdos. v. 23.10.44," 23 Oct.
1944, T-311/217/1105-07.
6. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Fest), "Nr. 14036/44 geh.," 6 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
II/207, 69; PzAOK 3, KTB, 16 Nov. 1944, T-313/324/8604132; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt
(IM), "Nr. 12098/44 gKdos.," 17 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/207, 51; HGr Mitte/Ia,
"Nr. 16572/44 gKdos.," 17 Nov. 1944, T-311/229/1293; Skl, KTB, 23-24 Nov. 1944,
524, 545-46, 555 Skl, KTB, 11 Dec. 1944, 270; Genkdo XXVIII AK/Ia, "Nr. 1245/44
gKdos.," 16 Nov. 1944, T-311/217/999-1003; HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 16717/44 gKdos.," 20
Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 351-52.
7. HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 16802/44 geh.," 24 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 II/213, 355; HGr
Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 16916/44 geh.," 24 Nov. 1944, ibid., 356. The Germans devised an
imaginative method to prevent the Soviets from crossing the frozen Haff. They
constructed improvised bunkers, mounted on rafts, with sled runners. Even if the ice
broke, the defenders would still have floating fortresses. The Germans built about 150 of
these bunkers and moved them onto ice when the Haff froze; Military Improvisations
during the Russian Campaign (Washington: Department of the Army, 1951), 25-26.
8. Otto Heidkämpfer, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen im Januar 1945 bis zum Beginn des
Ausbruchsversuchs am Abend des 26.1.1945," Oct. 1953, BA/MA, RH 19 II/336, 4-6.
Heidkämpfer was Army Group Center's Chief of Staff.
9. By 4 Jan. 1945 the army group had given up 5 armored and motorized divisions, a
Volksgrenadier division, a motorized brigade and 2 cavalry brigades. In return Reinhardt
received a half dozen smashed divisions; ibid., 6-9; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Ia, file "KTB
Anlagen, Dezember 1944," BA/MA, RH 2/317, passim; HGr Mitte/Ia, "Nr. 111/45
gKdos.," 4 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 171-72; Reinhardt Diary, 13 and 14 Dec.
1944, 3 and 4 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 80-81.
10. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 114-17; Glantz and House, When Titans
Clashed, 238-41, 247, 369-70, (note 25); Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 449.
11. For example, OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 123/45 gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung der
Feindlage vom 7.1.45," 7 Jan. 1945, T-78/307/6258633-35.
12. Reinhardt Diary, 14 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 81.
13. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Tagesmeldung HGr Mitte vom 21.1.45," 22 Jan. 1945,
T-78/307/6295139; Reinhardt Diary, 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N
245/3, 82-83; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 450029/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Jan. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/328, 161.
14. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 450025/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/328, 160; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 915/45 gKdos.," 23 Jan. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 126; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IM), "Nr. 964/45 gKdos.," 23 Jan.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 111.
15. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N
245/15, 64-65, 69, 78-79; Reinhardt, "Nachschrift im April 1951," ibid., 29; Guderian,
Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 362; AOK 4/Ia, "Nr. 009/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 23 Jan. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 20-4/611.
16. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 1226/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost v. 29.1.1945,"
30 Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259996; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 468-69; Kabath,
"Seebrückenköpfe," 324-25.
17. Skl, KTB, 28 Jan. 1945, 492; AOK 4/Ia, Nr. T 29/45 geh., "Ia Tagesmeldung vom
29.1.1945," 29 Jan. 1945, T-312/261/7819009; OKH/GenStdH/Op Abt (IN),
"Tagesmeldung der HGr Nord vom 31.1.45," 1 Feb. 1945, T-78/308/6259934;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450066/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für Heeresgruppe
Nord," 2 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 236.
18. HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 1336/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Unternehmen 'Westwind,'" 17 Feb.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 239.
19. Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 139-41, 145; Ivan Bagramian, “The
Storming of Königsberg,” Main Front: Soviet Leaders look back on World War II (John
Erickson ed.) (London: Brassey's, 1987), 223, 226-30.
20. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/329, 23-24; Dieckert and Grossmann, Der Kampf um Ostpreussen, 142; Geschichte
des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 141.
21. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3325/45 gKdos.," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/333, 174; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3348/45 gKdos.," 20 Mar. 1945, ibid., 168;
Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am
19.3. nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, ibid., 165-66.
22. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 543-44; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/In/Lds Bef, "Betr.:
Festung Königsberg," 6 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 175-76; Lasch, So fiel
Königsberg, 104-09.
23. Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 389, 408. On the battle for Pillau, Strobel, "Der Kampf
um Pillau," BA/MA, Nachlass Ruge, N 379/v.97. Strobel was the Sea Commandant of
Pillau. All of the divisions evacuated were considered smashed, and most units had no
artillery. Only one division reported a strength of over 600 men, and the remnants of 5
divisions totaled 650 troops; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Vortragsnotiz betr. Zustand
der von Samland auf Nehrung zurückgeführten Divisionen," 18 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/337, 23-25.
24. OKW/WFSt/Op, "Nr. 88142/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328,
177; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450067/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für
Heeresgruppe Weichsel," 2 Feb. 1945, ibid., 186-87.
25. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 518-20; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 17274; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 250-52.
26. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 445-48; Murawski, Die Eroberung Pommerns durch
die Rote Armee, 76. Hitler had ordered major troop withdrawals from the West on 22
Jan., the day after he had created Army Group Vistula; OKW/WFSt/Op (H), "Nr.
88149/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295651-54; Jodl Diary, 5 Feb. 1945,
BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 78; Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of
General Raus, 1941-1945 (Steven Newton comp. and ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo,
2003), 318-19; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450134/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/328, 202.
27. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 472-76, 517-21; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff
at War, 1: 387-98; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 175-76.
28. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 523.
29. HGr Nord, KTB, 14 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 264-65;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Gedanken über die Weiterführung des Kampfes im Osten
(in Stichworten)," 18 Oct. 1944, T-78/338/6294723.
30. Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 27743/44 gKdos.," 9 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 315; Skl,
KTB, 14 Sept. 1944, 363; PzAOK 3/Ia, "Nr. 9230/44 geh.," 25 Sept. 1944, T313/323/8602873; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Fest, "Nr. 12290/44 gKdos.," 22 Nov. 1944,
BA/MA, RH 2/316, 81.
31. Skl, KTB, 8, 10, 12 and 15 Oct. 1944, 209, 242-43, 252-53, 260, 302, 376. On 11
and 12 Oct. Prinz Eugen fired 673 rounds of 20.3 cm shells, and Lützow fired 400 rounds
of 28 cm and 245 rounds of 15 cm shells. Two destroyers each fired 100 rounds of 15 cm
ammunition. On 14 Oct. Prinz Eugen, a destroyer and 3 torpedo boats shelled the coast
near Memel early in the day, and in the afternoon were relieved by Lützow, a destroyer
and 2 torpedo boats. Lützow and 2 destroyers returned on 23 Oct.; ibid., 11, 13, 14, 23
and 24 Oct. 1944, 272, 280, 325-26, 347 571, 596; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 243-52.
32. Skl, KTB, 11, 12, 14 and 22 Oct. 1944, 272, 292-93 339, 538; HGr Nord, KTB, 15
Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 13.
33. Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, 489; Lagevorträge, 10 Dec. 1944, 622.
34. Skl, KTB, 12, 16, 22 and 23 Dec. 1944, 286-87, 388-90, 554-55, 567.
35. For example, this subject came up when Meisel met with Guderian in mid-December
to discuss the situation at Memel and in Courland; Skl, 1 Skl I Ost 3753/44 gKdos.
Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," BA/MA, RM 7/261, 116-17; Skl,
KTB, 15 Dec. 1944, 359. See also Skl, KTB, 13 Dec. 1944, 313-14; Skl, KTB, 2 Jan.
1945, 19-20; MVO beim GenStdH, "B.Nr. 120/45 gKdos.," 7 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM
7/163, 18; Skl, "1/Skl I op 573/45 gKdos.," 9 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 18-19; Kurt
von Zydowitz, Die Geschichte der 58. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Kiel: Podzun,
1952), 134-35.
36. Skl, KTB, 14 and 18 Jan. 1945, 244, 321-22, 326; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan. 1945, 633.
37. Skl, KTB, 23 Jan. 1945, 420-23. A few days later Kummetz informed the Skl that
the army group required 3600 tons of supplies daily, including provisions for civilians;
ibid., 29 Jan. 1945, 504-05.
38. Ibid., 24 and 30 Jan. 1945, 434, 438, 512-13. Dönitz later ordered the transfer of 2
motor torpedo boat flotillas from the West, and 6 motor mine-sweepers from Norway, to
the Baltic; ibid., 22 Feb. 1945, 242; ibid., 26 Mar. 1945, 375.
39. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/AbtLdsBef, "Nr. 893/45 gKdos.," 22 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/331a, 140; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/AbtLdsBef, Nr. 997/45 gKdos., "Bezug: FS
OKM/Skl Adm Qu 2 mob 270/45 g.K. v. 23.1.45," 24 Jan. 1945, ibid., 105; Skl, KTB, 25
Jan. 1945, 454.
40. Lagevorträge, 23 Jan. and 5 Feb. 1945, 637-38, 647; Skl, KTB, 24 Jan. 1945, 440;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN), "Nr. 450045/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/328, 230; Oldwig von Natzmer, "Einsatz der 4. Armee ab Februar 1945 von O. v.
Natzmer, Generalleutnant a.D.," BA/MA, RH 20-4/632. Natzmer came from Courland to
East Prussia with Rendulic to serve as his Chief of Staff.
41. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450066/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für
Heeresgruppe Nord," 2 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 236; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe,"
298; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450081/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für
Heeresgruppe Nord," 7 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 235; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia),
"Nr. 450137/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 240;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450161/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/328, 246-47; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 23-24; Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA,
Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/15, 77.
42. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450055/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/328, 231-32; Lagevorträge, 6 and 9 Feb. 1945, 647-48.
43. Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 654; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450137/45
gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 240. Another reason for Hitler’s
insistence upon retaining Königsberg was his assertion that as long the Germans held the
city, he could claim still to have East Prussia; The Hitler Book: The Secret Dossier
Prepared for Stalin from the Interrogations of Hitler’s Personal Aides (Henrik Eberle
and Matthias Uhl ed) (Giles MacDonogh trans.) (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 181.
44. Rendulic reported 39,000 wounded from 25 Jan.-2 Feb., not counting dead and
missing; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. T 433/45 geh., "Tagesmeldung HGr Nord 5.2.45," 6 Feb.
1945, T-312/261/7819610. Rendulic protested that the army group, including 2nd Army,
had received only 25,000 replacements since 13 Jan., which covered losses only for the
previous six days; HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1543/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/328, 242-45.
45. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450161/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/328, 246-47; Adjutant des Chef des GenStdH, Nr. 639/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach
Führervortrag am 27.2.1945," 27 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/332, 300.
46. Lagevorträge, 26-27 Feb., and 4 Mar. 1945, 660-62, 668.
47. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/329, 23-24; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450213/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Mar.
1945, ibid., 30; Lagevorträge, 20 and 21 Mar. 1945, 681-83.
48. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450223/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 23 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/329, 31; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450228/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 24 Mar.
1945, ibid., 33; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3682/45 gKdos.," 26 Mar. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/334, 14; Lagevorträge, 25 Mar. 1945, 685.
49. Langmann to Dieckert, 18 June 1955, BA/MA, RH 20-4/632, 6-7. Langmann was
4th Army's Chief of Staff from 22 Feb. through 8 Apr. 1945.
50. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3713/45 gKdos.," 26 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/334, 28; HGr Nord/Ia, Nr. 2455/45 gKdos., "Bezug: OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr.
3713/45 g.K. vom 26.3 45," 28 Mar. 1945, ibid., 108; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
4332/45 gKdos.," 7 Apr. 1945, T-78/497/6484545; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 545.
51. OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, “Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.,” 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44
I/109.
52. Adj Chef GenStdH, Nr. 1097/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am
30.3.nachm.," 30 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 150; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
3902/45 gKdos.," 30 Mar. 1945, ibid., 145; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450247/45
gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, T-78/496/6484134-35; Langmann to Dieckert, 18 June
1955, BA/MA, RH 20-4/632, 6-7; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4485/45 gKdos.," 10
Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 72; OKW/WFSt/Qu, "Nr. 3857/45 gKdos.," 28 Apr.
1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 160.
53. Skl, KTB, 5 Feb. 1945, 39; Lagevorträge, 14 and 27 Feb., 16 and 20 Mar. 1945, 652,
662, 676, 682.
54. From 1-13 Feb. Army Group Courland had received 13,000 tons; Lagevorträge, 15
Feb., 20, 21 and 23 Mar. 1945, 653, 682-84.
55. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 930/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost v. 23.1.45," 23
Jan. 1945, T-78/308/6259636.; Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Feb. 1945, 252, 257; Skl, KTB, 9
Mar. 1945, 119, 125.
56. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 2667/45 gKdos.," 31 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 191-92; Skl,
KTB, 1 Apr. 1945, 7; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Tagesmeldung AOK Ostpreussen
vom 14.4.45," 15 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-2/995.
57. Lagevorträge, 28 Mar., 12 and 14 Apr. 1945, 687, 697, 699; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt
(Ia), "Nr. 4757/45 gKdos.," 17 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 250; OKW/WFSt/Op,
"20.20 Uhr: Fernspruch an Quartiermeister der Wehrmacht, General Toppe," 30 April
1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.
58. Skl, B.Nr.1/Skl I op 30161/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Verteidigung Gotenhafen," BA/MA,
RM 7/162, 67-68; MOK Ost, gKdos. 06497 QuH, "Betr.: Verteidigung G'hafen," 18 Oct.
1944, ibid., 5; Skl, KTB, 6 and 31 Oct.,1944, 141, 749; Skl, KTB, 14 Nov. 1944, 294;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Fest, Nr. 11807/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Festung Gotenhafen," 10 Nov.
1944, BA/MA, RH 2/316, 156.
59. MOK Ost, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 5751/44 F III, "Lagebetrachtung für den Monat
November 1944," 13 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 393; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Abt
LdsBef, Nr. 13312/44 gKdos., "Bezug: FS Chef Skl Adm Qu2 mob 6050/44 g.K. vom
19. Dez. 44," 20 Dec. 1944, T-78/338/6294859: Skl, KTB, 26 Dec. 1944, 618-19.
60. Lagevorträge, 19 and 21 Jan. 1945, 633, 635; Skl, KTB, 22 Jan. 1945, 401.
61. Lagevorträge, 23 Jan. 1945, 637-38.
62. On Hitler's expectations, see Himmler's remarks in "Aussprachen mit dem
ReichsFührer SS Himmler und Vortrag bei Adolf Hitler im Febr./März 1945 über die
Pommernschlacht und über die Führung im Osten: Aufzeichnung des Oberbefehlshabers
der 3.Pz.-Armee, Generaloberst a.D. Erhard Raus," BA/MA, RH 21-3/420, 8-11; Raus,
Panzer Operations, 319-21.
63. Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 499; Lagevorträge, 30 Jan., 1 and 5 Feb. 1945, 641, 644,
647; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 1100/45 gKdos.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v. 865,
55.
64. Skl, KTB, 7 Feb. 1945, 58; Admiral zbV, B.Nr. 200/45 gKdos., "Bemerkungen des
ObdM auf der Reise nach Stettin und Swinemünde am 8.2.1945," 9 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,
RM 7/231, 148-49.
65. Himmler to Weiss, 27 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115, 44; "Unterlagen für das
Fernschreibgespräch Reichs-Führer SS/Ob AOK 2 durchgegeben von Lt. Suhr, AOK 2,"
17 Feb. 1945, T-311/168/7219776; Himmler to Weiss, 17 Feb. 1945, T311/168/7219772-73; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, 177-78. Hitler had already decided to
send 2 divisions coming from Courland to Pomerania to prevent a Soviet breakthrough.
He feared that if eastern Pomerania and West Prussia lost land contact with the rest of the
front it would overtax the navy's ability to supply troops in coastal sectors. Dönitz agreed
that the present supply tasks had stretched the navy's resources to the limit; Lagevorträge,
6 Feb. 1945, 648.
66. Lagevorträge, 20 Feb. 1945, 657-58. Yet already the next day problems arose.
Army Group Vistula refused to consider Swinemünde a fortress because it had not been
sufficiently fortified. OKH intervened and ordered Himmler's army group to build up the
city's defenses as a fortress, claiming Swinemünde was decisively important for ensuring
supply to East Prussia and Courland; Skl, KTB, 21 Feb. 1945, 234;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/Lds Bef, "Nr. 2513/45 gKdos.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/332, 285-86.
67. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), Nr. 450138/45 gKdos. Chefs., "Weisung für die
Fortführung der Operationen bei den Heeresgruppen Mitte und Weichsel," 21 Feb. 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/328, 92-93; Skl, KTB, 24 Feb. 1945, 279; Lagevorträge, 27 Feb. 1945,
662.
68. The Skl estimated 2nd Army required 1100 tons of supplies per day; Lagevorträge, 3
and 12 Mar. 1945, 665, 673; Skl, KTB, 2 Mar. 1945, 26.
69. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr. 1814/45 gKdos.," 3 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/333, 344; MVO beim Chef GenStdH, B.Nr. 1894/45 gKdos., "Betrifft: Bedeutung
ostpommerscher Häfen für Seekriegführung," 6 Mar. 1945, ibid., 404; Skl, KTB, 5 Mar.
1945, 74-75. A few days later Kummetz included Hela, claiming its retention was
decisive for possession of Danzig and Gdynia; MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr.
2185/45 gKdos.," 15 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 229.
70. Skl, KTB, 4, 7 and 8 Mar. 1945, 54, 103-04, 109; Lagevorträge, 8, 12, 13 and 25
Mar. 1945, 669, 673-74, 685.
71. TBJG, 12 Mar. 1945, 15: 480; Lagevorträge, 4 and 6 Mar. 1945, 668.
72. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450181/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 March 1945,
BA/MA, RH 2/329, 18; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450184/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13
Mar. 1945, T-78/339/6295159-61; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), geh., "Notizen zum
Abendvortrag beim Führer am 18.3.45," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 185; Adjutant
des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 19.3.
nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 165-66.
73. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450181/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 10 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/329, 18; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450183/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 11 Mar.
1945, ibid., 23-24; Adjutant Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 780/45 gKdos., "Notiz nach
Führervortrag am 10.3.45," 10 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 299; Lagevorträge, 16 and
17 Mar. 1945, 677-78.
74. Skl, KTB, 16 Mar. 1945, 223; Lagevorträge, 17 Mar. 1945, 678.
75. Skl, KTB, 22 Mar. 1945, 313; Lagevorträge, 20 Mar. 1945, 681-82. The shelling
had been conducted by the obsolete battleship Schlesien, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen
and the light cruiser Leipzig; Skl, KTB, 20 Mar. 1945, 273.
76. Skl, KTB, 22 and 23 Mar. 1945, 312, 337; Adj.d.Chefs d.GenStdH, Nr. 967/45
gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 23.3.nachm.," 23 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/333, 50-51. On the 26th, upon learning that Soviet aircraft had destroyed two ships
bearing ammunition in Danzig's harbor, Hitler commanded Göring to increase fighter
activity over Danzig; Adj.d.ChdGenStdH, Nr. 1021/45 gKdos., "Notiz nach
Führervortrag am 26.3.45, nachm.," 26 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 29-30.
77. Lagevorträge, 30 Mar. and 4 Apr. 1945, 688, 693; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
450238/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 29 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 54;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450247/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM
7/102, 43.
78. Lagevorträge, 3 Apr. 1945, 692; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 4342/45
gKdos.," 8 Apr. 1945, T-78/497/6484547; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450276/45
gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Apr. 1945, T-78/496/6484112-13.
79. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4062/45 gKdos.," 1 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335,
16; Adj.d.C.d.GenStdH, Nr. 1150/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag am 2.4.45,
nachm.," 2 Apr. 1945, ibid., 43-45; Skl, KTB, 1 and 6 Apr. 1945, 6, 85; Reinhard
Tiemann, Geschichte der 83. Infanterie-Division, 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun,
1960), 318-21; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (III), Nr. 4211/45 gKdos., "Tagesmeldung Ost
vom 5.4.1945" 6 Apr. 1945, T-78/338/6294568; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
450263/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 4 Apr. 1945, T-78/339/6295272; OKW/WFSt/Op
(H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.," 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.
80. Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 1000/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach Führervortrag
am 25.3.45, nachm.," 25 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/334, 6-7;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt/LdsBef, Nr. 4255/45 gKdos., "Betr.: Festung Stettin," 10 Apr.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/336, 58; Lagevorträge, 16 Apr. 1945, 699.
81. Admiral beim ObdM, KTB des ObdM, 25 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/115, 9;
OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3821/45 gKdos.," 26 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/118,
214.
82. Dönitz agreed to this only after Swinemünde had been cut off from the hinterland,
rendering it useless as a supply port for Courland. Jodl issued the order on 30 April; Skl,
"1/Skl Iop 908/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 28 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 161;
Adm.v.ObdM, "Nr. 1550/45 gKdos.," 28 Apr. 1945, ibid., 167; OKW/WFSt/Op, "Nr.
88869/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 30 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.
83. OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/B, "Nr. 89000/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 3 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44
I/109; OKW/WFSt/OrgAbt (H), "Stärken der Ostfront: Schätzung Stand 7.5.1945," 9
May 1945, BA/MA, RH 10/130, 28; "Lage d. AOK Ostpreussen Stand 9.5-000 Uhr nach
den bis 8.5.-22 Uhr eingegang. Meldungen," T-311/135/7180164; OKW/WFSt/Op,
"Stand der Schiffsbewegungen im Ostseeraum," 10 May 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/34;
Tiemann, Geschichte der 83. Infanterie-Division, 335.
84. Jürgen Schröder and Joachim Schultz-Naumann, Die Geschichte der pommerschen
32. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1956), 194, 201; Walter
Schelm and Hans Mehrle, Von den Kämpfen der 215. württembergisch-badischen
Infanterie-Division (Stuttgart: privately published), 303.
85. Apparently the order for the divisions’ transfer from Army Group Center came from
Hitler; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450010/45 gKdos. Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler),"
14 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295383-85; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450011/45 gKdos.
Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 15 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295389-91. In his memoirs,
Guderian wrote: “On January 15th Hitler interfered for the first time in the defensive
battle, by issuing an order, despite my protests, for the transfer of the Gross-Deutschland
Corps from East Prussia to Kielce where it was to block the break-through that the
Russians were threatening to make towards Posen. It is obvious that this move could not
have been made in time to stop the Russians and would have involved a weakening of
East Prussia at the very moment when the enemy's attack there was about to become
highly dangerous. If the corps was taken away, the same disastrous situation must
develop in East Prussia that already existed along the Vistula. So this powerful striking
force—consisting of the Panzergrenadier Division Gross-Deutschland and the Luftwaffe
Panzer Parachute Division Hermann Goering, commanded by the Panzer Corps GrossDeutschland, and led by the trusted General von Saucken—sat in railway sidings while
its destination was the subject of argument. My refusal to carry out this order infuriated
Hitler;” Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballantine, 1957) (Constantine Fitzgibbon
trans.), 320. Guderian incorrectly states that Grossdeutschland was transferred to Army
Group A. In fact, it was the division Brandenburg; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
450011/45 gKdos.Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 15 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295389-91;
Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 304.
86. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N
245/15, 40-43.
87. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450010/45 gKdos. Chefs. (Guderian to Hitler)," 14
Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295383-85; Skl, KTB, 14 Jan. 1945, 248; Reinhardt Diary, 15 Jan.
1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 82.
88. Prinz Eugen and a destroyer covered Twenty-Eighth Corps' withdrawal from Memel
to Cranz from 29-31 January. A destroyer and two torpedo boats supported its
breakthrough to German lines in the western part of the Samland from 2-5 February. In
the Elbing-Tolkemit-Frauenburg sector, Admiral Scheer shelled Soviet troop
concentrations from 6-7 February, was relieved by Lützow on the 8th, and then returned
with a destroyer and two torpedo boats on 9-10 February. Admiral Scheer also supported
the attack to regain contact from the Samland to Königsberg on 19 and 20 February. On
the 23rd a destroyer and a torpedo boat assisted the army in the Samland, and from 24-26
and on 28 February another destroyer and one torpedo boat provided fire support; MOK
Ostsee, Op B Nr. gKdos. 1602 F III, "Rückblick auf Monat Februar 1945," 10 Apr. 1945,
BA/MA, RM 7/90, 484; Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 505; Skl, KTB, 1 Feb. 1945, 2.
89. For example, see Lagevorträge, 28 and 30 Jan. 1945, 640-41.
90. Ibid., 18 and 20 Jan. 1945, 631, 634; Skl, KTB, 20 and 22 Jan. 1945, 353, 401-02;
OKM/Chef Mar Wehr Tr I, "Nr. 228/45 gKdos.," 22 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 242.
91. Lagevorträge, 21 and 22 Jan., 635, 637; Skl, KTB, 21 and 27 Jan. 1945, 375, 485.
92. The 20,000 men Dönitz had offered the Army were originally intended to release
Army units from Denmark for the Eastern Front. In March Hitler decided that these
divisions should no longer be known as Naval Divisions, but instead as Naval Infantry
Divisions. Although this was a trivial matter indeed, it demonstrates Hitler's interest in
the subject; Lagevorträge, 20 and 30 Jan. 1945, 634, 641: OKW/WFSt/Org II/Op (M),
"Nr. 1101/45 gKdos.," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.865, 54; Skl, KTB, 31 Jan. 1945,
533-34; Skl, KTB, 10 Mar. 1945, 144.
93. The order to set up the 2nd Naval Division also states that the Navy had given 5000
men to the SS; OKW/WFSt/Org (II) (1), Nr. 388/45 gKdos., "Betrifft: Erdkampf-Einsatz
der Kriegsmarine," 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.865, 40.
94. All Army soldiers in the division were simultaneously transferred to the Navy; Der
Chef des OKW/WFSt/Org (I), Nr. 1754/45 geh., "Betr.: Überführung der 163.Inf.Div. in
die Kriegsmarine," 1 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.495, 66.
95. Hitler realized this and issued instructions for 8000 of these men to be sent to the
East as replacements; OKW/Chef WFSt, "Lage am 30. Januar 1945," gKdos.Chefs., 30
Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115.
Chapter 7: Courland, East Prussia, and West Prussia: Bastions or Bridgeheads?
1. Percy Schramm, "Einleitung," OKW KTB, 7: 14, 53-54.
2. "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering: From the Invasion to the
Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," World War II German Military
Studies, Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 18. As discussed in Chapter 5 above, Hitler withdrew over
a dozen divisions from Courland, so Goering is incorrect in stating that Hitler evacuated
only six.
3. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 4587/44 gKdos.," 21 Oct. 1944, T-312/1636/955-56.
4. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 101.
5. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3249/45 gKdos.," 17 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333,
212; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450246/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 31 Mar. 1945, T78/339/6295048-49; Adjutant des Chefs des GenStdH, Nr. 897/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach
Führervortrag am 19.3. nachmittags," 19 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 165-66;
OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450277/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH
19 III/17, 13; Adm FHQu, Nr. 278/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 18/4/45," 18
Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 26.
6. HGr Nord, KTB, 22 Oct., 13, 14 and 21 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/331, 102, RH
19 III/332, 170, 180-81, 184-87, RH 19 III/333, 95-97.
7. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4404/44 gKdos., "Zusammenfassende Auswertung der
wichtigsten Gefangeneaussagen und Meldungen des Geheimen Meldedienstes und der
Frontaufklärung—Stand 5.12.44," 5 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 2/317, 66; HGr Nord, KTB,
25, 26 and 27 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 80, 115, 134, 136.
8. HGr Nord, KTB, 27 and 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19/III 335, 133-34, 178;
OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Vortragsnotiz: Sowjetrussische Kräfte vor deutscher Ostfront,"
8 Jan. 1945, T-78/466/6446495; Ic/AO/Ausw., "Feindkräfterechnung," 9 Jan. 1945,
BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/15, 14.
9. Chef der Führungsgruppe im GenStdH, Nr. 111/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zur
Entwicklung der Lage am 18.2.45," 18 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/338, 26; HGr
Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 869/45 gKdos. (Vietinghoff to Guderian)," 2 Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RH
2/333, 351; HGr Kurland/Ia, "Nr. 1287/45 gKdos.," 2 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 52;
OKH/GenStdH/FHO/IIc, geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung Stand 1.5.45," T78/497/6485216; Heeres-Generalstab des Beauftragten des Führers für die
Reichsverteidigung Nord/Führungsgruppe/Ic/III, "Feindkräfte vor Verteidigungsbereich
Nord, Stand: 1.5.1945 (morgens)," T-78/462/6441657.
10. HGr Nord, KTB, 6, 7 and 9 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/334, 46, 57, 60-63, 74.
11. According to Soviet sources at the end of 1944 2nd Belorussian Front received the
2nd Shock Army and 3rd Belorussian Front the 2nd Guards Army. On 8 Jan. 1945 the
5th Guards Tank Army was incorporated into 2nd Belorussian Front, and 11 days later
the 43rd Army became part of 3rd Belorussian Front. By the time Zhukov launched his
offensive in mid-January 1945, the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies had joined 1st Belorussian
Front, and the 21st Army had entered Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front. In addition, in Jan.
1945 the 4th Shock Army briefly transferred to the front at Memel, and then returned to
Courland. Along with the 22nd Army, the 4th Shock Army was transferred to the reserve
on 1 Apr. 1945. The armies remaining in Courland during the battles in East Prussia and
Pomerania were the 1st Shock, 4th Shock, 6th Guards, 10th Guards, 22nd, 42nd, 51st,
54th and 67th; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 114, 135-37, 144; Deutschland im
zweiten Weltkrieg, 6: 690-91; Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1: 389; David
Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1989),
479, 505; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 451. One source claims that the 54th Army
turned over its units to the 1st Shock and 61st armies in Oct., and its staff was deactivated
in Dec. 1944; Albert Conner and Robert Poirier, Red Army Order of Battle in the Great
Patriotic War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), 66.
12. HGr Nord, KTB, 10 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/332, 135; Anlage 6 zu
OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4640/44 gKdos., "Luftlage Ost, Stand 21.12.44," 22 Dec.
1944, T-78/338/6294839; AOK 18, KTB, 8 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 20-18/925, 32;
Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 222.
13. Those remaining were the V and XIX Tank Corps, and the III Guards Mechanized
Corps. Of the others, the I and XXIX Tank Corps participated in the Jan. offensive with
3rd and 2nd Belorussian Front, respectively, while the X Tank Corps joined Konev's 1st
Ukrainian Front. III Guards Tank Corps formed part of 2nd Belorussian Front's reserve
in Jan., and XIX Tank Corps was transferred to Stavka reserve on 1 Apr. 1945; Erickson,
The Road to Berlin, 453, 456, 467, 469; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 116-17,
132, 144; Haupt, Heeresgruppe Nord, 308; OKH/GenStdH/ FHO (Chef), Nr. 371/45
gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom 20.1.1945," 20 Jan. 1945, T78/466/6445324; HGr Nord, KTB, 21 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/333, 95-97.
14. These units included 3 guards tank brigades, 16 guards tank regiments and 2 guards
assault gun regiments; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc) "Heeresgruppe Kurland Unterlage zur
Feindkräfteberechnung Stand vom 13.4.1945," T-78/462/6441702.
15. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 3721/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen
vom 21.10.1944," 21 Oct. 1944, T-78/466/6445418; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr.
3955/44 gKdos., "Wichtigste Feindfestellungen vom 5.11.1944," 5 Nov. 1944, ibid.,
Frame 6445401; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I/M), "Vortragsnotiz: Feindlage vor Memelflussund Memelbrückenkopffront," 19 Dec. 1944, T-78/495/6483079-81.
16. HGr Nord/Ia, "Nr. 1543/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 26 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 24243; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450213/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 21 Mar. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/329, 30; OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450238/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 29 Mar.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/329, 35; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 4062/45 gKdos.," 1 Apr.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 16; Adj.d.C.d.GenStdH, Nr. 1150/45 gKdos., "Notizen nach
Führervortrag am 2.4.45 nachm.," 2 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/335, 43-45;
OKH/GenStdH/ OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450254/45 gKdos.Chefs.," 3 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM
7/102, 34; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450263/ 45 gKdos.Chefs.," 4 Apr. 1945, T78/339/6295272; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IN/K), "Nr. 4342/45 gKdos.," 8 Apr. 1945, T78/497/6484547; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450276/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 13 Apr.
1945, T-78/496/6484112-13; OKW/WFSt/Op (H)/Nordost, "Nr. 3823/45 gKdos.," 27
Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RW 44 I/109.
17. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.1.45)," T78/497/6485216; "Beitrag zum KTB für den 20.1.1945," T-78/339/6295941;
OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 19.2.45)," T78/496/6484289.
18. Foreign Armies East rated Soviet units opposite Army Group North at less than half
strength—it evaluated Soviet troops in East Prussia as having a combat value of 39 rifle
divisions and 35 armored units—while those opposite Army Group Vistula were rated at
a strength of 71 rifle divisions, 6 cavalry divisions and 58 armored units. In comparison,
Gehlen estimated that the units opposite Courland had a combat strength of 35 rifle
divisions and 32 armored units; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung
(Stand: 1.3.45)," T-78/496/6484299.
19. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.3.45)," T78/496/6484314; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand:
31.3.45)," T-78/496/6484331.
20. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 3.4.45),” T78/496/6484334; OKH/GenStdH/ FHO (IIc), geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand:
10.4.45)," T-78/496/6484342. Krebs, Guderian's successor, rated Russian strength even
higher and informed Hitler that the defense of East and West Prussia tied down 193
Soviet infantry divisions; Lagevorträge, 4 Apr. 1945, 693; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc),
geh., "Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.4.45)," T-78/496/6484347. Gehlen was
transferred to the officer reserve pool on 10 Apr. 1945.
21. Gehlen estimated there were 1500 aircraft with 3rd Belorussian Front (1st Air
Army), 1200 with 2nd Belorussian Front (4th Air Army) and a total of 5000 supporting
1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts (2nd, 6th and 16th Air Armies); Anlage 6 zu
OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4640/44 gKdos., "Luftlage Ost, Stand 21.12.44," 22 Dec.
1944, T-78/338/6294839. Bagramian lists the 1st and 3rd, as well as parts of the 4th,
15th and 18th Air Armies, as participating in the fighting in East Prussia in mid-Feb.;
Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 222.
22. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 542-44; Geschichte des zweiten Weltkrieges, 10: 14546; Bagramian, "The Storming of Königsberg," 231-33. Nonetheless, the Soviets had
artillery to spare. Zhukov and Konev had a total of 16,716 artillery pieces for the assault
on Berlin; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 538, 595.
23. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 539, 556-57, 758. Particularly in this case, Gehlen's
estimates were far off the mark. Although the Soviets employed over 190 divisions in the
Berlin operation, Gehlen predicted that the Russians had only a total of 192 rifle divisions
against both Army Groups Vistula and Center; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IIc), geh.,
"Feindkräfteberechnung (Stand: 15.4.45)," T-78/496/6484347.
24. Zhukov received 3rd Army from East Prussia, and 61st and 3rd Shock from
Courland. Konev had 21st Army from Courland and 28th Army from East Prussia. In
Rokossovskii's forces, the 2nd Shock Army and III Guards Tank Corps had come from
Courland. Elements of the 4th and 18th Air Armies had supported operations in East
Prussia; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 556-57; Bagramian, "The Storming of
Königsberg," 222.
25. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 8-10 Sept. 1941, 23 Apr. 1942, and 7, 22 and 24 July 1942,
69-70, 237, 427, 442, 459; see also "Adolf Hitlers Geheimrede vor dem 'Militärischen
Führernachwuchs' vom 30. Mai 1942," reproduced in ibid., 493, 495; Lagevorträge, 9-11
Aug. 1943, 537.
26. Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938-1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors
Engel (Hildegard von Kotze ed.) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), entry for 8
Dec. 1941, 118; TBJG, entry for 20 Mar. 1943, 7: 593.
27. "Mittagslage vom 6. November 1944," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 679; Guderian,
Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 346, 350. In this connection, Schörner’s letter of 6 Aug.
1944 would only have reinforced Hitler's conviction.
28. TBJG, 5 Dec. 1944, 14: 354-55, 3 Jan., 12 Feb., 3 and 7 Mar. 1945, Vol. 15: 42-43,
366, 405, 442.
29. HGr Nord, KTB, 12 and 22 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/330, 243, RH 19 III/331,
102; AOK 16/OQu/Qu1, "OQu Besprechung am 25.10.44, 9.30 Uhr," T312/640/8268877.
30. For example, after a conversation with Schörner, Hilpert noted: "Fortress Courland
must be held until the end of the war, because it draws many times over our own strength
(150 divisions!) and keeps them far from our homeland;" Der OB der 16.Armee/Ia, "Nr.
8750/44 geh.," 1 Dec. 1944, T-312/634/8262429. Schörner criticized Haupt's assessment
of his role in the decision to defend Courland. Schörner claimed that he wanted to hold
Courland no more than Guderian, but he had his orders and considered the reasons
(which, unfortunately, he does not specify) for this command to be valid; BA/MA,
Nachlass Schörner, N 60/73.
31. HGr Nord, KTB, 31 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/335, 182-83.
32. Anlage 1 zu OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4012/44 gKdos. vom 10.11.44,
"Vermutliche Operationsabsichten des Gegners im einzelnen," BA/MA, RH 2/316, 150.
POW interrogations in Courland provided evidence to support this view; HGr
Nord/Ic/AO, Nr. 7352/44 geh., "Tagesmeldung vom 30.10.1944," 31 Oct. 1944, T78/487/6471800.
33. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4520/44 gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom
14.12.1944," 14 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/779, p. 87; Skl, KTB, 16 Dec. 1944, 388.
34. Reports indicated that the 2nd Guards and 61st Armies had transferred to East
Prussia, and the 3rd Shock Army was in Hungary; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), Nr. 4724/44
gKdos., "Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 28.12.1944," 28 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/779, 58; Beilage zu Anlage 2 zu FHO (I), Nr. 81/45 gK. v. 5.1.45, "Sowjetrussische
Angriffsabsichten im einzelnen," BA/MA, RH 2/331b, 153-54.
35. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 2/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung des
Gesamtfeindlage im Osten vom 15.1.1945," 15 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 3-6. The
revised estimates claimed that in the first two Courland Battles the Soviets attacked with
only 10 armies of 71-80 rifle divisions, 6-7 armored corps and 10-17 armored units. By
the beginning of the 3rd Courland Battle the Russians had withdrawn 4 armies with 22
rifle divisions, 2 tank corps and 5 armored units; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IN), "Feindliche
Operationsmöglichkeiten und Kräfteansatz gegen Heeresgruppe Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, T78/487/6471688-90; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (I), "Feindliche Kampfführung gegen die
H.Gr.Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, T-78/487/6471681-84.
36. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 7/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Feindlage im
grossen vom 20.1. vorm.," 20 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 8-10.
37. OKH/GenStdH/FHO (Chef), Nr. 26/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zur
Feindbeurteilung Stand 2.2.1945," 2 Feb. 1945, T-78/496/6484215; OKH/Chef der
Führungsgruppe im GenStdH, Nr. 111/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Gedanken zur Entwicklung der
Lage am 18.2.45," 18 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 25-30.
38. OKH/GenStdH/FHO, Nr. 45/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Beurteilung der Feindlage vor
deutscher Ostfront im grossen, Stand 25.2.45," 25 Feb. 1945, T-78/466/6446427.
Although Gehlen was mistaken about the Soviets' concern for Pomerania, he did not miss
the mark otherwise.
39. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 332, 336, 348, 361; Heinz Guderian, "The
Interrelationship between the Eastern and Western Fronts," World War II German
Military Studies, Vol. 24, MS# T-42, 38; The Hitler Book, 179-80.
40. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 450012/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T78/339/6295412; Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 361, 374-75, 389-90; Speer,
Inside the Third Reich, 534-35; Bradley, Walther Wenck, 328-29; Maizière, In der
Pflicht, 103-04. Although in his memoirs Guderian claims that Hitler had relieved him of
his post, Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant maintains that Hitler still thought well of Guderian
and expected him to return after his convalescence; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 406.
41. Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2,
BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 31; Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 266; TBJG,
18 April 1944, 12: 135. Another reason for Hitler's decision to defend Sevastopol was
his concern for the effect of the complete loss of the Crimea on Bulgaria and especially
Turkey, which had already halted delivery of chromium ore; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr.
771366/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung," 25 Apr. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 6-8.
42. "Besprechung des Führers mit Generaloberst Jodl am 31. July 1944 in der
Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 585, 590; Jodl Diary, 16 Sept. 1944,
BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 57.
43. For example, at the end of January Himmler ordered Thorn's fortress commandant to
hold the city under all circumstances in order to tie down enemy forces; Der Ob der HGr
Weichsel, 26 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.115, 41. On Schneidemühl and Poznan as
breakwaters, OKW KTB, 15, 16 and 18 Feb. 1945, 8: 1096-97, 1099, 1105.
44. Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 474, 517, 520, 523-25, 638.
45. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 696-99.
46. OKH/GenStdH/MVO, "B.Nr. 329/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 6 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/162, 326; Seetransportchef f.d.Wehrmacht, "Skl Adm QuVI 5294/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 8
Sept. 1944, ibid., 327-28.
47. Skl, KTB, 13 Oct. 1944, 315; Skl, "Adm Qu VI 5508/44 gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 456.
48. From Jan. through Sept. 1944 Germany gained 339,537 tons of shipping. Losses in
this period amounted to 639,732 tons, resulting in an overall decline of over 300,000
tons. By the end of Nov. the net loss had risen to 537,000 tons; "RKS
Handelsschiffstonnage, Entwicklung vom 1.1-30.9. 44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 436; Skl,
KTB, 15 Dec. 1944, 373. From this Salewski concludes that it would have been
impossible to evacuate the army group at any time after Sept. 1944; Salewski, Die
deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 466-67, 491.
49. Skl, KTB, 17 Jan. 1945, 298-99. The two steamers were the Cometa and Langssee;
ibid., 19 Jan. 1945, 345; BA/MA, Nachlass Genmaj. Hubert Lamay, N 317/23, 5. For a
list of passenger ships and their transport capacity, see Rohwer and Hümmelchen,
Chronology of the War at Sea, 2: 488-89.
50. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, "B.Nr. 567/45 geh.," 25 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a,
72.
51. For example, the earlier estimates for the number of men heavy cruisers could
transport rose from 1000 to 1200, for destroyers from 300 to 500, for Type 39 torpedo
boats from 200 to 500, and for Type 35 and 37 torpedo boats from 100 to 220 men; Skl,
KTB, 20 Jan. 1945, 360.
52. MVO beim Chef GenStdH, B.Nr. 448/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betrifft: Abtransport
weiterer Divisionen von H.Gr.Nord," 17 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/328, 225-26.
Although these divisions left much of their equipment in Courland, Dönitz nevertheless
assured Hitler he would transport an armored division in 3 days; Lagevorträge 18 Jan.
1945, 631.
53. Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Loch, N 186/16. The
original study envisioned 3 divisions holding a small bridgehead around Windau and 11
divisions in a larger Libau bridgehead. This would free 9 infantry and 2 armored
divisions; Hofer, Oberstlt.i.G., gKdos., "Studie über Freimachung von Kräften unter
Ändering des bisherigen Auftrages der Heeresgruppe," 30 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19
III/338, 3-4. The "Laura" plans underwent several revisions, from the original one to
hold bridgeheads around the ports to later variations which called for the entire army
group's evacuation.
54. Skl, KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 153-54; Adm FHQu, Nr. 101/45 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Lageunterrichtung," 16 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/102, 205; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945,
177-80.
55. Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945, 180-81; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 655.
56. Skl, KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 154. The transports continued throughout the month. In
Feb. the Navy brought 64,000 men and 14,000 vehicles from Courland; OKW KTB, 6
Mar. 1945, 8: 1147.
57. For example, AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4605/44 gKdos., "Stärken der Divisionen (Stand:
28.11.44)," 1 Dec. 1944, T-312/971/9162693; AOK 18/Ia, Nr. 4877/44 gKdos., "Stärken
der Divisionen (Stand: 30.12.44)," 31 Dec. 1944, T-312/971/9162657.
58. "Vortragsnotiz des Ia vom 6.II.," 6 Feb. 1945, BA/MA, RH 19 III/338, 12-16;
OQu/NT, "Erläuterung und Beschleung des OQu bei tägliche Durchschnitts Zulauf,"
ibid., 21-25; HGr Kurland/Ia, Nr. 23/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Vortragsnotiz für Fall 'Laura,'"
15 Feb. 1945, ibid., 43-46; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 655; Skl, KTB, 17 Feb. 1945,
178, 181.
59. Skl, KTB, 23 and 24 Feb. 1945, 264-65, 282; Lagevorträge, 17 Feb. 1945, 654.
60. Lagevorträge, 17 and 18 Mar. 1945, 678-80; Skl, KTB, 19 Mar. 1945, 266-67.
Wagner failed to include the "lengthy comments" of Hitler's reasons for holding Courland
in his summary of the conference.
61. Natzmer, “Festung Kurland,” IfZ, ZS 111, 61-63; Dieckert and Grossmann, Der
Kampf um Ostpreussen, 74; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 252; Lasch, So fiel
Königsberg," 28.
62. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 667-68.
63. Ibid., 399, 670-71.
64. Ibid., 604, 668.
65. Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 486-87; OKW KTB, 8: 346,
355-56.
66. Skl, KTB, 20 Oct. 1944, 486-87; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 372-75; Jung, Die
Ardennen-Offensive, 28. Although it is true that Rumania's surrender and Bulgaria's
defection opened a huge gap in the southeast, Hitler chose to withdraw from the Balkans
before the danger to his forces there was acute.
67. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 395-96. Norway's importance to Hitler will be
examined in Chapters 9 and 10.
68. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 69; Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 2.
69. Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde, 139; TBJG, 4 and 15 Mar. and 18 Apr. 1944, 11: 399,
482, 12: 138; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 665-68.
70. Gotthard Breit, Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild deutscher Generale beider
Weltkriege im Spiegel ihrer Memoiren (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1973), 206-07, 210.
Speer mentions General Heinrici as one who believed this; “Kapitel 6, Kuerzungen, F.
Hitler als Feldherr und Politiker (9 Mar. 1952),” Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter
BA/K), Nachlass Speer, N 1340/385, 27 + 5-6.
71. "Besprechung des Führers mit Generaloberst Jodl am 31. Juli 1944 in der
Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 585-94; "An Interview with Genobst Alfred
Jodl: Planning the Ardennes Offensive," 26 July 1945, World War II German Military
Studies, Vol. 3, ETHINT 50, 4-5; "An Interview with Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering:
From the Invasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High Level Strategy," ibid.,
Vol. 2, ETHINT 30, 10.
72. TBJG, 2 and 20 Dec. 1944, 14: 318-19, 452; "An Interview with Genobst Alfred
Jodl: Planning the Ardennes Offensive," 15-16; "An Interview with Reichsmarschall
Hermann Goering: From the Invasion to the Ruhr, Eastern vs. Western Fronts, High
Level Strategy," 10-12; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 386; Albert Speer, Inside the Third
Reich (Richard and Clara Winston trans.) (New York: Avon, 1970), 527-28.
73. Kreipe Diary, 16 Sept. 1944, IfZ, F 29, 21.
74. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 105-09.
75. Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (Buenos Aires: Dürer, 1950), entries
for 5 Sept. and 25 Oct. 1944, 2: 130, 169; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 527-28. On the
Skl’s confidence in the offensive’s success, Werner Rahn, “Winkelriede, Opferkämpfer
oder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderen Einsatzformen der deutschen Kriegsmarine
1944/45,” Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument
internationaler Sicherheit (Werner Rahn ed.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 512 (The
author thanks Dr. Rahn for sending a copy of this important article. Unfortunately, it was
too late to include in the manuscript).
76. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 104; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 765.
77. Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bonn: Athenäum, 1951),
563-64; Walter Görlitz, Der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1952), 2: 462.
78. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 373; Guderian, "The Interrelationship
Between the Eastern and Western Fronts," 51.
79. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Chef), "Besprechungspunkte für den Führervortrag am
20.12.1944," 19 Dec. 1944, T-78/338/6294884; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr.
450012/45 gKdos. Chefs.," 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt
(IN), "Nr. 1357/45 gKdos.," 31 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RH 2/331a, 4.
80. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 81-85; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Anthony
Powell trans.) (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982), 398.
81. OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (IS/A), "Nr. 430586/43 gKdos. Chefs.," 4 Sept. 1943, OKW
KTB, 6: 1455-56; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 164-65, 171; Wolfgang Pickert, Vom
Kuban-Brückenkopf bis Sewastopol (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1955), 55.
82. Zeitzler, "Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg," Vol. 2,
BA/MA, Nachlass Zeitzler, N 63/80, 31; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 456-57.
According to Speer, Hitler planned to use the Kuban Bridgehead as a springboard for a
future offensive into Persia and India; “Fragen Fest,” (undated response of Speer to
questions in a letter from Fest, dated 20 Aug. 1969), BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17;
Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17; Speer, Inside the Third
Reich, 353-54.
83. Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 266.
84. Manstein, Lost Victories, 392; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 59, 181. Hitler also
believed that Soviet aircraft based in the Crimea would pose a serious threat to Rumanian
oil fields and refineries; Lagevorträge, 27 Oct. 1943, 553.
85. Zydowitz, Geschichte der 58. Infanterie-Division, 130-31.
86. Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/17; Albert Speer,
Spandau: The Secret Diaries (Richard and Clara Winston trans.) (New York: Macmillan,
1976), 15; "Ansprache des Führers vor Divisionskommandeuren am 12. Dezember 1944
im Adlerhorst," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 720; "Ansprache des Führers vor Divisionskommandeuren am 28.Dezember 1944 im Adlerhorst," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 739,
742.
87. Heidkämper, "Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen," BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N
245/15, 54-55.
88. TBJG, 4, 25, 26 and 30 Jan. 1945, 15: 53-56, 218, 231, 275.
89. Speer to Hitler, 5 Sept. 1944, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/214; “Protokoll 8:
Bedarf der Wehrmacht, Progeammgestalting, Lieferungen vom Ausland, einschliesslich
besetzte Gebiete (8 August 1945),” in Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945
(Ulrich Schlie ed.) (Munich: Herbig, 2003), 384-87; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 48081. In his memoirs, Speer claims Jodl convinced Hitler to request the study, and that
Hitler was no longer interested in it when completed. He fails to mention this in the
August 1945 interrogation, and it could be that his memory in August 1945 was better
than when he published his memoirs more than twenty years later.
Chapter 8: The Swedish Question
1. The Hitler Book, 179-80; HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 7 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19
III/318, 50, 67; Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 336; Gerhard Boldt, Hitler—Die
letzten zehn Tage (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1973), 74-75, 77. Boldt is rather vague with his
dates. His account indicates that Hitler cited Sweden as a reason for holding Courland in
late Jan. and again in late Mar. 1945.
2. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed) Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg, 4: Horst Boog et al, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), p. 405; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 97, 103-04; Lennart Behrendtz,
"Tysklands hållning till svensk intervention i vinterkriget: En analys mot bakgrund av
den nazistiska östpolitiken," Scandia 38 (No. 2): 225-27; Bruno von Uthmann, "German
Military Policy in Scandinavia," 28 Feb. 1949, World War II German Military Studies,
Vol. 5, MS # T-101, Annex 22, 11-13.
3. Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt was military attaché in Berlin from 1933 to 1945. He claims to
have met with Sköld on 3 Apr. and warned him that the Germans would land at Narvik.
Sköld thereupon angrily lectured him at some length that this was impossible; Curt
Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," Kungl. Krigsarkiv, Stockholm (hereafter cited as KrA),
Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 204.
4. On 9 April the Swedes had 1 company of troops and 1 artillery battery in southern
Sweden; Carl August Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst: Händelser och människor från min bana
(Stockholm: Norstedt, 1965), 155. The Swedes sent over 100 artillery pieces, more than
90 anti-aircraft guns, 70 anti-tank guns and 14 aircraft to Finland. In April 1940 the
Swedes had only 544 artillery pieces, 244 anti-aircraft guns, 145 anti-tank guns and 122
operational aircraft; Tor Lange, "Vapenhjälpen till Finland," Sveriges militära beredskap
1939-1945 (Carl-Axel Wangel ed.) (Köping: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1982) (hereafter
Sveriges beredskap), 136. See also Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 13, 119-20; Nils Palmstierna
and Carl-Axel Wangel, "Försvaret av övre Norrland 1 september 1939-mars 1940,"
Sveriges beredskap, 120-21.
5. Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien, 277, 287; "Niederschrift des L IH (Obstlt.
v.Lossberg) über seinen Vortrag vor dem Chef OKW und dem Chef WFA in der
Reichskanzlei am 15.4.40 von 10.40-11.05 Uhr," 15 Apr. 1940, OKW KTB, 2: 963.
6. Patrick Salmon, "British Plans for Economic Warfare against Germany 1937-1939:
The Problem of Swedish Iron Ore," The Second World War: Essays in Military and
Political History (Walter Laqueur ed.) (London: Sage, 1982), 31-32, 37, 43-46. On
Churchill's interest, Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1: The Gathering
Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 531-36, 543-47.
7. The Swedes had learned of this scheme by tapping the phone lines of the British
legation and in Apr. 1940 arrested two Englishmen loading explosives into their car.
Churchill was a driving force behind the plan to sabotage Oxelösund's port; Charles
Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33-42.
8. Klaus Wittmann, "Deutsch-schwedische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im Zweiten
Weltkrieg," Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939-1945 (Friedrich Forstmeier and HansErich Volkmann eds.) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977), 201. Sources vary considerably
regarding the amount of iron ore Sweden sent to Germany. Wittmann claims that after
1940 Swedish iron ore fulfilled about 25% of Germany's requirements. The Germans
imported 5.34 million tons from Sweden in 1940, 5.02 million tons in 1941, 4.2 million
tons in 1942, 5.56 million tons in 1943 and 2.6 million tons in 1944; ibid., 203-07; Alan
Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977), 311; Martin Fritz, "A Question of Practical Politics: Economic Neutrality
during the Second World War," Neutrality and Defense: The Swedish Experience
(Stockholm: Wallin & Dalholm, 1984), 106-08. These figures do not agree with an entry
in the Skl war diary, which states that from Jan.-Aug. 1943 alone, iron ore shipments
from Scandinavia to the greater German area amounted to 7.39 million tons, compared
with over 5.4 million tons in the same period for 1941 and 1942, or with Speer, who
mentioned an amount of close to ten million tons in 1943; Skl, KTB, 24 Sept. 1943, 493;
“Die Bedeutung der Zufuhr an schwedischen und norwegischen Eisenerzen für die
deutsche Eisenerzeugung,” 11 Nov. 1943, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N 1340/212.
9. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 608.
10. Uthmann, "German Military Policy in Scandinavia," 13-15.
11. Fst, Marinoperationsavd., Nr. H 49, "VPM rörande det sjöstrategiska läget i
Östersjön vid krig mellan Sovjetunionen och Tyskland," 21 Mar. 1941, KrA,
Beredskapverket 9 (Skölds papper), Vol. 2; TBJG, entry for 28 Jan. 1942, 3: 205. The
German military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann, reported that Karl Schnurre, a
special negotiator from the German Foreign Ministry, spoke with him of meetings on 24
May 1941 with Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson and Foreign Minister
Christian Günther. Uthmann informed OKH that according to Schnurre, Günther had
declared that if the Germans became involved in a war with Russia, the Swedish
government would be ready to do everything it could to support Germany and would
even conclude a military pact. Prime Minister Hansson, Uthmann related, had assured
Schnurre that provided Sweden maintained its sovereignty and freedom, the Swedish
government would bring its policies closer to those of Germany. Uthmann to Matzky, 27
May 1941 (Alf Johansson ed.) Historisk Tidskrift, 1984, No. 4: 397-400. Johansson
maintains that either Schnurre or Uthmann greatly exaggerated remarks by Hansson and
Günther, because Swedish records of the talks present a very different picture.
12. Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 230; Hökv
FSt, "Nr. H 12:1/1941," 13 Mar. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.
13. "Lagebetrachtung für einen Ostfeldzug gegen Russland (Fall 'Barbarossa')," 30 Jan.
1941, in Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 3: 154-59. In 1941 the Swedes
escorted some 650,000 tons of shipping through their territorial waters; Wittmann,
"Deutsch-schwedische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," 208.
14. OKW KTB, 3 Feb. 1941, 1: 299; ibid, 8 May 1941, 2: 393.
15. Ibid., 5 and 25 June 1941, 2: 401, 409. According to the transit agreement Germany
could not reinforce its troops in Norway via Sweden. Yet in Mar. 1941 the Swedes
noticed that 20,000 more troops on leave had “returned” north than earlier had gone
south. The government protested, but did nothing; Wilhelm Calgren, Swedish Foreign
Policy during the Second World War (Arthur Spencer trans.) (London: Ernest Benn,
1977), 96-98. Calgren gives no hint that the Swedes were fairly certain that Germany
planned to attack the Soviet Union.
16. Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 182-87; Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second
World War, 84; Uthmann, "German Military Policy in Scandinavia," 20; Carl-Axel
Wangel, "Neutralitetsrätt—regeler och tillämpning," Sveriges beredskap, 60-66.
17. Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, 85, 104. On the
Nazis’ displeasure with Sweden's press, Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 124-26, 159; TBJG,
entries for 10 Dec. 1941, 28 Jan. 1942, 21 and 26 Apr. 1943, 30-31 Aug. 1943, 21 Sept.
1943, 2: 462; 3: 205-06; 8: 143-44, 167 9: 389, 393, 546.
18. Denham states that the Swedish secret police photographed visitors at the British
legation and at his apartment. He relates a hilarious episode of an encounter with the
police in late 1943. He discovered a microphone inside his chimney and once when he
had guests at his apartment, he and his visitors went up to attic and found two Swedish
policemen with a tape recorder hiding under a sackcloth; Henry Denham, Inside the Nazi
Ring: A Naval Attaché in Sweden 1940-1945 (London: John Murray, 1984), 27, 45, 48,
53, 140-42, 150-52. Cruickshank also maintains that the Sweden's secret police was
headed by a "violently pro-German officer;" Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 206.
19. Lief Björkman, "Svensk beredskap hösten 1940 till Juni 1941," Sveriges beredskap,
206; Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 334;
Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 193, 216; Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 54. Thörnell retired
from active service at the end of Mar. 1944.
20. Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 207; Gunnar Hägglöf, Samtida Vittne 1940-1945
(Stockholm: Norstedt, 1972), 206. Boheman states that the ball-bearings question was
especially important to the Americans because the bombing of German ball-bearing
plants at Schweinfurt had been so costly. He claims that in May 1944 the US
government sent Stanton Griffis, a film magnate, as a special delegate to negotiate
directly with the Swedish company producing ball-bearings. Griffis rather
undiplomatically threatened that the US would bomb Swedish ball-bearing plants;
Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 267-71, 295-96.
21. Lagevorträge, 29 Dec. 1941, 22 Jan. 1942, 336, 347-48; "Aufzeichnung des
Generalmajors Schmundt über die Besprechung Hitlers mit Mussolini und dem Chef des
italienischen Wehrmachtgeneralstabes, Generaloberst Graf Cavallero am 30. April 1942
(Andreas Hillgruber and Jürgen Förster eds.)," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1972,
No. 1: 117. Speer states that around 1942 Hitler considered occupying Sweden, because
air bases there could threaten northern Germany; “Fragen Fest,” BA/K, Nachlass Speer,
N 1340/17.
22. OKW KTB, 16 Nov. 1942, 4: 968, 970. Hitler merely stated that he did not intend to
insist on transit traffic to the previous extent and he would send Schnurre to negotiate for
as much traffic as possible; ibid., 6 Aug. 1943, 6: 905.
23. Chef WFSt, Nr. 662214/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Entspricht die Verteilung der
Gesamtkräfte auf den einzelnen Kriegsschauplätzen der strategischen Lage?," 8 Sept.
1943, BA/MA, RM 7/260, 323; OKW/WFSt/Op, B.Nr. 662625/43 gKdos.Chefs.,
"Betrachtung der Feindliche Angriffsmöglichkeiten gegen den Nordraum," 3 Nov. 1943,
ibid., 338-39.
24. In 1942 the Swedes broke 2100 kilometers of telegram text; Olof Thörnell,
"Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- och kryptotjäntst," 1 Dec. 1947,
KrA, Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 3, Bihang 7, 37-38; Torgil Thorén, "Försvarsväsendets
radioanstalts (FRA) tillkomst, utveckling och arbete till sommaren 1945," 8 Mar. 1946,
ibid., Vol. 43, 5-9. The site of Swedish code-breaking activity, Karlaplan 4, is only a
block from Sweden's military archives.
25. Calgren is extremely reluctant to state exactly when the Swedes knew that Hitler
planned to invade Russia; Wilhelm Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939-1945
(Stockholm: Liber Allmänna Förlaget/Försvarsdepartementet, 1985), 66-69. The Swedes
later learned that from Aug. 1941-Jan. 1942 an orderly who delivered reports on decoded
German messages to the Defense Staff and Foreign Ministry photographed the reports
and sold them to the Soviets; ibid., 95.
26. Ibid., 98; Thörnell, "Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- och
kryptotjäntst," 1 Dec. 1947, KrA, Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 3, Bihang 7, 38; Burkhart
Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany and its Allies in World War II: A Record of Axis
Collaboration Problems (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980),
175-76.
27. Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of German
Naval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940 (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1973), 372-74.
28. OKW KTB, 5 and 14 Jan, 10, 13 and 16 Mar. 1943, 5: 18, 39, 199-200, 207, 217.
29. Ziemke, German NTO, 258-60.
30. OKW KTB, 21 Aug. 1943, 6: 983; Gemzell, p. 221.
31. Olof Thörnell "Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden," KrA,
Beredskapverket 1, Vol. 5, Bihang 2, 1-14.
32. "Militära synpunkter på Sverige läget i händelse av krig mellan Tyskland och
Sovjetunionen," 5 Apr. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1; Fst, Sektion I, "PM för
Överbefälhavarens föredragning i statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfall
Tyskland-Sverige," KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.
33. Thörnell "Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden," KrA, Beredskapverket
1, Vol. 5, Bihang 2, 41; Fst, Sektion I, "Memorial angående viss krigsfallsplanläggning,"
25 Jan. 1944, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.
34. As of 1 Oct. 1941 the Swedish Navy consisted of 7 coastal defense ships, 3 cruisers,
17 destroyers, 18 submarines and 32 mine sweepers. By the end of the war the Swedes
had added 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines, 10 mine sweepers and 20 motor torpedo
boats; Carl-Axel Wangel, "Flottans utbyggnad," Sveriges beredskap, 322-25; Chefen för
Marinen, "Instruktion för Krigsfall I/IMK:I/," [Mar.] 1941, KrA, Marinstaben,
Expeditionen, Vol. 5, F XVI.
35. Chefen för Marinen, "Särskild instruktion för CKF vid Krigsfall I," 21 Apr. 1942,
KrA, Marinstaben, Expeditionen, Vol. 5, F XVI. The reason for the Swedes' failure to
account for invasion from Finland or the Baltic States earlier is puzzling; Chefen för
Marinen, "Instruktion för Krigsfall I (IMK:I/42)," [Dec.] 1942, ibid.
36. Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst, 64. Forshell was extremely pro-German and in
1942, convinced of a Nazi victory, advised Admiral Fabian Tamm, Commander in Chief
of the Swedish Navy, that Sweden should join with Germany and not miss the “historic
opportunity to contribute to Europe's future;” Juhlin-Dannfelt, "Hågkomster," KrA, Curt
Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, Vol. 2, 271-72.
37. Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 63-65; Carl-Axel Wangel, "Neutralitetsförsvaret till
sjöss," Sveriges beredskap, 556-58.
38. B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 502/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der Überwasserstreitkräfte,"
19 Feb. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1418.
39. MOK Ost, KTB, 16 and 22 July, 22 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 31/M 522.
40. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 65/43, "Betrifft: Tonnage-Krieg,"
Anlage 4 zum KTB des MOK Ost v. 16.-31.8.1943, ibid.
41. "B.Nr.1/Skl 23966/43 gKdos.," 27 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/160, 118-19;
Lagevorträge, 28 Aug. 1943, 545; Beredskapverket 1, KrA, Vol. 3, p. 68. Skl, KTB, 6
Sept. 1943, 109.
42. MOK Ost, KTB, 15 and 26 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/M 523.
43. Ibid., 1 July 1944; Adm.östl. Ostsee, gKdos.Chefs. 334 AI, "Betr.: Auftreten schwed.
Einheiten Höhe Irbenstrasse," 14 July 1944, Anlage 17 zu MOK Ost KTB v. 1.15.7.1944, ibid.
44. MOK Ost, KTB, 16, 18 and 24 July 1944, ibid. This was not the last incident of this
type. In March 1945 the Germans discovered a Swedish minelayer in their U-boat
training areas near Bornholm "for no apparent reason;" Adm. westliche Ostsee, B.Nr. Op
gKdos. 591 F III, "Monatsbericht kommandierender Admiral westliche Ostsee für den
Monat März 1945," 10 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 497.
45. Marinstaben, Krigsdagbok, 28 and 29 July, 5 and 6 Aug. 1943, KrA, D II, Vol. 2
(hereafter cited as Mst, KDB).
46. Goebbels’ diary contains complaints about Sweden’s attitude throughout the year,
often with threats of retaliation; TBJG, 19 Jan., 1 Mar., 15 Mar. and 18 Sept. 1944, 11:
120, 374, 481, 13: 508.
47. On 23 May the Defense Staff ordered reconnaissance planes to fly no closer than 10
nautical miles from Bornholm or the coast of the Baltic States; Mst, KDB, 14, 15, 16 and
23 May 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2; Fst, Sektion I, "PM för Överbefälhavarens föredragning
i statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfall Tyskland-Sverige," KrA,
Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.
48. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 648/44 Chefs.," T-1022/1825/PG 32519.
See also a naval intelligence report of 40,000 Swedish troops poised to seize the islands
in 3/Skl, "S.B.Nr. 10029/44 geh. A," 14 Aug. 1944, ibid. Skl, KTB, 9 July 1944, 207.
49. On 31 Mar. the Swedes received a report that the Germans planned to invade Sweden
via the Åland Islands if Finland made peace with the Soviets; Fst, avd M, KDB, 31 Mar.
1944, KrA, F III:1. This information would have served to confirm a report from a
Swedish naval attaché, Möje Östberg, in Berlin. Östberg reported that following dinner
with a mutual friend, he had spoken with Meisel about the situation in Finland. Meisel,
intoxicated (according to Östberg not an unusual condition for Meisel), had declared that
the Germans were well-prepared for action in the Baltic—even against Sweden. Meisel
boasted that Germany's Baltic Fleet was larger than the Swedes assumed and warned that
German forces in northern Finland would be saved if that country made peace with the
Soviets, which could place Sweden in a critical situation; Maratt Berlin, "Avg 52/Und 8,"
24 Feb. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 2. "Memorial 1/3 1944 angående utvecklingen i händelse
av finsk-ryska freds- eller vapenstilleståndsförhandlingar," 1 Mar. 1944, KrA,
Beredskapverket 7, Vol. 1.
50. The Navy ordered increased air reconnaissance from its southern coast to the Gulf of
Bothnia, coastal artillery emplacements were fully-manned, squadrons shifted their
warships, airfields were reinforced and mined against airborne assault, ports were closed
from dusk to dawn, harbor obstacles and booms were erected and destroyers patrolled the
coast. In addition, port facilities at Luleå and Oxelösund and the rail lines from Luleå to
the Norwegian border and from the border to Kiruna were prepared for demolition; Fst,
avd M, KDB, 1 Apr. 1944, KrA, F III:1; MSt, KDB, 23 Mar.-14 Apr. 1944, KrA, D II,
Vol. 2.
51. MSt, KDB, 19-20 June and 15 and 16 Sept. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.
52. OKW/WFSt/Ag.Ausland, Nr. 4936/44 geh. Ausland II A2, "Betr.: DeutschlandSchweden," 19 Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RW 4/v.653; OKH/GenStdH/FHO (IV), gKdos.,
"Kurzgefasste Übersicht Schweden," 10 Jan. 1945, T-78/502/6490840. Fritz, "A
Question of Practical Politics," 109; OKW/WFSt/Op M/Ia, "Betr.: Erzverschiffung Lulea
vom 5.6.-1.7.1944," 29 Aug. 1944, T-77/786/5514985; 1/Skl 2, "Nr. 22344/44 gKdos.,"
19 July 1944, T-77/694/1904449; OKW/Feldwirtschaftsamt (Ausl.) 2.Abt., Nr. 7966/44
geh., "Vortragsnotiz für Chef OKW," 19 Aug. 1944, T-77/694/1904425; 2/IIIe
Schweden, "Nachtrag zur Vortragsnotiz für Chef OKW vom 19.8," 25 Aug. 1944, T77/694/1904417; WO Schweden, Anlage zu Nr. 289/44 geh., "Erzverschiffung über
Lulea in den Kriegsjahre 1939-1944," T-77/694/1904386-87.
53. Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die
Seekriegsführung in der östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 109.
54. ObdM, "Kurzlage ObdM Nr. 4," 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 352.
55. Skl, KTB, 29 Sept. 1944, 787. "Vortrag des Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der
Oberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle' am 24./25.8.44," BA/MA, RM 7/100, 162; Skl, KTB, 25
Sept. 1944, 697; 1/Skl I Op, B.Nr. 3151/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der 2.
Kampfgruppe zur Unterstützung H.Gr.Nord," 4 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RH 19 III/16, 69;
B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3066/44 gKdos. Chefs., "Betr: Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte zur
Abwehr von Landungen im Skagerrak-Raum," 25 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 329;
1/Skl I Ost 3753/44 Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," 15 Dec. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/261, 117.
56. When the navy proposed the erection of launchers it also, via OKW, requested the
Foreign Ministry to clarify the proper response it should take to vaguely-defined Swedish
encroachments. A few days later the Foreign Ministry responded that it could not provide
guidelines without precise information on the navy's complaints and requested exact
details on incidents. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministry suggested that the navy
refrain from provoking Sweden under all circumstances; OKW/WFSt/Qu2 (Nord), Nr.
11914/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Deutsche Haltung gegenüber Schweden," 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA,
RW 4/v.653; Auswärtiges Amt, "Nr. 890 g.Rs.," 11 Oct. 1944, ibid; OKW/WFSt/Qu2
(Nord), Nr. 7908/44 geh., "Betr.: Verhalten gegenüber Schweden," 15 Oct. 1944, ibid.
57. Skl, KTB, 23 Oct. 1944, 561.
58. MOK Ost/Führstab, "Op 6644 FI gKdos.," 24 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 340;
Skl, KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, 668; Skl, KTB, 14 Nov. 1944, 298; Skl, KTB, 8 and 9 Feb.
1945, 72, 75-76; Mst, KDB, 9 Nov. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.
59. OKW/WFSt/Qu2 (Nord), Nr. 88030/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Schweden," 5 Jan.
1945, BA/MA, RW 4/v.654; Adm.FHQu, Nr. 20/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung,"
10 Jan. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/101, 120.
60. OKW KTB, 15 Feb. 1945, 8: 1098; Lagevorträge, 10 Mar. 1945, 671. In 1943 the
government permitted the training of Norwegians and Danes who had fled to Sweden.
Although officially referred to as police units, this force received military training and
heavy weapons. By the end of the war the "police units" contained some 15,000
Norwegians and 5,000 Danes; Beredskapverket 1, KrA, Vol. 3, 483-85, Vol. 35, 70-71.
In the fall of 1944 Sweden's Foreign Minister informed his Norwegian counterpart that
Sweden was prepared to agree to a direct request from the Norwegian government to
allow 12,000 to 16,000 Norwegian police troops to enter Norway surreptitiously. If
Norway's king and the Allies so requested, Swedish troops would help the Norwegians
gain entry into Norway; JIC 263, Top Secret, "Swedish Participation and Cooperation to
liberate Norway," 31 Mar. 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1, 1942-45,
European Theater (University Publications of America Microfilm), Reel 10, Frames 30711.
61. Carl-Axel Gemzell, "Tysk militär planläggning under det andra världskriget: fall
Sverige," Scandia 41 (No. 2): 201-04.
62. 1/Skl, Nr. 1568/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Kurze Betrachtung zum Kriegsfall mit Schweden
und zu den dabei auftretenden Aufgaben der Kriegsmarine" [May 1943], BA/MA, RM
7/160, 172-84.
63. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 403.
64. 1/Skl 3119/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Schweden," 20 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/163,
384; Skl, KTB, 23 Oct. 1943, 463-64; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs.
196/43," 10 Dec. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 372-80. The report by Naval High
Command, Norway, bluntly stated that war with Sweden would result in Norway's
isolation almost without a fight, because Sweden would immediately provide AngloAmerican air and naval forces with bases to block all shipping through the Kattegat and
Skagerrak. German troops in Norway and northern Finland would then be cut off from
their supplies, and left with whatever was on hand. In addition, this would put an end to
exports from Norway, which in 1943 included 1.06 million tons of ores and metals,
360,000 tons of fertilizer, and 200,000 tons of fish; MOK Norwegen/Führungsstab, B.Nr.
gKdos. 934 AI Chefs., "Betrifft: Studie Schweden," 6 Mar. 1944, RM 7/163, 363.
65. Skl, KTB, 19 Oct. 1944, 460; B.Nr. 1/Skl Ib 3337/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Studie
Schweden," 19 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/163, 355-59.
66. B.Nr. 1/Skl 3414/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lagebetrachtung für den Fall eines
Kriegseintrittes Schwedens auf der Seite unserer Gegner," 29 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/163, 267-93.
67. Skl, KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, 10; 1/Skl I op 110/45 Chefs., "Betr.: Vorbereitungen für
einen möglichen Kriegseintritt Schwedens," 12 Feb. 1945, T-1022/3913/PG 31757.
68. Fst, avd M, "VPM ang marinpolitiska läget," 9 Sept. 1944, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3; Mst,
KDB, 28 Oct., 3 and 11 Nov. 1944, KrA, D II, Vol. 2.
69. Fst, avd M, "VPM angående det militär-politiska läget hösten-vintern 1943/44 samt
de åtgärder, som böra vidtagas därest en ökning av den marina beredskapen måsta
genomföras," 29 Dec. 1943, KrA, F IV, Vol. 3. In the spring of 1943 the Swedes
considered Soviet seizure of the Baltic States as presenting a possible threat to the Åland
Islands and Gotland; Fst, Avd M, "Sveriges strategiska läget våren 1943," ibid.
70. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 462.
Chapter 9: The U-Boat War, the Baltic Sea, and Norway
1. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 497.
2. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 348; Günter Hessler, The U-Boat War in the
Atlantic, 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1989), 3: Diagram 31. Hessler was Dönitz’s sonin-law and a submarine commander who later served as Staff Officer (Operations) to Flag
Officer, U-Boats. Shortly after the war Hessler prepared this study at the British
Admiralty's request and received access to captured German documents.
3. B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 843/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Abschlussbetrachtung zum Geleitzug Nr. 19,"
24 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/ 847; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 3104 A op,
"Geleitoperation Nr. 3," 28 May 1943, ibid. According to Allied sources, the Germans
actually sank 21 ships of 141,000 tons; Jürgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of
March 1943: The Battle for HX 229/SC 122 (Derek Masters trans.) (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1977), 198. Other helpful works on the U-boat war include Rahn’s
excellent summary in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed), Germany and the
Second World War, Vol. 6: Horst Boog et al, The Global War: Widening of the Conflict
into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941-1943 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2001), 342-405; Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York: Harper & Row,
1990), Stephen Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1954-61)
and, despite questionable interpretation, Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, 2 vols. (New
York: Random House, 1996, 1998).
4. Lagevorträge, 11 Apr. 1943, 475-77; Iu, "Kurze Betrachtung zum U-Bootskrieg,"
Chefs., [7] June 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/847. In May 1943 the Germans lost one submarine
for every 10,000 tons of Allied shipping sunk, compared to recent ratios of one U-boat
per 100,000 tons; BdU, KTB, 24 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/8, 258-60.
5. Lagevorträge, 14 and 31 May 1943, 505, 507-10; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44 gKdos.,
"Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, Anfang November 1944," 11 Nov. 1944, OKW
KTB, 8: 1577.
6. Although several sources state that this was the diving depth of the Type XXI, Ruge
mentions Dönitz’s fury upon learning that construction flaws jeopardized the U-boats'
ability to reach a depth of 300 meters, and during trials a Type XXI dove to 225 meters
(738 feet); Friedrich Ruge, In vier Marinen (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1979), 264. See
also Ing. J. Elenz, Bericht Nr. St 116, "Festigkeitstechnische Untersuchung an einem UBoot vom Typ XXI beim Tieftauchen am 23.3.45," 16 June 1948, BA/MA, Nachlass
Oelfken, N 518/2a; Axel Niestlé, “German Technical and Electronic Development,” in
Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds) The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945 (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1994), 435-36; Werner Rahn, “Die Entstehung neuer deutscher UBoot-Typen im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Bau, Erprobung und erste operative Erfahrungen,”
Militärgeschichte 3 (No. 2, 1993): 15. On convoy speed, Weinberg, A World at Arms,
374.
7. 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 4858 AI, Überlegungen zum Einsatz des Typ XXI," 10
July 1944, BA/MA, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/19, 7-18; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the
Atlantic, 1: 115, 119, 3: 6; N.I.D. 24/T.9A/45, “Report: Summary of German U-Boat
Designs,” 17 Oct. 1945, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 77, 17; Erwin Sieche, "The Type XXI
Submarine," Warship, No. 17 (Jan. 1981), 3-7; Eberhard Rössler, The U-boat: The
Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines (Harold Erenberg trans.)
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 208-09, 340. The Type XXIs also vastly
improved living conditions for their crews. Each sailor had his own bunk, and the
submarines contained a washroom with showers and, most important, 3 toilets instead of
the former "primitive lavatory" also used to store food; Peter Cremer, U-Boat
Commander: A Periscope View of the Battle of the Atlantic (Lawrence Wilson trans.)
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 195.
8. Rössler, The U-Boat, 209-10, 341; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 7;
N.I.D. 24/T.9A/45, “Report: Summary of German U-Boat Designs,” 17 Oct. 1945,
NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 77, 20; Erwin Sieche, "The German Type XXIII Submarine,"
Warship, No. 19 (July 1981): 154-58.
9. Guntram Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung 1942-1945
(Hamburg: Mittler, 1997), 130-31; Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 517-21. For an equally
optimistic evaluation by Dönitz on the prospects for the new submarines, 2/Skl BdU Op,
B.Nr. gKdos. 4858 AI, “Überlegungen zum Einsatz des Typ XXI," 10 July 1944,
BA/MA, Nachlass Dönitz, N 236/19, 4-18.
10. Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 83;
Rössler, The U-Boat, 214; Albert Speer, Reichsminister für Rüstung und
Kriegsproduktion, "Nr. M 1362/45 gRs.," 27 Jan. 1945, T-77/864/5611342-43.
11. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, National
Archives, Record Group 243 (hereafter NA, RG 243), Entry 6, Box 723; Report 92a22,
USSBS Agency Investigation Ingenieurbureau Glueckauf—Procurement Division, 7 May
1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 724. According to these estimates the first Type XXI
was scheduled for delivery at the end of Apr. or beginning of May 1944, and the first
Type XXIII (consisting of 4 sections) at the end of Feb. or beginning of March; Anlage
zu Der Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, Vorsitzer der
Schiffbaukommission, "B.Nr. 2321/43 gKdos.," 30 Nov. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 12629.
12. Hauptamt Kriegsschiffbau, "K Stb. 2812/43 gKdos.," 13 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM
7/98, 198. In fact, sectional construction reduced slip time from 26 weeks for a Type IXD, a U-boat of similar size, to about 6 weeks for Type XXI submarines; Heinrich Oelfken
and Kurt Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar. 1948,
BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5. The great advantage to reduced construction time
was that it required fewer workers—it usually took 250,000-300,000 work hours to build
Type XXIs according to sectional construction, and building boats of similar size by old
methods would have required 460,000 hours; Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche
Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 141.
13. Oelfken and Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar.
1948, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe,
Technical Report No. 312-45, “German Submarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945,
NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 32, 11-13; USSBS “Overall Report
(European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, Box 47, 69; Schulze-Wegener, Die
deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 132-35; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 193-94; Karl
Dönitz, Die deutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/374, 57.
14. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,
“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,
NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 25. Dönitz intended to deploy 30 Type
XXIIIs in English waters, 60 in the western Mediterranean, 15 each in the Adriatic and
Black Seas and retain 20 in the Baltic for training. He originally planned to build the
Type XXIIIs near their intended operational areas (Toulon in France, Genoa and
Monfalcone in Italy, and Nikolaev in Russia), but in the end only Hamburg served as
assembly site for these U-boats; Skl, KTB, 21 and 27 Sept. 1943, 422, 537; Sieche, "The
German Type XXIII Submarine," 154; Rössler, The U-Boat, 218-19.
15. Report 92a22, “USSBS Report on Ingenieurburo Glueckauf,” 27 Apr.-7 May 1945,
NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 724; Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization of German
Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR,
Series IV, Box 42, 33-36; A.N. Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late,"
Proceedings 87 (No. 3): 91; Rössler, The U-Boat, 231-34.
16. Lagevorträge, 26 Jan. 1940, 79; Rössler, The U-boat, 168-75; Hessler, The U-Boat
War in the Atlantic, 2: 44-45.
17. Lagevorträge, 26 Aug. and 28 Sept. 1942, 416-19, 420-24; Rössler, The U-Boat,
178-82. The failure to increase production of hydrogen peroxide fuel was the main
reason for postponing construction of these U-boats; Heinrich Oelfken, "Deutsche UBootsprojekte 1943-45," BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/2a; Ruge, In vier Marinen,
259.
18. Lagevorträge, 24 Dec. 1942, 435-36; Skl, KTB, 15 Aug. 1943, 271; Hessler, The UBoat War in the Atlantic, 1: 110; see also Wagner's comments in Lagevorträge, 445.
There were a number of other projected Walter submarines, but they never got off the
drawing board; Rössler, The U-Boat, 234-38, 246-47, 254-72, 277-82.
19. Skl, KTB, 8 June 1943, T-1022/1681/PG 32066; BdU, KTB, 1 Dec. 1943, BA/MA,
RM 87/9, 99-100.
20. BdU, KTB, 24 May and 22 June 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/8, 259, 306; MarineArtillerieamt, AWa C IIf 3936/43 gKdos., "Betrifft: Flakbewaffnung U-Boote," 30 June
1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 468; Lagevorträge, 14 and 31 May 1943, 505, 507-10.
Obsessed with the idea that an unknown location device was the sole cause of the Uboats' defeat, the Germans falsely concluded that their own radar search receiver (Metox)
emitted waves on which the Allies homed in. In fact, after the Germans had introduced
their search receivers the Allies switched to ten-centimeter radar on a wavelength Metox
could not detect; BdU, KTB, 5 and 23 Aug. 1943, BA/MA, RM 87/9, 25, 40. The
Germans reached the same erroneous conclusion about the next model of radar search
receiver (Wanze, or Hagenuk), and forbade its use; Skl, KTB, 6 Nov. 1943, 167-68.
21. Walter to Dönitz, 19 May 1943, BA/MA, RM 6/106, 7-8; Heinrich Oelfken, "Der
Schnorchel: Entwicklung und Erfahrungen," 30 Apr. 1947, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N
518/3; Werner Fuchs, "Stellungnahme zu den Angaben des Buches von Grossadmiral
Dönitz 'Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage,'" 6 Feb. 1959, BA/MA, Nachlass Fuchs, N
548/v.43. On the snorkel making life on U-boats less comfortable, V.E. Tarrant, The Last
Year of the Kriegsmarine, May 1944-May 1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
30-31.
22. Some of the major works on breaking German naval codes include Changing
Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History: Papers from the Third US Naval
Academy History Symposium (Robert Love ed.) (New York: Garland, 1980); Patrick
Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence
Centre, 1939-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977) (during the war Beesly served in
the British Admiralty as Deputy Chief, Submarine Plotting Room); Francis Hinsley,
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations,
Vol. 3, Parts 1 and 2 (London: HMSO, 1984, 1988); David Kahn, Seizing the Enigma:
The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1991).
23. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 396-405; Brian Schofield, "The Defeat of
the U-Boats during World War II," Journal of Contemporary History 16 (No. 1): 127-28;
Jürgen Rohwer, "Doenitz and the Battle of the Atlantic: A New Perspective," Afterword
to Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990),
494-96, 506-07; Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 119-21.
24. This represented a tremendous percentage. Since the beginning of the war the
Germans had lost an average of 6% of their operational U-boats per month;
Lagevorträge, 2 Aug. 1943, 529; Skl, KTB, 13 Aug. 1943, 234; Skl, KTB, 8 Sept. 1943,
164. Rahn gives the losses at 37 and 25, respectively; Germany and the Second World
War, 6: 348.
25. Skl, KTB, 6 Jan. 1944, 91; Lagevorträge, 1-3 Jan. 1944, 565; Anlage zum KTB des
BdU v. 20.2.44, "Ubootslage," BA/MA, RM 87/10, 35-37.
26. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44 gKdos., "Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, Anfang
November 1944," 11 Nov. 1944, OKW KTB, 8: 1577-80; Jodl Diary, 20 Dec. 1943,
BA/MA, RW 4/v.33, 3; Skl, KTB, 31 Jan. 1944, 567; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb. 1944, 575.
27. Lagevorträge, 12-13 Apr., 4-6 May 1944, 583-85; B.Nr. 1/Skl Iu 1374/44
gKdos.Chefs., "U-Bootslage Mittelmeer," 1 May 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/848, 63-64.
28. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 771900/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 14.6," 14
June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 122; Anlage zum KTB des BdU v. 10.8.44, "Ubooteinsatz
im Invasions- und im invasionsgefährdeten Raum," BA/MA, RM 87/42, 38;
Lagevorträge, 29 June 1944, 593; Anlage zum KTB des BdU vom 7.6.1944,
gKdos.Chefs., "Ubootslage 1.6.1944," BA/MA, RM 87/40, 13, 19; Skl, KTB, 7 June
1944, 140-41.
29. Skl, KTB, 23 June 1944, 641; ibid., 11 Sept. 1944, 282; ibid., 5 Nov. 1944, 111;
ibid., 6 Jan. 1945, 104; BdU, KTB, 3 Dec. 1944, BA/MA, RM 87/46, 14; "Kurzlage des
ObdM," geh., 14 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 271; "Erfahrungs-FT Nr. 186," 13
Nov. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/848, 327-28; Anlage 3 zum KTB des BdU vom 1.1.1945,
"Zusammengefasste Ubootslage Atlantik Monat November-Dezember, BA/MA, RM
87/46, 107-11; Lagevorträge, 3 Dec. 1944, 3, 21 and 23 Jan., 15 and 17 Feb., 13 Mar.
1945, 621, 630, 635, 638, 653, 655, 675.
30. In Jan. 1945 the Allies sank only 6 U-boats, and not a single one by aircraft; Charles
Sternhell and Alan Thorndike, "Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946) (Operations Evaluation Group Report No.
51)," Strategic Planning in the US Navy: Its Evolution and Execution, 1891-1945
(Scholarly Resources Microfilm) Reel 10, 70, 73-74; Glennon, "The Weapon that Came
too Late," 88.
31. Report 200a37, USSBS, “Interview No. 53, Karl-Otto Saur,” 22 June 1945, NA, RG
243, Entry 6, Box 1000; Rössler, The U-Boat, 241, 246; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 256.
32. Skl, KTB, 7 Aug. 1944, 160-61; ibid., 6 Sept. 1944, 160; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr.
gKdos. 507 Chefs. Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1. November 1944," 7 Nov. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 87/45, 6-7.
33. Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 604; Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entry for 25
Oct. 1944, 2: 169; Skl, KTB, 5 Oct. 1944, 119.
34. OKM, Mar Rüst/Rü Wi IIIg 2720/44 gKdos., "XIX. Rü-Besprechung Kriegsmarine
am 6.9.44; Besprechungs-ergebnisse und Entscheidungen," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/100, 260-61; 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos.Chefs. 611 Ing., "Stand der U-Boote am 1.
Januar 1945," 5 Jan. 1945, RM 87/46, 94. In 1944 total new U-boat tonnage was 233,559
tons, compared with 161,719 tons built in 1941, 193,000 tons in 1942 and 221,093 tons
in 1943; Albert Speer, Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, "Nr. M
1362/45 gRs.," 27 Jan. 1945, T-77/864/5611342-43.
35. 2/Skl BdU Op, B.Nr. gKdos. 626 Chefs., "Wirkungsgrad der U-Boote," 13 Jan. 1945,
BA/MA, RM 87/46, 175-77; TBJG, 4 Jan. 1945, 15: 58; Lagevorträge, 15 Feb. 1945,
653.
36. Skl, KTB, 1 Mar. 1945, 16; Lagevorträge, 12 and 18 Mar. 1945, 673, 680; "Typ
XXIII Boote," BA/MA, Nachlass Ruge, N 379/v.101; Fuchs to Bodo Herzog, 16 Sept.
1965, BA/MA, Nachlass Fuchs, N 548/v.17; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3:
98-99; Sieche, "The Type XXIII German Submarine," 160-61.
37. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243,
Entry 6, Box 723; Navy Dept., Office of the Chief of Naval Ops, Op 32-FN, Top Secret,
9 May 1947, “Estimate of Russian Exploitation of German Submarine Types,” NA, RG
38, Entry 98c, Box 15; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No.
312-45, “German Submarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945, NavOpArch,
NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 32, 13; Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung,
140; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1: 110.
38. Lagevorträge, 16 Mar. 1945, 676; Skl, KTB, 17 Mar. 1945, 244; OKW KTB, 29 Mar.
1945 8: 1208; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 631;
Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 98; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 201-02.
39. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 1, 47-50, 244-45,
284-85, 519-23; Part 2, 483, 627-29. For an example of the detailed information
available to the Allies on the Type XXIs and XXIIIs, JIC (44), 316 (O), "New Weapons
in Relation to German Strategy: Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee," Top
Secret, 28 July 1944, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1, 1942-45, European
Theater (University Publications of America Microfilm), Reel 10, Frames 817-19.
40. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 246, 249; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 627.
41. On several occasions British estimates came to only half the actual number of new
U-boats the Germans possessed; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War,
Vol. 3, Part 2, 471-74, 482, 486, 630, 633; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 248;
Kenneth Knowles, "Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic: The American View," Changing
Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History, 447; Erickson, The Road to Berlin,
481-82.
42. Lagevorträge, 8 July 1943, 518; Oelfken, "Deutsche U-Bootsprojekte 1943-45," 23
Feb. 1947, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/2a; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 259-60.
43. In 138 major air raids on naval yards, U-boat bases, ports, shipbuilding and naval
installations the Allies dropped about 100,000 tons of bombs, or about 4% of the total
bomb tonnage on all targets during the war. These air attacks destroyed only 29 XXIs;
USSBS “Overall Report (European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, Box 47, 69-70.
Examples of damage from air raids include Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44
gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. Rüstungs-Besprechung am 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/1099, 130; B.Nr. 1/Skl IIIa 25244/44 gKdos., "Auszug aus Bericht über
Rüstungsbesprechung am 9.8," 19 Aug. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 134-35; OKM, Mar
Rüst/Rü Wi IIIg 2720/44 gKdos., "XIX. Rü-Besprechung Kriegsmarine am 6.9.44;
Besprechungsergebnisse und Entscheidungen," 11 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 261;
Skl, KTB, 26 July 1944, 569; Skl, KTB, 17 Nov. 1944, 365; Skl, KTB, 9 and 19 Dec.
1944, 208, 468-69; Skl, KTB, 22 Feb. 1945, 249; BdU, KTB, 18 and 31 Dec. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 87/46, 56, 92; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb. and 10 Apr. 1945, 660, 696: OKW
KTB, 1 and 19 Jan., 12 and 31 Mar. 1945, 8: 976, 1023, 1167, 1213; Rössler, The U-Boat,
240-41, 250-54.
44. Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44 gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. Rüstungs-Besprechung
am 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 130; Skl, KTB, 9 and 20 Dec. 1944, 208,
515; Skl, KTB, 13 Jan. 1945, 224; Oelfken and Arendt, "Die Baumethoden der deutschen
U-Boote 1935-1945," 28 Mar. 1948, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; U.S. Naval
Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization of German
Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR,
Series IV, Box 42, 20; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 196; Hinsley, British Intelligence in
the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part 2, 483.
45. Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243,
Entry 6, Box 723; Report 200a35, USSBS, “Questionnaire submitted by a British
Commission to Albert Speer with Answers supplied by Speer while he was at Dustbin,”
NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 999; Tarrant, Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, 185-89.
46. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,
“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,
NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38-40. The total amount of time required to
repair damage to the Type XXI program in the autumn of 1943 amounted to 300,000
hours per month, but in 1944 rose to 2.2 million hours per month; Rössler, The U-Boat,
251-52.
47. Report 200a37, USSBS, Interview No. 59, Dönitz, 28 June 1945, NA, RG 243, Entry
6, Box 1000. For example, in Jan. 1944 the Germans cleared 24 mines from the Baltic.
The number of mines cleared rose to 88 in Feb., 157 in Mar., 235 in Apr. and 431 in
May; Skl, KTB, 3 June 1944, 44; Lagevorträge, 26 Feb., 4-6 May 1944, 575, 586.
48. For example, Skl, KTB, 12 and 21 Apr. 1944, 268, 466; ibid., 9 Sept. 1944, 239;
ibid., 21 Dec. 1944, 526; ibid., 1 Jan. 1945, 2-3; ibid., 25 Mar. 1945, 364.
49. Ruge maintained there were so many problems that sectional construction did not
yield significant savings in building time, and Speer came under Gestapo investigation
due to the delays; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 256. On delays in construction, “Niederschrift
der Unterredung des Herrn Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs, durchgeführt am 16. Dez. 1951
mit Dr. Frhr. von Siegler im Auftrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,” 31 Dec. 1951, IfZ,
ZS 41, 20-21; Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late," 91; Speer, Infiltration, 11314, 124. Admiral Fuchs (head of the Main Office for Warship Construction from Nov.
1939-Nov. 1944) not surprisingly assigns most of the blame to Speer, who he says made
unrealistic promises to Hitler. Puttkamer, however, claims that naval construction
experts were simply naysayers, and that Speer and Dönitz together forced through a
viable program; see notes from David Irving’s interview of Puttkamer from 28 May
1968, IfZ, ZS 285/II, 124-25. Although Irving has been denounced as a Holocaust
denier, a racist, and an anti-Semite by a British court and his books are unreliable, there is
no reason to assume Puttkamer would lie to him. For the judgment in the Irving Case,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/irving/ (accessed 1 September 2006).
50. U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 312-45, “German
Submarine Design 1935-1945,” July 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series
IV, Box 32, 13; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45,
“Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, ibid., Box 42,
38; Glennon, "The Weapon that Came too Late," 86, 91-92; Rössler, The U-Boat, 241-42;
Heinrich Oelfken, "Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8
Mar. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5.
51. Skl, KTB, 27 Dec. 1944, 635; ibid., 25 Jan. 1945, 458; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 33470/44
gKdos., "Der Rüstungsstand der Seestreitkräfte, Anfang November 1944," 11 Nov. 1944,
OKW KTB, 8: 1577-80; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No.
477-45, “Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945,
NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 24; Glennon, "The Weapon that
Came too Late," 92; Sieche, "The Type XXI Submarine," 5, 8; Rössler, The U-Boat, 24045.
52. Schulze-Wegener, Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 126, 202; Hessler, The U-Boar War in the
Atlantic, 1: 108; Skl AdmQu, B.Nr. Skl/AdmQu 414/44 gKdos., "Betr.: XIV. RüstungsBesprechung am 28.6," 28 June 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 130; Chef Mar.Rüst,
MarRüst Nr. 5448/44 gKdos., "Meldung an ObdM betr. Rü-Sitzung vom 12.7.1944," 13
July 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 13; U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical
Report No. 477-45, “Organization of German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept.
1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38-40.
53. Schulze-Wegener, Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 198-99; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the
Atlantic, 1: 108.
54. Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1: 108; Skl, KTB, 9 Dec. 1944, 208; Skl,
KTB, 25 Jan. 1945, 457; Skl, KTB, 13 and 16 Apr. 1945, 208-13, 262-63; Report 92a17,
USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 723;
U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, Technical Report No. 477-45, “Organization of
German Submarine Construction—1943-45,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch,
NAVTECHMISSEUR, Series IV, Box 42, 38; Cremer, U-Boat Commander, 201;
Lagevorträge, 5 Feb. 1945, 647. For additional problems that surfaced during trials,
Oelfken, "Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8 Mar. 1949,
BA/MA, Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; Rössler, The U-Boat, 240-45; Glennon, "The
Weapon that Came too Late," 92-93; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 264; Tarrant, Last Year of
the Kriegsmarine, 47-50, 190.
55. Type XXIII submarines needed only one week's additional work; Oelfken,
"Schwierigkeiten beim Bau der U-Boote Typ XXI, XXIII, XXVI," 8 Mar. 1949, BA/MA,
Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/5; Lagevorträge, 14 May 42, 393; “Auszug aus dem KTB des
B.D.U. vom 21. Juni 1942,” in OKW KTB, 4: 1279.
56. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Operations Evaluation Group, Report No.
60, “An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Primary Anti-Submarine Measures in
Countering Type XXI Submarines” 4 Apr. 1949, NavOpArch, OEG, Box 99; OEG Study
No. 41, “Tactical Kinematic Capabilities of the Type XXI Submarine,” 3 Mar. 1950,
NavOpArch, OEG, Box 71.
57. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 136. The 40,000 workers
included 1,000 inmates of Neuengamme concentration camp; Study 126,
“Wilhelmshaven Dockyard Workers in World War II,” 1949, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T
94, 12; Report 92a17, USSBS Interview No. 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, National
Archives, Record Group 243, Entry 6, Box 723.
58. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 135; Friedrich Ruge,
“German Supreme Command-OKW,” 17 Nov. 1948, NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 69;
Weinberg, A World at Arms, 1033, note 92. Similarly, the V-2 program devoured
resources equivalent to 24,000 combat aircraft; Williamson Murray, “Betrachtungen zur
deutschen Strategie im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (RolfDieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann eds.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 321.
59. Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval
Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes 1935-1953 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 136-37;
Michael Salewski, "Die Verteidigung der Ostsee 1918-1939: Politische und strategische
Konzeptionen," Marine-Rundschau 69: (No. 7): 394; Adam Ulam, Stalin: The Man and
his Era (New York: Viking, 1973), 489, 519; Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy:
Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 36-40;
Jürgen Rohwer, "The Russians as Naval Opponents in Two World Wars," The Soviet
Navy (Malcolm Saunders ed.) (New York: Praeger, 1958), 59.
60. Germany and the Second World War 4: 656-57; V.I. Ackasov, "Der DurchbruchsOperation der Baltischen Rotbanner-Flotte von Reval auf Kronstadt (Hans Siegel trans.),"
Marine-Rundschau 64 (No. 1): 26-45; Rohwer, "Der Minenkrieg im finnischen
Meerbusen, September-November 1941," 94.
61. "Skl I op 1556/41 gKdos.Chefs.," 21 Sept. 1941, T-608/1/664; Rohwer, "Der
Minenkrieg im finnischen Meerbusen, September-November 1941," 97-100; Rudel,
Stuka Pilot, 31-44; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl 928/41 gKdos., "Lage Kriegsmarine am 28.9.1941,
0800 Uhr," T-608/2/472.
62. Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 502/43 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Einsatz der
Überwasserstreitkräfte," 19 Feb. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1418; "1/Skl IE 2326/43
gKdos.Chefs.," 13 Aug. 1943, Anlage 13 to MOK Ost KTB, 1-15 Aug. 1943, BA/MA,
RM 31/M522.
63. Skl, KTB, 19, 24, 25 and 29 Sept. 1943, 385, 486, 504, 565-66; Lagevorträge, 24
Sept. 1943, 551.
64. Anlage zu 1/Skl 950/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Bestand der russischen Ostseeflotte, Stand
Mitte März 1944," BA/MA, RH 19 III/15, 96.
65. 9.Sich.Div., KTB, "Schlussbetrachtung zum 30. Sept. 1944," BA/MA, RM 67/v.149;
MOK Ostsee, Op B.Nr. gKdos. 4630 F III, "Kurzer Rückblick auf September 1944," 9
Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 358; Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl IL 29573/44 gKdos., "Betr.: Schutz
des Raumes der östl. Ostsee gegen Feindluftangriffe und Sicherung gegen
Feindseestreitkräfte, insbes. U-Boote," 28 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 110-13;
Anlage zu B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 3106/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Weisung für die Seekriegsführung in
der Östlichen Ostsee," 29 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 106-09; OKM/3.Abt.Skl,
B.Nr. 3/Skl R 5653/44 gKdos., "Feindlagebericht Ost vom 1.9. bis 30.9.1944," 16 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 13-14.
66. MOK Ostsee, KTB, 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 31/3217, 249; Admiral Östl. Ostsee,
"Chefs. 450 F I," 3 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/162, 78; Skl, 1/Skl I Ost 3753/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.," 15 Dec. 1944, BA/MA,
RM 7/261, 117; MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, "B.Nr. gKdos. 1035 Chefs.," 30 Nov. 1944,
BA/MA, RM 7/163, 163.
67. Skl, KTB, 20, 21 and 22 Feb. 1945, 209-15, 233-34, 242.
68. Ibid., 15 Mar. 1945, 203.
69. Ibid., 26 Mar. 1945, 385; OKH/GenStdH/OpAbt (Ia), "Nr. 3640/45 gKdos.," 25 Mar.
1945, BA/MA, RH 2/333, 11.
70. Skl, KTB, 14 Mar. 1945, 195; ibid., 13 Apr. 1945, 201-02.
71. MOK Ostsee/Führungsstab, B.Nr. gKdos. 600/45 F I, "Rückblick auf die
wesentlichsten Ereignisse und Aufgaben im Bereich MOK Ost im Kriegsjahr 1944," 17
Mar. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/90, 415-16.
72. Achkasov and Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War, 25154. In the last 8 months of the war Soviet naval aircraft sank 34 warships and 57
merchant vessels totaling 163,489 tons, and Russian submarines sank only 33
merchantmen with 102,521 tons; Rohwer, "The Soviets as Naval Opponents in Two
World Wars," 65; Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 274.
73. V. I. Ackasov, "Die sowjetische Kriegsflotte im Verlauf des 'Grossen
Vaterländischen Krieges (Woldemar Gangnus trans.),'" Marine-Rundschau 62 (No. 5):
270.
74. Basically, an “old school” strategy envisioned gaining command of the sea with a
battle fleet composed of heavy surface vessels. A “young school” approach regarded
large surface vessels as obsolete, being vulnerable to swarms of smaller, faster vessels.
75. The conditions under which the Soviet fleet envisioned combat were an enemy fleet
simultaneously exposed to mines, coastal artillery, shore-based aircraft, torpedo boats and
submarines; Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, xxvii, 40.
76. Kabath, "Seebrückenköpfe," 274.
77. On the invasion of Scandinavia, Carl-Axel Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und
Skandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund: Gleerup, 1965),
275-77, 289-90; Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1: 177-80, 192-93;
Lagevorträge, 23 Feb. and 9 Mar. 1940, 82, 85. For Hitler's comments on Norway's
importance to the U-boat war, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 24 Apr. 1942, 238-39.
78. Hitler feared the British would take advantage of the upcoming campaign in the
Soviet Union to attack Norway; OKW/WFSt/Abt L (I op), "Nr. 44141/41 gKdos. Chefs.,"
15 Feb. 1941, T-608/1/457.
79. Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. and 29 Dec. 1941, 288, 334-36. In mid-Dec. Hitler decreed
that Norway had top priority for construction of coastal defenses; OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I
Op), Nr. 3022/41 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Küstenverteidigung," 14 Dec. 1941, OKW KTB,
4: 1262-63.
80. Germany and the Second World War, 6: 423-25; Lagevorträge, 341. On Hitler's
constant fear of an invasion in Norway, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 2-36.
81. The navy pointed out that insufficient base facilities in Norway would prevent the
transfer of all submarines there; Lagevorträge, 22 Jan. 1942, 347-48; Der Führer und
Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 55493/42
gKdos.Chefs.," 14 Mar. 1942, T-77/786/5514473. By late April the Germans had
deployed 20 U-boats off Norway and in May the navy had 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers,
8 destroyers and 4 torpedo boats there; OKW KTB, 22 Apr. 1942, 3: 326; Lagevorträge,
19 Nov. 1942, 427; Ziemke, German NTO, 217. Lagevorträge, 7 Feb. 1942, 351-52.
82. Ziemke, German NTO, 252-57; see also Warlimont's comments to entries from 19
Oct. 1942 and 23 Jan. 1943 in OKW KTB, 4: 841, 5: 66; "Abendlage vermutlich vom 20.
Dezember 1943," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 441, 446-47; OKW KTB, 28 Dec. 1943, 6:
1387-88; Lagevorträge, 1 Jan. 1944, 569; Hessler, The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 3: 69.
83. OKW KTB, 23 Jan. (Warlimont's comments), 5 Oct., 8 Oct., 1, 3 and 12 Nov., 31
Dec. 1943, 5: 66, 6: 1219, 1226, 1238, 1243-44, 1271-72, 1394, 1401; Dönitz, "Die
Schlacht im Atlantic in der deutschen Strategie des Zweiten Weltkrieges," MarineRundschau 61 (No. 2): 71-72; Skl, KTB, 10 and 13 Feb. 1944, 232, 278.
84. OKW KTB, 31 Jan. 1945, 8: 1060; Ziemke, German NTO, 300-09.
85. Hitler had also stated this belief in Dec. 1943; OKW KTB, 28 Dec. 1943, 6: 1387-88;
Adm.FHQu, Nr. 411/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 17.10.44," 17 Oct. 1944, T1022/1709/PG 32122-A; Skl, KTB, 18 Oct. 1944, 431-32; Lagevorträge, 31 Oct. 1944,
616.
86. B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 2614/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: 'Tanne,'" 27 Aug. 1944, T1022/1825/PG 32520; Ob MOK Ost, "O6753 gKdos.," 31 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM
7/163, 259-60; Skl, B.Nr. 1 Skl Ib 3714/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Die Notwendigkeit,
zusätzliche Mittel für Kriegsmarine und Handelsschiffahrt einzusetzen" (undated, but
probably from Dec. 1944), BA/MA, RM 7/261, 69. See also Dönitz’s comments in
"Mittagslage vom 1. September 1944 in der Wolfsschanze," Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,
635-36.
87. Skl, KTB, 31 Oct. 1944, 752; ibid., 2 Nov. 1944, 34. Even in Feb. 1945 Hitler
continued to worry about an invasion in Norway, and Dönitz still regarded Denmark as a
likely target; Lagevorträge, 25 Jan. and 15 Feb. 1945, 639, 653.
88. Skl, KTB, 13 June 1944, 329-30; ibid., 13 Aug. 1944, 316.
89. “Vortrag des Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber in 'Koralle'
am 24./25.8.44,” BA/MA, RM 7/100, 170; Chef der Skl, B.Nr. 1/Skl I Op 26968/44
gKdos., "Betr.: Seekriegsbasis Norwegen," 2 Sept. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 582-83;
Anlage zum KTB des BdU v. 18.9.44, "Abschliessende Betrachtung des Ubootseinsatzes
im Kanal," BA/MA, RM 87/43, 63.
90. Lagevorträge, 28 Nov. 1944, 618; Ziemke, German NTO, 309; OKW KTB, 13 Feb.
1945, 8: 1092.
91. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 336, 374; Skl, KTB, 1 Feb. 1945, 3; OKW
KTB, 8: 1309-10, 1899. Most of the troops in Norway at the beginning of May, except
those belonging to 20th Mountain Army (which had withdrawn from Finland), had no
combat experience; Steinert, 23 Days, 142, 304 (note 9).
92. Skl, KTB, 1 and 3 Mar. 1945, 10-13, 44-47. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 88542/45
gKdos.Chefs., "Stellungnahme Seekriegsleitung zur Studie 'Birkhahn,'" 5 Mar. 1945, T78/786/5514693-95. OKW/WFSt/Qu/Op, Nr. 88546/45 gKdos.Chefs., "Studie über die
Auflockerung bzw. Aufgabe von Nordnorwegen zur Kräftegewinnung für den Einsatz in
Deutschland und auf Grund der Versorgungs- und Transportlage," 8 Mar. 1945, T77/786/5514669; Jodl to Winter, 10 Mar. 1945, T-77/786/5514663-64; Lagevorträge, 10
Mar. 1945, 671.
93. Skl, KTB, 28 Mar. 1945, 401.
94. MOK Norwegen/Führstb, "gKdos. 03800," 27 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/851, 148;
"1/Skl I op 9611/45 gKdos.," 27 Apr. 1945, ibid.
95. 1/Skl I op gKdos., 4 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 25; "Abschrift von Abschrift
einer dokumentarischen Niederschrift von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von
Dr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316/v.29, 3; Ziemke,
German NTO, 313.
96. Report 94a4, “OKM Documents at Glucksberg,” NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 731.
97. Skl, "Neu B.Nr. 1/Skl I op 3404/43 gKdos.Chefs., 13 Nov. 1943, T/608/1/1044; Skl,
KTB, 22 Dec. 1943, 357; Skl, KTB, 20 Nov. 1944, 443; Lagevorträge, 19 Jan. 1944,
572.
Chapter 10: Hitler and Dönitz
1. Portions of this chapter appeared in an abbreviated form in David Grier, “The
Appointment of Admiral Karl Dönitz as Hitler’s Successor,” The Impact of Nazism: New
Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy (Alan Steinweis and Daniel Rogers eds.)
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003): 182-198; and “Army Group Kurland,” in
Thomas Kelly (ed.), World War II: Variants and Visions (Collingdale, PA: Diane, 1999),
145-55.
2. Dönitz claimed that the navy’s main task after Jan. 1945 was to evacuate wounded,
refugees and troops from the East to prevent their capture by the Russians; Dönitz, Ten
Tears and Twenty Days, 433.
3. Meisel to Assmann, 6 Oct. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v.18. For a similar
view, Kurt Assmann, "Why the U-Boat War Failed," Foreign Affairs 28 (No. 4): 668.
4. Dönitz informed Hitler that the 227 U-boats being readied for action included 84 Type
XXIs and 42 Type XXIIIs; Lagevorträge, 15 and 17 Feb. 1945, 653, 655-56.
5. Skl, KTB, 29 Jan. 1945, 506-07; ibid., 4 Feb. 1945, 29; ibid., 2 Mar. 1945, 24.
6. Ibid., 28 Feb. 1945, 339-42; Lagevorträge, 1 Mar. 1945, 664; Karl Dönitz, "Die
deutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/374, 56.
7. IMT, TMWC, 13: 296, 397.
8. Gerald Posner, Hitler's Children: Sons and Daughters of Third Reich Leaders Talk
about Themselves and Their Fathers (New York: Berkley Books, 1992), 160. Dönitz's
party membership form is now at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde.
According to this document the request for membership was made on 7 March 1944, but
Dönitz's admission into the Party, with Party Number 9664999, was backdated to 1 Feb.
9. Eberhard Weichold, "Die deutsche U-Bootskrieg 1939/45," BA/MA, Nachlass
Weichold, N 316/v.9, 39; "Abschrift von Abschrift einer dokumentarischen Niederschrift
von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," ibid.,
N 316/v.29, 1; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 268. Admiral Fuchs claimed that Dönitz was not a
National Socialist at the start of the war, but that a transformation in his views occurred
in 1942 as a result of his increased contact with Hitler; “Niederschrift der Unterredung
des Herrn Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs, durchgeführt am 16. Dez. 1951 mit Dr. Frhr. von
Siegler im Auftrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,” 31 Dec. 1951, IfZ, ZS 41, 22.
10. Erich Raeder, "Mein Verhältnis zu Adolf Hitler und zur Partei," BA/MA, Nachlass
Raeder, N 391/3, 50-51.
11. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 541. Following his release from Spandau, Speer was
quite critical of Dönitz. Despite this animosity, many of Speer’s observations about
Dönitz ring true.
12. Army Group South's commander, General Otto Woehler, protested that this was an
insult to the Army; Der Ob der HGr Süd/Ia, "Nr. 404/45 gKdos.," 5 Feb. 1945, BA/MA,
RH 2/332, 41-42.
13. ObdM, "Kurzlage ObdM Nr. 4," 6 Oct. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/100, 352.
14. IMT, TMWC, 13: 392; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 236.
15. IMT, TMWC, 13: 393.
16. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1992), 406.
17. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 243.
18. “Admiral Doenitz re Pastor Niemoeller, 24 July 1945: 1400 Hours,” IfZ, ZS 1810/II,
18.
19. IMT, TMWC, 13: 392-93; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 232; Gitta
Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (New York: Knopf, 1995), 390, 638.
20. Wolfgang Peter, "Euthanasia Programme," The Oxford Companion to World War II
(I.C. Dear ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 344.
21. Friedrich Ruge, "Vorwart," Lagevorträge, 7; see also Wagner's comments in ibid.,
449; IMT, TMWC, 13: 321; 35: 291-301.
22. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 551.
23. Fuchs could not recall who the official was; Fuchs to Baum, 30 Dec. 1956, IfZ, ZS
41, 27.
24. Lagevorträge, 31 Jan., 2, 14 and 27 Feb., 4 Mar. and 14 Apr. 1945, 642-43, 645, 652,
662, 668, 699.
25. Walter Baum, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand," Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte 11 (No. 1): 25-30, 39; Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entry for 24
Mar. 1959, 334-35; AdmFHQu, Nr. 287/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 6/9," 6
Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A; Lagevorträge, 13 Oct. 1944, 26 Mar. 1945, 604,
686. Hitler had apparently forgotten about the scuttling of the pocket battleship Graf
Spee in Dec. 1939.
26. “Midday Situation Report, January 27, 1945, in Berlin,” Hitler and His Generals,
631; Raus, Panzer Operations, 339.
27. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, 25 Mar. 1959, 335; Lagevorträge, 9 and 11
Aug., 10 Sept. 1943, 18 and 19 Jan., 12 June 1944, 533, 535, 549, 571-72, 589. The
summaries of Dönitz’s meetings with Hitler no longer included Dönitz’s mealtime
companions after 2 Nov. 1944. Although one could argue Dönitz had reason to meet
with Hitler, he also dined with Himmler on at least 3 occasions; Lagevorträge, 11 Sept.
1943, 12 July and 13 Oct. 1944, 549, 599, 605.
28. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 6327/43 gKdos.," 21 Oct. 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/98, 188;
Skl, KTB, 22 Oct. 1943, 439. In this connection, see Goebbels' comments on the great
benefit in having a "one-day advantage" with Hitler in Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende,
entry for 3 Sept. 1944, 2: 127-28.
29. The only others with an SS escort were Hitler, Himmler, Bormann, Keitel,
Ribbentrop, and Funk; Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 26 Dec. 1950, 2325 Mar. 1959, 163, 334-35; Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang: Als Chef des Persönlischen
Dienstes bei Hitler (Werner Maser ed.) (2nd rev.ed.) (Munich: Herbig, 1980), 119; David
Irving’s notes of an interview with Puttkamer from 21 Nov. 1967, IfZ, ZS 285/II, 70-71,
77; Puttkamer to Uhlig, 16 Apr. 1952, IfZ, ZS 285/I, 20; Below, Als Hitler Adjutant, 41011; TBJG, 28 Feb., 14 and 21-22 Mar. 1945, 15: 383, 505, 557, 571; Keitel, In the
Service of the Reich, 197; "Hitlers politisches Testament," 29 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8:
1666-69.
30. In February 1945, 35 generals and 19 field marshals received “salary supplements”
from Hitler; Peter Meroth, "Vorschuss auf den Endsieg," Stern, 12 June 1980, 88-92;
Norman J.W. Goda, “Black Mark: Hitler’s Bribery of His Senior Officers during World
War II,” Journal of Modern History 72 (June 2000): 413-52. At Nuremberg Dönitz was
asked if he had received bribes or "a gift of any kind from Hitler." He replied, "Apart
from the salary to which I was entitled, I did not receive a penny; I received no gifts;"
IMT, TMWC, 13: 313. One author claims that Hitler presented Dönitz with 300,000
marks when he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Peter Padfield, "Grand
Admiral Karl Dönitz," Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II (Stephen
Howarth ed.) (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 196.
31. Although Raeder was the one who suggested this date for his retirement, to express
his and the navy’s loyalty, Hitler agreed; Bird, Raeder, 203. Hitler's decree that the Nazi
Party was the only legal party on 14 July 1933, Bastille Day, appears to have been a
conscious attempt to show this was a new revolution, and the establishment of the
Volkssturm was officially proclaimed on 18 Oct. 1944, the anniversary of Battle of
Leipzig. On Hitler's sensitivity to timing, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 6 July 1942, 423-24;
Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, Nachlass Speer, N1340/17; Joachim Fest, Speer: The
Final Verdict (Ewald Osers and Alexandra Dring trans.) (New York: Harcourt, 2001), 49.
32. Lagevorträge, 9-11 Aug. 1943, 538.
33. Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entry for 22 Nov. 1944, 2: 180-81.
34. “Interrogation of Grand Admiral Dönitz, 21 July 1945: 1400 Hours,” IfZ, ZS
1810/II, 3.
35. “Testimony of KARL DOENITZ, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 22 October
1945, 1030-1130 by Lt.Col. Thomas S. Hinkel, IGD, OUSCC, Comdr. John P. Bracken,
USNR, and Lt. Michael Reade, RN,” NavOpArch, John Bracken Papers, Box 1, 20-21.
36. Unterredung Meckel-Doenitz, IfZ, ZS 1810/I, 18, 32.
37. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 18 Mar., 11 May and 10 Dec. 1947,
20 Jan. 1953, 23-25 Mar. 1959, 42, 58, 77-78, 217, 334-35; John Brown Mason, “PW
Grand Admiral Dönitz” [July 1945], IfZ, ZS 1810/II, 18; Navy Dept., Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, Intelligence Division, "Report on Interrogation of German Prisoners
of War," 23 Aug. 1945, NA, RG 38, Entry 98c, Box 8; Herbert Kraus, “Karl Dönitz und
das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” Hans-Erich Volkmann (ed) Ende des Dritten
Reiches—Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Munich: Piper, 1995), 4.
38. Steinert, 23 Days, 21, 145-46, 304 (note 17) ; “Politische Angelegenheiten,” BA/BL,
R62/10, 2-5; Padfield, Dönitz, 415; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 251;
Guido Knopp, Hitlers Helfer (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1996), 329; Erich Topp, “Manning
and Training the U-boat Fleet,” in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds), The Battle of
the Atlantic 1939-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 216-17; Douglas Peifer,
The Three German Navies (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), 16, 3738. Peifer estimates that between 2,500-6,000 German sailors were executed in World
War II; Peifer, The Three German Navies, 10.
39. Kraus, “Karl Dönitz und das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches,’” 1; Rolf-Dieter Müller and
Gerd Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945: Die Zerstörung des Deutschen Reiches (Frankfurt:
Fischer, 1994), 103; Steinert, 23 Days, 120-28.
40. Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days, 441-42; IMT, TMWC, 13: 305. For examples
of Dönitz’s private talks with Hitler, or their meetings in a very small group,
Lagevorträge, 13, 14 and 31 Oct., 1 and 2 Nov., 3 Dec. 1944, 3 and 23 Jan., 12 Apr.
1945, 604-05, 616-17, 621, 630, 638, 696. See also Heinz Assmann, "Some Personal
Recollections of Adolf Hitler (Roland Krause trans.)," Proceedings 79 (No. 12): 1293.
41. Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, entries for 30 Sept. 1956 and 25 Mar. 1959,
295, 335.
42. IMT, TMWC, 13: 402-03.
43. Meisel to [Kurt] Assmann, 6 Oct. 1949, BA/MA, Nachlass Meisel, N 537/v.18.
44. Irving’s notes from an interview with Puttkamer from 20 Nov. 1967, IfZ, ZS 285/II,
55.
45. Gerhard Weinberg, "Der Überfall auf die Sowjetunion im Zusammenhang mit
Hitlers diplomatischen und militärischen Gesamtplanungen," Unternehmen Barbarossa:
Zum historische Ort der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis Herbst 1941
(Roland Foerster ed.) (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 184-85.
46. Leon Goldensohn, The Nuremberg Interviews (Robert Gellately ed) (New York:
Knopf, 2004), 127.
47. KTB des Führungsstab Nord, 22 and 26 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8: 1454, 1458; see
also untitled, undated document (a record of activities in the area under Dönitz's control)
in a folder entitled "Politische Angelegenheiten," in BA/BL, R 62/10, 7. Hitler's order for
the execution of Hermann Fegelein, his bride-to-be's brother-in-law, on 28 April
demonstrates that Hitler still believed the struggle must continue. On Eva Braun's
unsuccessful attempt to prevent Fegelein's execution, see Hitler's secretary Traudl
Junge’s comments in Last Witnesses in the Bunker (Pierre Galante and Eugene Silianoff
eds.) (Jan Dalley trans) (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1989), 11. Eva’s sister Gretl
was pregnant at this time; Sereny, Albert Speer, 534.
48. Last Witnesses in the Bunker, 11-15; Fest, Hitler, 769-77; Alan Bullock, Hitler and
Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York Viking, 1992), 887-91.
49. OKM/AMA/WF, B.Nr. 156/44 Chefs., "Grossadmiral Dönitz Schlussansprache auf
der Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar am Freitag, dem 17. Dezember
1943," BA/MA, RM 7/98, 34-37.
50. 1/Skl, "Ansprache des Ob.d.M. vor den Oberbefehlshabern am 15.2.44,"
gKdos.Chefs., 1939-1945: Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten (HansAdolf Jacobsen ed.) (5th ed.) (Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961),
456-58; Pruf-Nr. 1535 gKdos., "Vortrag des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine über
den Tonnagekrieg gehalten am 19. Oktober 1944 vor führenden Persönlichkeiten der
Politik, Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft," BA/MA, RM 7/848, 300-01. Ruge's account,
based upon his notes from this speech, lists Courland as the first topic in Dönitz’s speech;
Ruge, In vier Marinen, 260-61.
51. Dönitz Speech to German Youth, 20 Feb. 1945, cited in Robert Conot, Justice at
Nuremberg (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 416.
52. "Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 9 May
1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 12.
53. Earl Beck, Under the Bombs: The German Home Front 1942-1945 (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 182; IMT, TMWC, 35: Document 650-D, 304-08;
Admiral beim ObdM, KTB des ObdM, 25 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, RM 6/115, 8-9.
54. “3rd Situation Report, April 27, 1945,” Hitler and His Generals, 737-38. See also
Adm FHQu, 21/45 gKdos., “Lagebeurteilung 26.4.1945,” 26 Apr. 1945, BA/BL, R
62/10, 49. A doctor in the bunker stated that the cadets presented excellent targets,
wearing white caps and blue uniforms with gold buttons; Ernst Günther Schenck, Das
Notlazarett unter der Reichskanzlei: Ein Arzt erlebt Hitlers Ende in Berlin (Neuried: Ars
Una, 1995), 102-04. For the recollections of the naval unit’s commander, Franz
Kuhlmann, “Endkampf um den ‘Führerbunker,’” Ruhr-Nachrichten, 20-26 April 1985 (I
am indebted to Dr. Werner Rahn for drawing my attention to this source). See also Rahn,
“Winkelriede, Opferkämpfer oder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderen Einsatzformen der
deutschen Kriegsmarine 1944/45,” 515-20.
55. Steinert, 23 Days, 293-94 (note 56); KTB des Führungsstab Nord, 1 May 1945, OKW
KTB, 8: 1468.
56. "Hitlers politisches Testament," 29 Apr. 1945, OKW KTB, 8: 1666-69.
57. Baum, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand," 44-48; Thomas, The German
Navy in the Nazi Era, 241, 262; Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler, 11-12, 173; Topp,
“Manning and Training the U-boat Fleet,” 218.
58. Godt dates Dönitz’s shift as occurring on the evening of 30 Apr. More likely it
occurred on 4 or 5 May; "Abschrift von Abschrift einer dokumentarischen Niederschrift
von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr. Walter Baum,-Oldenburg,"
BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316 /v.29, 1. For a discussion of Dönitz’s policies on 1
May, Lennart Sjöstedt, "Kapitulation eller strid till sista man? Til frågan om Karl Dönitz'
handlingsprogram vid regeringstillträdet 1945," Scandia 30 (No. 2): 288-356.
59. Keitel, In the Service of the Reich, 227.
60. "Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 2 May
1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 2.
61. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear Nor Hope: The Wartime Career of
General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Defender of Cassino (George Malcolm trans.)
(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 306; Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945, 100-02.
62. See the unpublished entry from Spandau Diaries for 22 Jan. 1955, BA/K, Nachlass
Speer, N 1340/450.
63. Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History (Johannes Steinhoff et al ed.)
(Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1989), 182, 186; Erich Topp, The Odyssey of a U-Boat
Commander (Eric Rust trans.) (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 107-08.
64. 1/Skl I op gKdos., 4 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 25. Schellenberg maintains that
at least until 2 May Dönitz was not ready to give up Norway without a fight; Walter
Schellenberg, Hitler's Secret Service: The Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg (Louis Hagen
trans.) (New York: Jove, 1977), 397, 399. "Abschrift von Abschrift einer
dokumentarischen Niederschrift von Admiral a.D. Godt, zur Verfügung gestellt von Dr.
Walter Baum,-Oldenburg," BA/MA, Nachlass Weichold, N 316/v.29, 3.
65. OKW, "Nr. 89001/45," 3 May 1945, RW 44 I/109; de Maizière, Oberstleutnant i.G.,
"Punkte für den mündliche Vortrag bei den Ob. und Chefs der HGr Kurland und des
AOK Ostpreussen," 3 May 1945, ibid. Maizière states that Dönitz’s goal was the
continuation of the fight against Bolshevism to save as many Germans as possible from
the Soviets.
66. “Tagesniederschriften der Reichsregierung vom 2.-17. Mai 1945," Chefs., 6 May
1945, BA/BL, R 62/15, 9.
67. Friedrich Ruge, “German Supreme Command-OKW,” 17 Nov. 1948, NavOpArch,
GNR, Box T 69.
68. Maizière, In der Pflicht, 105-06.
69. Kapitel 6, Kuerzungen, F. Hitler als Feldherr und Politiker, 10 Feb. 1954, BA/K,
Nachlass Speer, N 1340/385, 40.
70. Traudl Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben (Munich:
List, 2003), 123; Joachim Fest, Inside Hitler’s Bunker: The Last Days of the Third Reich
(Margot Dembo trans.) (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 74, 131; Breit,
Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild, 215-16.
71. See untitled folder in BA/K Nachlass Speer, N 1340/384, 5-6; “Protokoll 1: Adolf
Hitler (1 August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 88-89.
72. Sereny, Albert Speer, 82.
73. Wilhelm Meisel, “Betr: Hitler und die KM,” IfZ, ZS 1739, 6.
74. Fröhlich, “Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944,” 197-98, 208-09.
75. Fest, Inside Hitler’s Bunker, 74, 131. For other examples of Hitler’s uncanny ability
to inspire hope in the latter stages of the war, Fest, Speer, 240-41, 248; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis (New York: Norton, 2001), 1026, note 40.
76. Jürgen Rohwer, "Introduction," in Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1990), xiii-xiv.
77. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 383-400. See also reports for the period
Feb.-Apr. 1944 in “Auszug aus Vortragsnotizen H.V.O. Genst.d.H. bei Ob.d.M. und Chef
Skl,” T-608/1/1554-74.
78. Lagevorträge, 18 Jan., 20-21 Mar. 1944, 571, 578; "1/Skl Ib 833/44 gKdos.Chefs.,"
17 Mar. 1944, T-77/778/5503976-77; OKW/WFSt/Op (M), "Nr. 77927/44
gKdos.Chefs.," 22 Mar. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/1099, 98; B.Nr.1/Skl 921/44 gKdos.
Chefs., "Bemerkungen des ObdM über die Bedeutung von Odessa für die Kriegführung
im Südosten," 24 Mar. 1944, T-77/778/5503979-87.
79. On Tunisia, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 2: 245-68; on Sicily, Thomas,
The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 230; on the Scheldt River, Adm.FHQu, Nr. 291/44
gKdos.Chefs., "Lagebeurteilung 7/9," 7 Sept. 1944, T-1022/1709/PG 32122-A.
80. Lagevorträge, 31 Oct. 1944, 616;" Skl, "B.Nr. 1/Skl I op a 30696/44 gKdos.," 9 Oct.
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/131, 464. The former Chief of Staff to the Army's Commander-inChief, West, maintains that repeated requests to give up Dutch coast were frustrated
because navy opposed this for its strategic reasons until the end; Siegfried Westphal,
Heer in Fesseln (Bonn: Athenäum, 1950), 100. On the Rhine, Lagevorträge, 5, 9 and 15
Feb. 1945, 647-48, 653. There are undoubtedly other examples. Aside from the Baltic,
all other cases of Dönitz’s intervention in army operations are only examples the author
discovered by chance.
81. Wagner rather lamely maintained that Dönitz’s plan bore no hostile design, but
intended full agreement on the part of Spain; Lagevorträge, 14 May 1943, 505-06.
82. On the loss of the Scharnhorst, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 2: 327, 33245; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 234-35.
83. For example, Skl, KTB, 12 Nov. 1943, 295; ibid., 20 Dec. 1943, 316-18;
Lagevorträge, 17 Sept. 1941, 8 and 26 Feb., 10 Sept. 1943, 208, 465, 470, 548; “Rede
von Grossadmiral Dönitz, gehalten am 6. Oktober 1943 auf der Tagung des NS
Reichsleiter, Gauleiter und Verbandsführer,” IfZ, ZS 1810/I, 3.
84. Skl, KTB, 18 Dec. 1943, 288-91; Lagevorträge, 19-20 Dec. 1943, 555-56; OKW
KTB, 21 Dec. 1943, 6: 1376; Skl, KTB, 6 Feb. 1944, 109; Weinberg, A World at Arms,
772-73. See also 1/Skl IL 400/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Betr.: Aufklärungsflugzeuge für
Belange des BdU," 7 Feb. 1944, BA/MA, RM 7/847.
85. Skl, KTB, 7 June 1944, 140; ibid., 5 Oct. 1944, 119; BdU, B.Nr. 656/45
gKdos.Chefs., "Stand des U-Bootskrieges am 1.1.1945," BA/MA, RM 87/46, 104-05.
86. Lagevorträge, 31 May 1943, 510.
87. "Niederschrift über die Ansprache des Ob.d.M. an die Hauptamts- und Amtschefs am
2.6.43," Chefs., 3 June 1943, BA/MA, RM 7/260, 232; OKW KTB, 17 Nov. 43, 6: 1289;
OKM/AMA/WF, B.Nr. 156/44 Chefs., "Grossadmiral Dönitz Schlussansprache auf der
Tagung für Befehlshaber der Kriegsmarine in Weimar am Freitag, dem 17. Dezember
1943," BA/MA, RM 7/98, 34-37; Skl, KTB, 6 Jan. 1944, 91; TBJG, 8 June 1944, 12:
427; Voices from the Third Reich, 185; Anlage zum KTB des BdU vom 7.6.1944,
gKdos.Chefs., "Ubootslage 1.6.1944," BA/MA, RM 87/40, 11, 20-22; Eberhard Godt,
"Der U-Boot Krieg," Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1953), 143.
88. Pruf-Nr. 1535 gKdos., "Vortrag des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine über den
Tonnagekrieg gehalten am 19. Oktober 1944 vor führenden Persönlichkeiten der Politik,
Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft," BA/MA, RM 7/848, 300.
89. “Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der
Wolfsschanze,” IfZ, F 19/3; “Ansprache des Führers vor Generalen und Offizieren am
22.6.1944 im Platterhof,” IfZ, F 19/3; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),” Albert
Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 109; TBJG, 13 Feb., 22 and 28 Mar. 1945, 15: 377,
572-73, 618; Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, 609-10, 731.
90. OKW/WFSt/Op (M), Nr. 772281/44 gKdos.Chefs., "Lageunterrichtung 3.7," 3 July
1944, BA/MA, RM 7/99, 42-43.
91. Junge, Bis zur letzten Stunde, 154.
92. For Hitler’s enthusiasm for the V-2 rockets, TBJG, 2 Dec. 1944, 23 and 25 Jan. 1945,
14: 321, 15: 192-94, 217; Junge Bis zur letzten Stunde, 135-36.
93. Skl, KTB, 4 July 1944, 76.
94. On the cover sheet to this speech is penciled in: ”A good speech from our Dönitz, the
speech of a man!” Adjutant des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine, “M 555/44
gKdos.,” 18 Oct. 1944, IfZ, F 20. For more on Dönitz’s commitment to the Durchhalt
strategy, Rahn, “Winkelriede, Opferkämpfer oder Sturmwikinger? Zu besonderen
Einsatzformen der deutschen Kriegsmarine 1944/45,” 506-07, 511-12, 514-20.
95. TBJG, 25 Jan. 1944, 23, 26 and 30 Jan., 2 and 28 Feb., 1, 3, 4, 5 and 16, 22 Mar.
1945, 11: 157, 15: 198, 229, 273-75, 368, 383, 391, 404, 410, 422-23, 517, 572-73;
Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 91; Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, entries for 16
Aug. and 5 Sept. 1944, 30 Jan. and 25 Feb. 1945, 2: 119, 130, 227, 252.
96. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 81; Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 357, 396;
Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud (Robert Edwards trans.) (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole,
2003), 192, 196-99; “Ansprache des Reichsführers SS und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres
Himmler an NS-Führungsoffiziere des Feld- und Ersatzheeres am 29.7.44 im Führerhauptquartier," BA/MA, RH 53-7/v. 878; "Unterlagen für einen Vortrag des Gen.
Obersten Jodl, des Chefs WFSt, vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern über die militärische
Lage (München, 7. November 1943)," OKW KTB, 8: 1559-60.
97. “Rede auf der Gauleiter-Tagung am 3. August 1944 in Posen,” BA/K, Nachlass
Speer, N 1340/205; “Tagung der Leiter der Reichspropagandaämter am 28. u. 29. Aug.
1944, Vortrag von Reichsminister Speer: Die deutsche Rüstung und der totale
Kriegseinsatz,” ibid; “Ansprache Reichsminister Speer auf der Arbeitstagung der
Rüstungsobmänner in Berlin am 31.8.44,” ibid; “Reichsminister Speer auf dem ‘Tag des
deutschen Eisenbahners 1944’ in Berlin, Revalerstrasse 99,” 5 Dec. 1944, BA/K,
Nachlass Speer, N 1340/206; “Reichsminister Speer vor dem 3. Lehrgang der
Kommandierenden Generale und Korpschefs, Kaserne Krampnitz, 13.1.1945,” BA/K,
Nachlass Speer, N 1340/207; Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?,” 391-97;
and on the generals, Breit, Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild, 208-14, 224.
98. Reinhardt Diary, 5 Apr. 1945, BA/MA, Nachlass Reinhardt, N 245/3, 87.
Reinhardt’s comment could also be interpreted as derisive, or as an exclamation of
despair.
99. Eberhard Weichold, "Der deutsche U-Bootskrieg 1939/45," BA/MA, Nachlass
Weichold, N 316/v.9, 46, 53; Weichold, "Auseinandersetzung mit Grossadmiral Dönitz
in Bezug auf den Aufbau einer neuen Ubootwaffe vom Frühjahr 1943 an und hinsichtlich
seiner Beratertätigkeit Hitlers als Oberbefehlshaber der Marine," 15 Apr. 1959, ibid., N
316/v.29. Allied interrogations revealed that about half of the German POWs still had
confidence in Hitler, and believed Germany possessed decisive secret weapons, until
Mar. 1945; Rudolf Sulzmann, "Die Propaganda als Waffe im Kriege," Bilanz des zweiten
Weltkrieges, 399.
100. Helmut Heye, “Die deutsche Kriegfuehrung der Marine,” August 1945,
NavOpArch, GNR, Box T 68, 31-32; Schenck, Das Notlazarett unter der Reichskanzlei,
44-45; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 783; The Hitler Book, 300-01.
101. “Protokoll 2: Politiker und Politik in national-sozialistischen Deutschland (20.
August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 167-68. See the similar
account, in this instance from April 1945, in Knappe, Soldat, 15.
102. Hitlers Tischgespräche, 27 June 1942, 389; Lagevorträge, 11 Aug. 1943, 535, 537;
Assmann, "Some Personal Recollections of Adolf Hitler," 1295; TBJG, 18 Apr. 1944, 2,
4, 26 and 30 Jan., 12 Feb., 5 and 12, 22 Mar. 1945, 12: 134, 15: 37, 52, 232, 273, 368,
424, 485, 572-73.
103. TBJG, 12 and 28 Feb., 15 Mar. 1945, 15: 366, 383, 512; “Ansprache des Führers an
die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze,” IfZ, F 19/3;
“Ansprache des Führers vor Generalen und Offizieren am 22.6.1944 im Platterhof,” IfZ,
F 19/3; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die KransbergProtokolle, 108.
104. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 475.
105. OKM/M Att, gKdos., 7 May 1945, BA/MA, RM 7/854, 156. Hitler was not the
only one under illusions about the Battle of Berlin. The German commander in Italy,
General von Vietinghoff (another former Army Group Courland commander), was
unwilling to negotiate a surrender in Italy because he felt that most of his troops believed
Hitler's declaration that the Battle of Berlin would turn the tide of the war; Jürgen Förster,
"The Final Hour of the Third Reich: The Capitulation of the Wehrmacht," in 1945:
Consequences and Sequels of the Second World War (Paris: Institut d'histoire de temps
present, 1995), 78.
106. TBJG, 18 and 24 Jan. 1945, 15: 150, 210; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August
1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg- Protokolle, 85-86; Speer, Inside the Third Reich,
541.
107. TBJG, 16 Mar. 1945, 15: 520; Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won, 103.
108. For Hitler’s comparisons to the Kampfzeit, TBJG, 18 Apr. 1944, 4, 26 and 29 Jan.
1945, 12: 136, 15: 62, 232-33, 263-64. For comparisons to Stalin, ibid., 25 Jan., 6 and 8
Feb. 1945, 15: 218-19, 321, 337.
109. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power (Herbert Arnold
trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High
Command, 207.
110. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 717 and 1011, note 151; Weinberg, A World at Arms,
750.
111. Schulze-Wegener, Die deutsche Kriesgmarine Rüstung, 193-94.
112. Der Chef des technischem Amtes, “Niederschrift über die Besprechung beim Führer
am 22. März 1945,” BA/BL, R 3/1511, 29; Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 9 Feb.
1942, 275; Hitlers Tischgespräche, 28 July 1942, 474-75; Lagevorträge, 28 Sept. 1942,
31 May and 8 July 1943, 420-24, 511, 518; TBJG, 25 Jan., 14, 22 and 28 Mar. 1945, 15:
221, 505, 569-70, 618-19. On his hopes Speer, Infiltration, 143; Karl-Jesko von
Puttkamer, Die unheimliche See: Hitler und die Kriegsmarine (Munich: Kühne, 1952),
59; Below, Als Hitler Adjutant, 366, 379, 402; Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of FieldMarshal Albert Kesselring (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 239; Junge Bis zur letzten
Stunde, 171-72. Goebbels, who frequently echoed Hitler's beliefs, was also extremely
optimistic about the revival of the U-boat war; TBJG, 18 Jan., 13 Mar., 16 Apr., 8 June,
25 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1944, 8, 11, 18 and 31 Jan., 1, 6, 7, 9, 13 Mar. 1945, 11: 113-14, 464,
12: 114, 427, 14: 276-77, 369, 15: 88, 103, 145, 282, 389, 430, 436, 455, 494.
113. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 720, 755-57; Hancock, The National Socialist
Leadership and Total War, 157; TBJG, 4 Jan. 1945, 15: 53-56.
114. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm, 19-30.
Conclusions
1. Martin Blumenson, "Hitler versus his Generals in the West," Proceedings 82 (No. 12):
1281-87.
2. Speer, Infiltration, 100. Dönitz was quite intelligent as well. He scored a 138 on his
IQ test, which placed him in the 99th percentile, or very superior range. He therefore tied
for the third highest IQ of Nazis at Nuremberg; behind Schacht, who scored 143, SeyssInquart with 140 and Goering, who also had an IQ of 138; Eric Zillmer et al, The Quest
for Nazi Personality: A Psychological Investigation of Nazi War Criminals (Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 48.
3. As Eberhard Jäckel claims, "alone Hitler planned, alone he decided, alone he ruled;"
Jäckel, Hitler's World View, 83. Asked if Hitler made military decisions in conferences,
Jodl replied, “From the very first day on. All decisions that were of any importance were
made by him, himself;” Report 200a37, USSBS, Interview No. 62 Alfred Jodl, 29 June
1945, NA, RG 243, Entry 6, Box 1000. See also Speer, Infiltration, 6.
4. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 24; Franz Halder, "Decisions affecting the
Campaign in Russia (1941/42)," World War II German Military Studies, Vol. 15, MS# C067b, 8; Kurt Zeitzler, "General Critique of MS # P-041a-P-041ll and a report on the
September 1942-June 1944 Period," The German High Command, Reel 4, MS# P-041ii,
15.
5. Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 8, 17. Speer claims that Hitler told his generals he
could not give up Nikopol and Kriwoj Rog in the Ukraine, or permit the loss of Finland,
due to the need for manganese and nickel, even though Speer had recently informed
Hitler sufficient stocks were available; “Protokoll 1: Adolf Hitler (1 August 1945),”
Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 122; “Protokoll 8: Bedarf der Wehrmacht,
Programmgestaltung, Lieferungen vom Ausland, einschliesslich besetzte Gebiete (8
August 1945),” Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle, 386-87.
6. TBJG, entry for 27 July 1943, 9: 179. See also ibid., entry for 9 Mar. 1943, 7: 509.
7. Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command, 213-14.
8. "Im Uebrigen waren bei aller Schwere der Lage doch noch Gruende vorhanden, die zu
der Hoffnung auf einen Umschwung in letzter Stunde durchaus berechtigten. . . So kam
es fuer die Fuehrung darauf an, unter Konzentration aller Kraefte auf die wichtigsten
Aufgaben weiter durchzuhalten und auf Zeitgewinn zu arbeiten, bis die neuen
Kampfmittel zum Einsatz kommen konnten. In diesem Sinn wurde auch die
Kriegsmarine gefuehrt;" Dönitz, "Die deutsche Seekriegführung," 6 Aug. 1945, BA/MA,
RM 6/374, 56.
9. Ibid., 62.
10. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: Norton, 1999), 529-31. See
also Weinberg, A World at Arms, 477.
11. Weinberg dates this shift to an earlier period, to late 1943 or early 1944; Weinberg, A
World at Arms, 668-69.
12. On Kershaw’s failure to emphasize ideology sufficiently, especially during the war,
see the review by Peter Longerich, “Working Towards the Führer,”
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205426.pdf (accessed
2 Sept. 2006), 11-12, 14-15. The review was published in Yad Vashem Studies, 30
(2002): 405-426.
13. Herwig, Politics of Frustration, 192-93, 242, 259.
14. Bird, Raeder, xvii, 50-51, 213; Peifer, Three German Navies, 188-89.
15. Michael Salewski, “Das maritime Dritte Reich—Ideologie und Wirklichkeit 19331945” in Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik 1848-1985 (Deutsches Marine
Institut and Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt ed) (Herford: Mittler, 1985),” 125-27.
16. Bird, Raeder, 137. On Raeder’s acceptance of Nazism, see also Werner Rahn,
“Kriegführung, Politik und Krisen—Die Marine des Deutschen Reiches 1914-1933,” in
Die deutsche Flotte im Spannungsfeld der Politik, 79-80.
17. Salewski, “Das maritime Dritte Reich,” 127-29; Salewski, Die deutsche
Seekriegsleitung, 2; Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, 141-61, 211-12, 235.
18. Peifer, The Three German Navies, 58.
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